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PhD Thesis Summary –  
Ishan Mukherjee 
AGITATIONS, RIOTS AND THE TRANSITIONAL  
STATE IN CALCUTTA, 1945-50 
 
     The thesis examines the agitations and riots that broke out in Calcutta in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. Through a close analysis of local outbreaks of 
urban violence, it hopes to contribute to the understanding of decolonization in the 
subcontinent. It interrogates existing chronological and conceptual frameworks 
through which decolonization has been understood in the historiography of the region. 
At the same time, the study analyses the continuities and changes in the practices of 
the local state apparatus, especially the police, through the transition ‘from the 
colonial to the post-colonial’ regime in South Asia. The scope of the study is limited 
to incidents and experiences in Calcutta, although it attempts to take into account 
relevant issues at the regional and all-India level wherever possible. 
 
     The historiography of popular politics in South Asia is fairly unanimous in 
concluding that the immediate aftermath of the Second World War saw widespread 
‘anti-imperialist’ ‘cross-communal’ protests throughout the subcontinent. In this 
period, many argue, people of all religions came together for the last time to fight the 
colonial regime. However, this moment of communal unity was quickly lost as the 
subcontinent plunged into communal violence on an unprecedented scale. Incidents in 
Calcutta are believed to exhibit this pattern very clearly. In February 1946 the city 
witnessed large-scale protests against the conviction of Captain Rashid Ali of the 
Indian National Army. However, just six months later, Calcutta witnessed massive 
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communal riots. The Great Calcutta Killing of August 1946 set off the chain of 
communal violence across the subcontinent that ultimately precipitated the partition 
of British India into two mutually hostile post-colonial states of India and Pakistan. 
 
This thesis hopes to challenge some of these assumptions in the historiography of 
decolonization. It seeks to complicate this linear narrative by questioning the ‘cross-
communal’ dimension of the anti-colonial protests. It also argues that the outbreak of 
communal violence was not as sudden as has been assumed. Rather, communal 
tension often co-existed with periods of united anti-colonial agitations. 
 
     The thesis will also examine inter-community relations in the city in the very first 
years after independence. It will study how new minorities produced by the Indian 
nation state grappled with, and were affected by, the changed circumstances in 
Calcutta.  
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Glossary 
 
akhand  undivided 
anna   one-sixteenth of an Indian rupee 
ashram  hermitage 
badmash  ruffian 
bhadralok  gentlefolk  
bidi  hand-rolled cigarettes usually produced in household bases 
workshops 
bustee   tenement, slum 
cutcheri  office, usually of a zamindari or an indigenous business firm 
darga   Sufi shrine 
ghats   river-bank 
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hartal    strike  
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1 
Introduction 
 
     Bhanu Bose was a notorious member of Calcutta’s underworld – a goonda.1 He 
and his brother, Jagabandhu Bose, both loosely affiliated with the Congress Socialist 
Party, led a criminal gang in the jurisdiction of Muchipara thana2 in central Calcutta. 
During the agitation in February 1946 against the conviction of Rashid Ali of the In-
dian National Army (INA), he allegedly advised his men to kill police sergeants and 
sahebs. This, he explained, would ‘help us free India’. Armed with the confession of 
one of Bhanu’s followers, who had testified against him during interrogation, the po-
lice arrested him on 5 April 1946. Well-connected as Bhanu was, the police had to set 
him free in a matter of weeks.3 
 
     When Calcutta plunged into communal mayhem in August 1946, Bhanu’s name 
surfaced again in police records.4 He had allegedly struck up an alliance with other 
powerful goondas of the city to join the murderous spree against Muslims. He disap-
peared from official discussions soon thereafter, and it remains uncertain whether the 
police ever brought him to book for communal rioting. But he reappeared in police 
files immediately after India’s independence. In September 1947, Gandhi undertook a 
fast to bring an end to communal violence in Calcutta, urging the city’s underworld 
                                                 
1 For a definition of what colonial officials meant by the term ‘goonda’ in the 1940s, see India 
and Burma Committee – Indian Political Situation: Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
for India, 15 August 1945, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds.), The Transfer of 
Power, 1942-47: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, vol. VI, London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976, no. 28, pp. 70-71. Also see Suranjan Das and J.K. Ray, 
The Goondas: Towards a Reconstruction of the Calcutta Underworld, Calcutta: Firma 
K.L.M., 1996. 
2 A ‘thana’ is a police station. Derived from Indian vernaculars (both Hindusthani and Ben-
gali), it was incorporated within colonial English vocabulary. 
3 K.P.M. No. 01699/05, S.B. File No. 868 (D/7), P.M. (1946), Special Branch Records, Cal-
cutta Police. 
4 Ibid. 
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operators to surrender their arms. The Muchipara gang split. Jagabandhu Bose sub-
mitted himself to the Mahatma’s wishes; but Bhanu led a rebel faction and decided to 
defy Gandhi’s call.5 
 
     Figures like Bhanu Bose sit uncomfortably within Indian historiography, which 
continues to operate within a ‘nationalism’ versus ‘communalism’ binary. This re-
mains the case, despite many examples of individuals like Bhanu Bose who partici-
pated in a range of street actions that defy neat separation into either of these catego-
ries. This has serious consequences for how historians of popular politics have hith-
erto understood processes of decolonization in the subcontinent. 
 
     A consensus continues to exist among historians that the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War generated ‘cross-communal’ ‘anti-colonial’ fervour among the 
public at large. Sumit Sarkar has held that popular mobilization against the INA trials 
and the rebellion in the Royal Indian Navy were expressions of a post-war anti-
imperialist spirit. 6  Gautam Chattopadhyay has gone so far as to suggest that the 
Rashid Ali agitations, in which Bhanu Bose participated, constituted an ‘almost revo-
lution’.7 For Chattopadhyay, the mass enthusiasm evident in the agitation held out 
alternative possibilities of India’s post-colonial future, which, if taken to its logical 
conclusion, could have avoided the tragedy of partition. 
                                                 
5 K.P.M. No. 01488/05, S.B. File No. 506/48, P.M. (1947), Special Branch Records, Calcutta 
Police. 
6 Sumit Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership, 1945-47’, Economic and Po-
litical Weekly, vol. 17, no. 14/16, Annual Number, April, 1982, pp. 677-689. This article has 
been reprinted in Sumit Sarkar, A Critique of Colonial India, Calcutta: Papyrus, 1985. 
7 Gautam Chattopadhyay, ‘An Almost Revolution (A Case Study of India in February 1946)’ 
in Barun De (ed.), Essays in Honour of Prof. S.C. Sarkar, New Delhi: People’s Publishing 
House, 1976. Also see Gautam Chattopadhyay, ‘Bengal Students in Revolt against the Raj, 
1945-46’ in Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 
1945-46, New Delhi: Manohar, 1987.    
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     Sucheta Mahajan, while critiquing these upsurges as ‘premature’,8 agrees that a 
popular ‘anti-colonial’ mood was pervasive in the post-war period, expressed in small 
gestures of support for the nationalist cause expressed by all sections of people 
throughout the country. On the whole, then, a historiographical agreement prevails 
that the descent into partition violence was a sudden development. This trajectory of 
popular politics on the eve of India’s independence allegedly found most vivid ex-
pression in Calcutta, where communal violence ‘suddenly’ erupted in August 1946 
only months after the vigorous, even spectacular, ‘cross-communal’ and ‘anti-
colonial’ INA agitations. 
 
     This thesis challenges these long-held assumptions. It demonstrates how impossi-
ble it is to recover a pristine anti-colonial moment untainted by communal antagonism 
in the last years of colonial rule in India. Gyanendra Pandey has, of course, pointed 
towards the concurrent histories of nationalism and communalism, both being prod-
ucts of the ‘age of Reason and Capital’.9 He shows how nationalist and colonialist 
discourse on communalism overlapped and represented the phenomenon as national-
ism’s ‘other’. But elucidation of this entangled history of nationalism and communal-
ism in Pandey’s analysis remains at a discursive plane; the empirical case studies he 
uses to unpack the ‘construction of communalism’ remain confined to issues that had 
manifestly sectarian and divisive overtones. Pandey does not use cases that could be 
integrated into a historiography of any liberal-secular versions of Indian nationalism. 
In contrast, apart from studying processes of articulation, consolidation and  
                                                 
8 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000. 
9 Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Delhi: Ox-
ford University Press, 1990. 
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mobilization of unambiguously communal identities, this research also attempts to 
reassess some issues and events that have hitherto been narrated in historiography as 
part of India’s heritage of cross-communal anti-colonialism. It shows how their inte-
gration into nationalist historiography has only been made possible by oversight or 
suppression of aspects that would have rendered them unavailable for the mythologies 
of Indian nationalism.   
 
     This study, therefore, approaches the nationalism/communalism dichotomy with 
different methodologies and questions. It is based on a close examination of everyday 
state practices and the rich archival records that such practices have produced over a 
period of about five years, from the end of the Second World War to the first few 
years after independence. It examines in detail patterns of street mobilization and state 
action in urban Calcutta during these critical years. Moments of cross-communal soli-
darity notwithstanding, the study shows how communal antagonism had become 
ubiquitous, both in spectacular street action and in everyday life, during the last days 
of the Raj. 
 
 
The Historiography of ‘Mobilization’: 
 
     The historiography of Indian politics has produced a substantial body of sophisti-
cated literature on ‘popular mobilization’. However, despite reformulations over time, 
this literature continues to remain structured by the nationalism/communalism binary. 
 
5 
     In nationalist historiography, popular mobilization in support of nationalist causes 
is presented as the result of a spontaneous reaction to colonial oppressions. The Indian 
National Congress, being the largest nationalist organization, was the automatic 
choice for large sections of Indians who instinctively rallied around Congress leaders 
when called to action to free the nation from colonial rule.10 Communal mobilization, 
in this framework, is the result of certain sections of people being ‘misled’ by self-
seeking leaders of opportunist parties patronized by the British as part of their ‘divide-
and-rule’ policy.11 
 
     At the other end of the spectrum are historians who have projected nationalist mo-
bilizations primarily as pursuit of self-interest by local elites who strategically mobi-
lized their social subordinates through patron-client relationships and aligned with 
provincial and all-India leaders to achieve their own ends. The tall leaders of the na-
tionalist movement co-opted such parochial and self-seeking local ‘subcontractors’ 
for their own agenda, producing large-scale mass movements that appeared to be uni-
fied over a national cause only when observed superficially from a distance. Of 
course, this historiography varies considerably in range and sophistication. Older 
studies, such as those of Judith Brown12 and the early work of Anil Seal,13 take a 
largely top-down view of political mobilizations, often reducing these to the result of 
                                                 
10 Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan and K.N. Panik-
kar, India’s Struggle for Independence, New Delhi: Viking, 1988. Also see Bipan Chandra, 
Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1981. For a spe-
cific discussion of mobilizations in the late colonial period, see Mahajan, Independence and 
Partition. 
11 Ibid. Also see Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India, New Delhi: Vikas, 1984. 
12 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1972; Judith M. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Ma-
hatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.  
13 Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the 
Later Nineteenth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. 
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frustrations and competitions among different types of educated elites perusing their 
disparate self-interested ends. Latterly, the ‘new Cambridge school’ has produced 
very sophisticated studies of local power dynamics, showing how these were mobi-
lized for larger movements and associations at provincial and all-India levels, and re-
vealing their links with the changing structures of colonial governance.14 Scholars 
working within this framework have rarely studied communal mobilizations specifi-
cally; but when they did so, these were explained as another instance of cobbling to-
gether disparate grievances and objectives to further elite interests.15 
 
     Rejecting both the above trends in Indian historiography for their ‘elitist’ biases, 
some scholars have attempted to recover patterns of ‘subaltern consciousness’ in the 
vast numbers of disempowered unlettered masses.16 These scholars argued for a do-
main of political consciousness and mobilizational potential of the subalterns that 
even while drawing upon elements of elite politics, remained autonomous from it.17 
                                                 
14 See, especially, the essays in two edited volumes: John Gallaghar, Gordon Johnson and 
Anil Seal (eds.), Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870 to 1940 (Re-
printed from Modern Asian Studies), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973; Christo-
pher Baker, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal (eds.), Power, Profit and Politics: Essays on Im-
perialism, Nationalism and Change in Twentieth Century India (Reprinted from Modern 
Asian Studies), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.  
15 This is at least one reading of Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim 
League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
16 For a manifesto-like presentation of the Subaltern Studies project, see Ranajit Guha, ‘On 
Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Stud-
ies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1982. Also see Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, 
Delhi; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983. For an earlier study of Congress mobilization 
along similar lines, but prior to the launch of the Subaltern Studies project, see Gyanendra 
Pandey, The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-34: A Study in Imperfect 
Mobilization, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
17 For example, some of these scholars have shown how Gandhi was reconfigured in ‘subal-
tern consciousness’ to produce idioms of politics that had nothing to do with what Gandhi 
thought, said or did. See Shahid Amin, ‘Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 
1921-2’ in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies III: Writings on South Asian History and 
Society, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984; David Hardiman, ‘Adivasi Assertion in 
South Gujarat: The Devi Movement’, ibid. Also see their individual works for the elaboration 
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This strand of historiography has produced invaluable insights into the world of sym-
bols, myths and rumours that constituted a rich repertoire of politics and energized 
vast sections of people into mass action. However, its outright dismissal of all under-
standings of popular politics in earlier historiography undermined the wider explana-
tory powers of their framework.18 For example, rejecting the value of studying strate-
gic political alignments with ‘elite’ politics completely has invariably left out entirely 
the plausible explanations of mass action that could at least complicate straightfor-
ward ‘initiative from below’ approaches to mobilizations.19 This thesis has gained 
considerably from the emphasis on symbols and signifiers for mass politics, but com-
bines these insights with efforts at delineating possible structures of strategic align-
ments and antagonisms, in terms of factions, party-political rivalries, networks of loy-
alty, and perceptions of interests. Leaving the latter domain out, this thesis argues, 
would amount to overlooking valuable historical material that can provide nuanced 
understandings of political processes and act as correctives to romanticisms and or-
thodoxies of much of older historiographies. 
      
     With the exception of Gyanendra Pandey, few Subaltern Studies scholars have 
really investigated patterns of communal consciousness and mobilization.20 It seems 
                                                                                                                                            
of similar themes: Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992, 
Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; David Hardiman, The Coming of the Devi: 
Adivasi Assertion in Western India, Delhi; Oxford University Press, 1987.  
18 See Guha, ‘On Some Aspects’; David Hardiman, ‘The Indian ‘Faction’: A Political Theory 
Examined’ in Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies I. 
19 See, for example, the following collection of essays containing some of the most influential 
critiques of the Subaltern Studies project: Vinayak Chaturvedi (ed.), Mapping Subaltern Stud-
ies and the Postcolonial, London: Verso, 2000. Also, Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Imperial 
Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, c. 1850-1950, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 (especially chapter 8).   
20 Much of Pandey’s works on the evolution of communalism in North India scattered in vari-
ous journals and in the Subaltern Studies volumes have been brought together, elaborated and 
reworked by him in Pandey, The Construction of Communalism. For his investigations of par-
 
8 
more useful, in fact, to read Pandey’s writings alongside those of other scholars of 
communalism who have highlighted the role of performative practices and rituals in 
public arenas for collective action along communal lines, and examined specific mo-
tifs and symbols around which communal antagonisms coalesced. Thus, a range of 
imaginaries, signifiers and symbolic actions – such as conceptions of sacred spaces, 
cow-slaughter, music before mosques, religious conversions, rape and abduction of 
women – have been foregrounded as typical sites for the constitution and mobilization 
of communal identity.21 This thesis has sought to examine how such images and sym-
bolic practices appear in the historical evidence on communal mobilizations in Cal-
cutta during the last years of the Raj; but it foregrounds other important symbols and 
slogans that are not seen as part of the usual repertoire of communal politics. In fact, 
some of these are seen as more congruent with nationalist rhetoric. This thesis shows, 
for example, how enthusiasm for Hindu-Muslim unity, counter-intuitively, produced a 
range of street actions that were reflective of Hindu-Muslim animosity. In fact, Hindu 
communal propaganda often used this rhetoric to portray Muslims as saboteurs of the 
project of national unity, while Muslim propagandists projected it as a Hindu conspir-
acy to deprive Muslims of their legitimate political and socio-economic demands. 
 
     In examining communal discourses and the actions these precipitated, this thesis 
argues for the need to interrogate the activities of a wider range of participants beyond 
                                                                                                                                            
tition violence, see Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and 
History in India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.  
21 Particularly influential has been the works of Freitag. See Sandria B. Freitag, Collective 
Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989; Sandria B. Freitag, ‘Sacred Symbol as Mobi-
lizing Ideology: The North Indian Search for a “Hindu” Community, Comparative Studies in 
History and Society, vol. 22, no. 4, 1980. Also see Anand Yang, ‘Sacred Symbol and Sacred 
Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in the “Anti-cow killing” Riot of 1893’, Com-
parative Studies in Society and History, vol. 22, no. 4, 1980. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis 
contains detailed references of works on communal mobilizations and violence. 
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affiliates of communal bodies or sections within the Congress. It shows that even left-
wing organizations and individuals associated with them often played active roles in 
whipping up or promoting communal frenzy. In a rich account of Hindu nationalist 
politics in UP (United Provinces, which later became Uttar Pradesh after independ-
ence), William Gould has explored how socialist leaders easily navigated between the 
Congress and Hindu nationalist organizations.22 He points out that by the 1930s, there 
was a formal ban on members of the Congress simultaneously holding membership of 
the Hindu Mahasabha; however, this did not prevent even prominent Congress social-
ists in various urban centres of UP from maintaining close links with Hindu commu-
nal outfits, or championing Hindu revivalist causes. Such contradictory dispositions 
were not merely about strategically exploiting multiple political affiliations for selfish 
ends, but were often backed by elaborate intellectual efforts at bringing together so-
cialist radicalism and elements of ‘Hindu thought’. This thesis studies somewhat simi-
lar cases of involvement of leaders and cadres of various socialist and left-wing out-
fits in Hindu communal activities. However, in the context of heightened communal 
tensions in Calcutta by the late 1940s, little intellectual effort seems to have been ex-
pended by such socialist radicals to justify their championing of communal causes.  
 
     While some of the mobilizing rhetoric discussed in the thesis have long been part 
of the repertoire of Indian politics, some were specific to the late-colonial and early 
post-colonial period. This necessitates a discussion of the temporal span this thesis 
covers and the ways in which this period has been labelled by historians.       
   
                                                 
22 William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
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Dilemmas of ‘Naming’ the Process of British Withdrawal: 
 
     Disagreements abound about how to label the historical process that led to British 
disengagement from the subcontinent. Some have called it a ‘transfer of power’.23 
Others have described it as ‘decolonization’. Several scholars insist that it should be 
understood as ‘freedom’ or ‘independence’. 24  At the risk of over-simplification, 
‘transfer of power’ is the preferred label of those taking a metropolitan perspective. 
Objections to this description are that it portrays the process of British withdrawal 
from India as a product of peaceful negotiations by elites at the top. ‘Freedom’ or ‘in-
dependence’ is the preferred choice of nationalist historiography (with all its internal 
variations), which insists upon the role of ‘India’s struggle for independence’ in forc-
ing Britain to quit India. The problem with this perspective lies in its romanticization 
of the ‘nationalist struggle’ that papers over internal contradictions, splits and dis-
agreements, and marginalizes alternative forms of politics. It is also teleological, as 
most versions present a linear narrative of growing ‘nationalist consciousness’ inexo-
rably progressing towards eventual triumph. Both descriptions – ‘transfer of power’ 
and ‘freedom’ (or ‘independence’) – are, therefore, extreme positions, describing two 
opposing views about what exactly happened in the subcontinent in the second half of 
the 1940s. 
                                                 
23 This debate was precipitated with a multi-volume compilation of primary material relating 
to developments in the 1940s mainly from the India Office records in London. Nicholas Man-
sergh and Penderel Moon (eds.), The Transfer of Power, 1942-47: Constitutional Relations 
between Britain and India, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, vols. I – XII, 1970-
1983. 
24 Another multi-volume compilation of primary material pertaining to developments in India 
in the late 1930s and 1940s was published from New Delhi under the title: Towards Freedom: 
Documents on the Movement for Independence in India, New Delhi: Indian Council of His-
torical Research and Oxford University Press, 1985-2015. Also see Bipan Chandra, Mridula 
Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, K.N. Panikkar, Sucheta Mahajan, India’s Struggle for Inde-
pendence, New Delhi: Penguin, 1988; Mahajan, Independence and Partition.    
11 
     The implications of using the term ‘decolonization’ remain ambiguous. Despite its 
currency in recent scholarship,25 Dipesh Chakrabarty has called for its rejection.26 
According to Chakrabarty, it is bound to produce a ‘totalizing model’ emphasizing a 
complete rupture with colonialism. He argues that the journey of societies and nations 
‘from the colonial to the post-colonial’ involves a process in which ‘the colonizer and 
the colonized were often engaged in a hybridizing encounter’.27 A clinical break with 
colonialism, which decolonization inevitably implies according to Chakrabarty, is un-
sustainable given the ‘colonizing tendencies’ of the post-colonial nation states of 
South Asia. This became evident, Chakrabarty asserts, right from the moment ‘anti-
colonial nationalism’ mutated into ‘official nationalism’ in these countries.28 Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay, however, has distinguished between two ‘visions’ of decolonization 
– the ‘commonwealth vision’ and, what one might call, a bottom-up vision.29 He has 
rejected the first because it is elitist, statist and marked by a deep metropolitan bias. 
He has endorsed the second vision of decolonization, which he has used to explore 
how post-colonial societies creatively imagined their new decolonized existence as 
citizens of a free nation-state. 
 
     This thesis is not particularly interested in this debate about labels, none of which 
do justice to the complexity of the changes in the subcontinent in this period. It is spe-
                                                 
25 Two ‘decolonization’ readers have been particularly popular among scholars of India in 
recent times: Prasenjit Duara (ed.), Decolonization: Perspectives form Then and Now, New 
York and London, 2004; James D. Le Sueur (ed.), The Decolonization Reader, New York and 
London: Routledge, 2003. 
26 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Introduction: From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Paki-
stan in Transition’, in Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar and Andrew Sartori (eds.), 
From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
27 Ibid., p. 3. 
28 Ibid., p. 7. 
29 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Decolonization in South Asia: Meanings of Freedom in Post-
Independence West Bengal, 1947-52, London and New York: Routledge, 2009. 
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cifically concerned with how, amidst this transition from the colonial to the post-
colonial condition, the institutions of the state intervened in social conflicts – during 
both ‘anti-imperialist’ agitations and ‘communal’ violence. It is satisfied, therefore, to 
characterize the dynamics of government practices during this period as a ‘transitional 
state’. It does not aim to provide a general account of the effects of these transitions 
on state-society relations, however. The ‘transition’ that characterized the eclipse of 
empire and the emergence of the nation-state in India, this thesis argues, had specific 
implications for practices of state intervention in Indian society. 
 
 
Chronological Framing of the Thesis: 
 
     This thesis attempts to study the transition from the colonial to the post-colonial 
situation over a relatively narrow time frame of about five years, beginning with the 
end of the Second World War in 1945 and extending up to early 1950. It recognizes 
the value of longue duree studies in identifying broad patterns and periodic shifts in 
colonial policy leading up to the British withdrawal. However, this study is preoccu-
pied with delineating deeper nuances in the changing dynamic of state-society rela-
tions that the immediate context of imperial withdrawal brought about. An intense 
focus over a shorter period – covering the eve and the immediate aftermath of the 
formal-constitutional termination of colonial rule in August 1947 – seems better 
suited for the purpose. 
 
     The end of the Second World War marked a distinct shift in Britain’s policy to-
wards India. Before the end of the War, every initiative of the colonial government 
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was directed towards devising the best possible arrangement for retaining British con-
trol over the subcontinent. Ever since the East India Company’s ‘Indian possessions’ 
were taken over by the British Crown in 1857, constitutional reforms at periodic in-
tervals ensured rearrangements of power relations to suit the changing needs of the 
colonial administration, enabling it to adjust to growing pressures from the society it 
governed. Even the Government of India Act of 1937 – the last constitutional reform 
in British India – was deeply concerned with retaining the ultimate reins of govern-
ment in British hands. For the colonial administration, the Act only entailed a retreat 
to a powerful all-India centre, even though it involved substantial devolution of pow-
ers to elected political leaders in the provinces. However, everything changed when 
the Second World War came to an end. The Labour government that assumed power 
in war-weary Britain was clear about its intention of withdrawing from the subconti-
nent at the earliest opportunity. Colonial policy, therefore, for the first time, came to 
be preoccupied with determining the best way of quitting India. This brought about a 
sea change not only in British attitude towards India’s future, but also in  the political 
climate of the subcontinent. The pressing question in Indian politics was no longer 
about how to drive the British away, ready as the British were to beat a retreat. It now 
involved debates about India’s future once the British rulers were gone, and who 
should inherit control over the institutions of government the British had created. This 
decisive shift in the imperial government’s attitude towards India and the concomitant 
change in the directions of Indian politics forms the context with which this thesis be-
gins its study. 
 
     The purpose of ending the thesis in 1950 is more tentative. Practical concerns have 
helped shape this decision. The kinds of archival material that form the backbone of 
14 
the thesis – the local intelligence sources of Calcutta Police, for example – dry up by 
the 1950s both in terms of volume as well as in richness of content. Chronologically, 
extending the study further would have involved reliance on other kinds of sources. 
Rewarding as that may have been, difference in the nature of sources would have in-
variably created problems of comparison with the earlier phases covered in this thesis, 
compromising its overall narrative and analytical unity. The second reason is that 
early 1950 witnessed a contrast that makes for an interesting note on which to end the 
thesis. As independent India adopted the world’s longest written constitution, em-
bodying supposedly the best and the most liberal values of the times, it witnessed a 
fresh wave of Hindu-Muslim violence. Calcutta, again, was one of the main theatres 
of this anticlimax. Ending the thesis at this point, on a somewhat ironical note, serves 
to emphasize the difficulty of identifying a precise date when the process of decoloni-
zation can be held to have been completed. 
 
 
The Colonial State in Transition: 
      
     Through a close examination of how the local state apparatus intervened in social 
conflicts, this thesis aims to study how state institutions and practices at the local level 
responded to the larger processes of imperial withdrawal and nation-state formation. 
This requires situating the study in the historiography of the nature of the state in co-
lonial and early post-colonial India. Scholarly opinion has always been sharply di-
vided on the issue. Some argue that the colonial state had struck deep roots in Indian 
soil, changing the nature of Indian society beyond recognition. Others believe that the 
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colonial state was satisfied with leaving Indian society to its own devices so long as 
certain imperial demands were met.30 
 
Intrusive State: 
 
     The argument about the intrusive nature of the colonial state has had a long career, 
beginning with nationalist scholarship on the nature of colonialism. Nationalists have 
depicted the colonial state as a highly exploitative machine that drove deep into In-
dian society to extract as much resources as possible. This ensured steady immiseriza-
tion of the Indian economy and society, robbing it of all its vitality.31 The colonial 
state’s ideological apparatus, however, was seen as rather weak. The blatant oppres-
sions and discriminations that supposedly characterized colonial rule is believed to 
have exposed its anti-Indian character early on, so that the spirit of national resistance 
emerged spontaneously among Indians from the very beginning, waiting to be tapped 
by the nationalist leaders. Such a framework enabled nationalist historians to rehabili-
tate all forms of resistance – rebellions led by local notables, activities of group-
specific local associations, peasant movements, and tribal uprisings – within the 
metanarrative of Indian nationalism’s heroic struggle against alien rule, leading the 
masses to eventual triumph32. 
 
                                                 
30 For a brief but pointed discussion on the historiography of the nature of the colonial state in 
British India, see Taylor C. Sherman, State Violence and Punishment in India, London; New 
York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 1-4. 
31 For a classic statement on colonial economic exploitation and its links with the evolution of 
the Indian nationalist movement in nationalist historiography, see Bipan Chandra, The Rise 
and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of Indian National Lead-
ership, 1880-1905, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1966. 
32 Chandra et al, India’s Struggle for Independence; Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism. 
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     Other steams of historical writing also argued for a deeply transformative impact 
of the colonial state apparatus on Indian society. Scholars working within the Subal-
tern Studies framework argued for an autonomous consciousness of the Indian masses 
that stood at variance with the elite nationalist leadership.33 They insisted that the co-
lonial state reached deep into the Indian social fabric by transforming the power rela-
tions that operated within colonial society. It was not so much of the bureaucratic ap-
paratus of the colonial state itself reaching all the way down to the local level; it was 
the social institutions and relations of production that colonialism either created or 
transformed beyond recognition, which dramatically reshaped Indian lives.34 
      
     The most far-reaching impact of colonial rule, argued Ranajit Guha, was orches-
trated by a radical restructuring of land relations that established the Raj as a ‘rule of 
property’ in the subcontinent.35 Keen to identify and fix ownership of land in the 
quest for squeezing out maximum possible revenue, the British created a new regime 
of landed property that not only tolerated older feudal-type exploitation, but reinvigo-
rated them with active support of the state. The recasting of land-ownership as bour-
geois ‘property’ rights superimposed newer structures of oppression onto earlier 
forms. As older ‘local despots’ replaced new ones, mahajans and banias entered agrar-
ian land markets, ushering in an altogether new structure of oppression that combined 
rentier exploitation with usury, ultimately backed up by the authority of the colonial 
                                                 
33 For a programmatic announcement of the ‘Subaltern Studies’ agenda, see Guha, ‘On Some 
Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India’.  
34 See Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Durham; 
London: Duke University Press, 1999 (first published 1983). 
35 This argument was first developed in Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Es-
say on the Idea of Permanent Settlement, Durham; London: Duke University Press, 1996 
(first published 1963).  
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state.36 By the time depredations of the new landed elites became too obvious to ig-
nore, and the colonial state was left with no choice but to take some remedial action, it 
was unable to do anything substantial. Its local functionaries ‘served as instruments of 
landlord authority’ and its legal system was readily available for manipulation ‘by 
court officials and lawyers in favour of landlordism’.37 Thus emerged the ‘Sarkar Sa-
hukar Zamindar’ model as the dominant framework in early subaltern studies scholar-
ship for explaining colonial exploitation, the tentacles of which supposedly reached 
down to the lowest levels of Indian society.38 
 
     Subsequently, Ranajit Guha developed a more theoretically ambitious framework 
for understanding the nature of the colonial state.39 Drawing upon Antonio Gramsci’s 
formulations,40 Guha argued that all states rule the societies they govern through a 
range of modalities that encompasses both coercion and persuasion. However, a rul-
ing authority constitutes itself as ‘hegemonic’ only when its use of persuasion exceeds 
that of coercion. Colonial rule, Guha insisted, articulated its authority overwhelmingly 
through coercive means, while its reliance on persuasion remained marginal to its 
                                                 
36 Guha, Elementary Aspects, pp. 6-8. 
37 Ibid, p. 7 
38 ‘Sarkar, Sahukar, Zamindar’ exploitation as the typical form of colonial oppression in India 
were explored through several essays in the early volumes of Subaltern Studies. There are, 
however, few articles that directly address the nature of the state, among which must be 
counted: Ranajit Guha, ‘The Prose of Counter-insurgency’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern 
Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1983; Upendra Baxi, ‘“The State’s Emissary”: The Place of Law in Subaltern Studies’, in Par-
tha Chatterjee and Gyan Pandey (eds.), Subaltern Studies VII: Writings on South Asian His-
tory and Society, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992; Vivek Dhareshwar and R. Srivatsan, 
‘“Rowdy-sheeters”: An Essay on Subalternity and Politics’, in Shahid Amin and Dipesh 
Chakrabarty (eds.), Subaltern Studies IX: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1996. 
39 Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India, Cam-
bridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1997.  
40 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, (trans. Joseph A Buttigieg), New York: Columbia 
University press, 2011. 
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functioning. He went on, therefore, to describe British rule in India as ‘dominance 
without hegemony’. Corollary to this formulation was the assertion that the colonial 
state was able to dominate Indian society, and hence penetrate deep into the social 
fabric, largely without bothering to persuade its subject population to give their con-
sent to colonial rule. Nevertheless, Guha’s observations on the nature of colonial gov-
ernment was not based on an empirical evaluation of the actual functioning of the 
state; his object of investigation was the nature of colonial knowledge production and 
the deployment of a discourse of history that, according to him, unleashed ‘spiritual 
violence’ upon the Indian subjects. 
 
     The shift towards the study of colonial knowledge production and discourse in the 
analysis of the colonial state and its functioning began, therefore, under the influence 
of Guha as well as a genre of historical anthropology pioneered by Bernard Cohn.41 
However, this historiographical move entrenched itself more firmly with the populari-
zation of Michel Foucault’s critiques of modern power his ideas about ‘governmental-
ity’,42 Henri Lefebvre’s spatial analysis43 and Edward Said’s theorization of ‘oriental-
ism’ as a form of colonialist knowledge.44 These influences produced a series of stud-
ies on colonialism, focusing mainly on the nineteenth century and the early decades of 
                                                 
41 Bernard S. Cohn, An Anthropologist among Historians and Other Essays, Delhi; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987; Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: 
The British in India, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.  
42 See Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
43  Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, (trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith), Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991. 
44 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985. 
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the twentieth century, that projected the colonial state as a highly intrusive machine 
that fundamentally reconfigured Indian society.45 
 
Limited State: 
 
     Some historians, however, challenged the characterization of the colonial state as a 
highly invasive form of government and remained skeptical of the ability and willing-
ness of the state to strike deep roots in Indian society and transform it in the process. 
 
     Inaugurating what has come to be called the ‘New Cambridge School’ thesis, Anil 
Seal argued that imperialism was driven by impulses of power as well as profit.46 This 
meant that expenditure incurred in the quest for power could not be allowed to dimin-
ish the quantum of profit that the authorities wanted to extract from India. Lowering 
the cost of administration was, therefore, a key concern for the colonial government, 
which prompted them to seek out cheap allies in the localities. Such transactions in-
                                                 
45 The ‘intrusive state’ thesis has been worked out in the context of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in a number of highly influential works. For a discussion of the growing 
intrusive and transformative potential of the prison system in British India, see Satadru Sen, 
Disciplining Punishment: Colonialism and Convict Society in the Andaman Islands, Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2000. For developments in the domain of science and medicine, see 
Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India, Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999; David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine 
and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth Century India, Berkeley: University f California Press, 
1993. For a discussion of how the colonial state penetrated Indian society through colonial 
knowledge production and caste, see Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the 
Making of Modern India, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. For an account of 
spatial dominance, see Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to Na-
tional Space, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004. On colonial forestry, see K. Siva-
ramakrishnan, Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern 
India, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999; for a study of governmentality in a city 
space, see Stephen Legg, Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi’s Urban Governmentalities, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 
46 Anil Seal, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism in India’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 
1973, pp. 321-347. In his conception of imperialism, Seal was drawing upon an earlier thesis: 
John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘An Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History 
Review, New Series, vol. 6, no. 1, 1953, pp. 1-15.  
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volved a political bargain which assured the authorities of low-cost revenue collection 
and preservation of order in the localities provided the state allowed its collaborators 
ample freedom in local affairs. This, Seal contended, amounted to a situation where 
‘the British were winking at the existence of a legal underworld where the private jus-
tice of faction settled conflicts with the blows of lathis, or where, at the best, the 
strong could get their own way in the courts’.47 In time, however, increase in demands 
for revenue from India on the behest of Britain’s expanding global ambitions necessi-
tated greater intervention in local autonomy. But these were balanced out by creating 
new institutions from mid-nineteenth century onwards, and introducing systems of 
nomination, representation and election in them. In effect, this was an effort at ‘cast-
ing wider nets to find collaborators’,48 who could be harnessed to Britain’s imperial 
ends. However, to ensure that these new institutions worked within the framework 
provided by government, colonial rule introduced new categories and classifications; 
this ensured that even in matters where Indians were given a free hand, they now had 
to express themselves only through governmental categories in their dealings with the 
state. Such developments, Seal argued, eventually ‘ruptured’ the autonomy of regions 
and localities, but did so in ways that allowed the state to economize on administra-
tive costs by leaving local initiative in the hands of Indian collaborators. 49 What 
emerges from this description is an image of the colonial state having to grant consid-
erable autonomy to Indian collaborators in the locality to satisfy demands made upon 
it by the British imperial system. The mechanisms devised to channelize Indian initia-
tive may have varied over time, but, structurally, the colonial state retained these fea-
tures all through its Indian career. 
                                                 
47 Seal, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism’, p. 328. 
48 Ibid, p. 333. 
49 Ibid, p. 329. 
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     This framework was carefully worked out over two edited volumes through a se-
ries of essays.50 Though the central concern of most of these studies was to explicate 
the dynamics of Indian politics as it traversed the local, provincial and national do-
mains, they worked with, implicitly and explicitly, the notion of the colonial state de-
lineated by Seal. Subsequently, efforts were made to nuance the understanding of the 
state by drawing attention to temporal shifts, largely postulating a growing intrusive-
ness of its institutions over time.51 But studies of specific localities revealed large 
domains of autonomy that Indian collaborators continued to enjoy well into the twen-
tieth century.52 
   
Revaluating the Late-Colonial and Early Post-Colonial State:    
      
     Despite all the differences between those who believed in the intrusive nature of 
the colonial state and those who argued for its limited reach, there seemed to be an 
apparent agreement. There seemed to be a consensus that, over time, the colonial state 
had been able to intervene in Indian society to a much greater extent. At least by the 
last decade of its existence, it was believed, the Raj had been able to reach deeper into 
Indian social life. This idea was subsequently elaborated mainly by political scientists 
who began studying the nature of the post-colonial state in India.53 Despite the initial 
                                                 
50 Gallagher and Seal (eds.), Locality Province and Nation; Baker, Johnson and Seal (eds.), 
Power, Profit and Politics. 
51 See, especially, David Washbrook, ‘Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India’, 
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, no. 3, 1981. 
52 See, for example, Anand A. Yang, The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, 
Saran District, 1793-1920, Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 
1989. 
53 See, for example, Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990; Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India, London: Penguin 
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2000.   
22 
turmoil created by partition and the birth-pangs of the new nation, many scholars ar-
gued, the Nehruvian state was able to restore the state machinery to health and effi-
ciency within a short time; it was able to generate enough consensus for greater pene-
tration in the socio-economic life of its citizens; large-scale hydro-electric and indus-
trial projects driven by state initiative were seen as testimony to the early post-
colonial state’s abilities and achievements.54 Considerable attention was devoted to 
how this had come about and the class interests that the state machinery came to ar-
ticulate. An influential strand within Indian Marxism came to characterize the early 
post-colonial state in terms of a ‘coalition’ of class forces – comprising the landed 
magnates, the bourgeois capitalists and the bureaucratic-managerial elites – with no 
single class being able to dominate the governmental apparatus.55 This, they postu-
lated, gave the Indian state a degree of autonomy to intervene and restructure Indian 
society and economy in fundamental ways. 
      
     However, there were others who were simultaneously drawing attention to a deep-
ening crisis of governance in India. Soon, political analysts turned towards the theme 
                                                 
54 For historically grounded studies of these processes, see Ramchandra Guha, India After 
Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, London: Macmillan, 2007. Also, for 
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of ‘ungovernability’, lamenting not just general lawlessness in public life but also 
rampant corruption and coercion perpetrated by state functionaries.56 These became 
difficult to ignore since at least the 1980s, with a resurgence in secessionist and ethno-
religious violence, matched by increasing instances of ‘excesses’ committed by the 
coercive arms of government. State personnel seemed to take sides openly in situa-
tions of civic strife; they often appeared to be acting as agents of dominant groups.57 
 
     Searching for roots of the crisis, however, has made scholars revaluate some of the 
assumptions of the historiography of the colonial state, especially its last phase. An 
influential strand characterized the growing disregard for formal-legal procedures in 
dealings between the state and its citizens as a deepening of democracy and, counter-
intuitively, the successes of the democratization process in post-colonial India.58 Oth-
ers have been less optimistic. A growing scholarship on the ‘everyday state’ has come 
to argue that the crisis represents the continuation of practices pioneered by colonial 
statecraft, which has been rendered unmanageable by its entanglements with democ-
ratic procedures. The foremost exponent of the latter thesis is Rajnarayan Chanda-
varkar, whose essay on ‘customs of governance’ has been seminal to a range of new 
                                                 
56 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
57 This increasingly expanding literature includes, for example, A.R. Desai (ed.), Expanding 
Governmental Lawlessness and Organized Struggles: Violation of Democratic Rights of Mi-
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studies engaged in rethinking the nature of the late-colonial and early post-colonial 
state in South Asia.59 
 
     Unwilling to invest in good governance, argued Chandavarkar, the colonial ap-
proach to public order involved a regime of ‘salutary neglect’. This meant that the 
state was interested only in maintaining a façade of peace over a range of social con-
flicts, which were ‘abandoned to the disciplinary mechanisms of local structures of 
power’. 60  But such power structures seldom proved resilient. Local conflicts fre-
quently erupted with enough vehemence to blow away the illusion of order. Increas-
ing demands on government for the preservation of peace, therefore, led to the crea-
tion of a bureaucratic and policing structure; but these often fell far short of the task. 
Colonial policing therefore chose to concentrate on selected targets while leaving out 
vast domains of social conflict to be resolved through informal power networks of the 
neighbourhood. But when the veil of order blew away, the policing apparatus, true to 
its military antecedents, responded with spectacular violence. This became increas-
ingly apparent with the growing strength of mass mobilizations in the 1920s and 
1930s and the deepening self-perception among state functionaries of its own inade-
quacy and vulnerability. At the same time, however, the ingrained ‘habits and cus-
toms of governance’ produced powerful images of the state standing aloof from and 
above the sociopolitical realm. The high-handed language of adjudication and conces-
sion that state officials deployed produced the illusion of the state’s abstraction from 
society as ‘pre-given’, while managing competing and conflicting interests from an 
elevated pedestal. 
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60 Ibid, p. 449. 
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     By the late 1930s, introduction of elections on a wider scale with an expanded 
franchise pushed local-power dynamics up the tiers of government hierarchy. The re-
sult was that local power struggles, so long circumscribed within the locality, perme-
ated the entire state apparatus. Leaders dependent on local support and influence had 
little interest in ensuring the rule of law when their local dominance was threatened, 
often using their influence over the coercive machinery to shore up their power. On 
the other hand, as David Washbrook has pointed out, Indian elected leaders who func-
tioned within the colonial autocratic framework of government, were always seen by 
the British authorities as representatives of mere factional, particularist or sectional 
interests. British ruling ideology conceived of good government essentially as rule of 
an enlightened executive imbued with a ‘service ideology’. 61 Therefore, partly to 
counter the supposedly adverse impact of representative government, and partly pro-
pelled by historical contingencies such as the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
executive arm of the state was strengthened with exceptional and arbitrary powers. 
This is the machinery that the nation state came to inherit after independence. The 
new regime of universal franchise it inaugurated created a peculiar imbalance: the 
idea of popular sovereignty which projected elected governments as ‘servants’ of the 
people sat awkwardly alongside the belief in the necessity of extraordinary executive 
power that is free from popular pressures. Chandavarkar suggested that the crisis of 
government in the post-colonial era has to be understood historically as the unfolding 
of this colonial inheritance. While democratic processes pushed local conflicts up to 
the highest levels of government, reliance on executive action led to an unprecedented 
elaboration of bureaucratic structures, completely irresponsive to popular mandates. 
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These insights, stated with sweeping brush-strokes by Chandavarkar, stimulated sub-
sequent research on the nature of state power and its relation to society during the 
transition from the colonial to the post-colonial period in South Asia. 
 
     Arguing that the twentieth-century state in India was ‘vulnerable, fluid and replete 
with tension’,62 Taylor C. Sherman has put forward the notion of the ‘coercive net-
work’ to understand the state’s quotidian functioning. Charting practices of govern-
ance from the Jallianwala Bagh incident in 1919 to the ‘police action’ and counter-
insurgency operations in Hyderabad in the 1950s, Sherman has shown how the every-
day state constantly adapted to the changing political climate in India. Far from arbi-
trary sanctions of the state being progressively replaced by rational, streamlined penal 
practices – involving formal arrests by the police, impartial trials and convictions by 
the courts and reforms in prisons – the twentieth century state relied heavily on ‘penal 
shortcuts’. 63  ‘Informal, extra-judicial, violent and collective punishments’, 64  often 
tangentially linked to the formal criminal justice system, remained the corner-stone of 
the penal regime; sanctions were often imposed by ‘intermediaries, quasi-state actors 
and private parties’65 rather than the formal governmental apparatus. Thus, under-
standing the state’s quotidian activities requires going beyond a narrow focus on indi-
vidual state institutions – police, army, bureaucracy and so on – to study the ‘inter-
connected institutions, laws and practices’ that constituted the ‘state’s coercive  
repertoire’.66 
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     In drawing attention to the diversity of penal practices, Sherman has argued that 
though most of the practices of the everyday state lay at the fringes of the formal re-
gime of criminal justice, these were always a part of larger imperial agendas. The pri-
ority accorded to the imposition of order by an under-resourced state machinery often 
led to official connivance in acts of disproportionate and extra-judicial violence per-
petrated by individual state actors on their own initiative; a range of practices also fell 
within the domain of ‘judicially sanctioned violence’.67 This led to an expanding gap 
between formal-official commitment to minimal use of force and tacit approval of in-
creasing levels of violence in the everyday practices of the state. This also meant ten-
sion between the processes of centralization of authority and policy-making on the 
one hand and assertion of autonomy by individual state actors tasked with implemen-
tation of policy on the other. The state in mid-twentieth century South Asia, argued 
Sherman, tended to react to emerging circumstances and events much more than to 
‘proactively shape realities on the ground’.68 
 
     Some of these arguments have been explored by several authors in an edited vol-
ume on the nature of the everyday state in India and Pakistan in the first few decades 
after independence. 69  Bringing both India and Pakistan within a single analytical 
frame, these essays have sought to bridge the gap between ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of 
politics and state action by examining policy formulation at higher levels and their 
interpretation and implementation at the local level. These authors have argued that 
the process of post-colonial nation-building did have a profound impact on the every-
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day lives of the new citizens of India and Pakistan; however, the ‘rhetorical underpin-
nings’ and the ‘modus operandi’ of the new nation-states exhibited a surprising lack 
of novelty and were often built upon colonial practices of governance.70 
      
     Several authors have drawn attention to the overwhelming reliance on the ‘perfor-
mative aspects of state power’ of both the governments of India and Pakistan. Awe-
inspiring grand state projects, Marcus Daechsel and Danial Haines have shown, 
sought not only to change the landscape and the built environment, but also to disci-
pline population, though with little ultimate success.71 Similarly, Yasmin Khan has 
shown how state spectacles and rituals that accompanied Gandhi’s death were aimed 
at consolidating the Nehruvian state.72 Contrary to assumptions about the stability of 
the Nehruvian state, several authors have drawn attention to weaknesses of the both 
the early Indian and Pakistani state, especially to meet popular demands.73 Again, 
some of the authors have shown how conceptions of Indian citizenship and constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights deviated from the liberal egalitarian 
rhetoric of the Constitution. They have shown that ‘quotidian conceptions of belong-
ing’ frequently acquired greater importance than legal considerations when it came to 
how the regime of citizenship operated on the ground;74 even legal provisions of citi-
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zen’s rights came to be derived from colonial legal provisions that had clear majori-
tarian and masculine biases.75 Together these essays went a long way in revising the 
long-held beliefs on the nature of the everyday interactions between the state and sub-
jects/citizens in the late colonial and early post-colonial periods. 
 
     A theme that recurs throughout this new historiography of the everyday state is the 
extent to which popular perceptions and interpretations of state action had an impact 
upon the functioning of government. Taylor C. Sherman has shown how criticism of 
government action and the state’s mechanisms of dealing with disorder were engaged 
in a dialogic relationship throughout the late-colonial and early post-colonial period. 
Just as strategies of popular protests attempted to circumvent the regime of punish-
ment, governmental practices also underwent transformations to deal with new forms 
of mass action. Thus Sherman’s study has been invested in what she has called a ‘cul-
tural history of state violence’.76 
      
     In studying how state action was understood by the people, historians have turned 
to the theme of ‘corruption’. William Gould, for example, has attempted to open up 
discussions about how subjects/citizens experienced the state by examining the range 
of exchanges, relationships and interactions between officials and the public that has 
come to be defined as ‘corruption’.77 He has argued that both colonialist and national-
ist discourses dismissed corruption in India as part of ‘customary exchanges’ peculiar 
to traditional societies. These could be overcome, it was believed, through moderniza-
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tion, either by introducing enlightened European practices of government or by the 
developmental initiatives of the nation-state.  However, Gould pointed out, even his-
torians who have studied local structures of social power and influence, and how these 
constituted wider networks of political alliances and associations, have refrained from 
reflecting upon contemporary public debates and responses to such processes. He 
demonstrates how studying what has been labelled as ‘corruption’ can provide invalu-
able insights into notions of proper state behaviour and public morality which are cru-
cial to the understanding of the functioning of the everyday state. By examining the 
notion of ‘corruption’ historically, in the course of the transition from the colonial to 
the post-colonial period, he shows how the contours of normative expectations from 
and conceptions of transgressions by state actors changed over time. While systemic 
transgressions persisted, specific historical conjunctures increased public sensitivity 
towards ‘corruption’. 
 
     An important article has focused upon the post-partition government services in 
India and Pakistan as critical sites for the understanding of the everyday state.78 The 
authors have highlighted the tremendous pressures under which state functionaries 
had to operate in the years after British withdrawal. These pressures were generated 
by both the uncertainties and endemic violence precipitated by partition as well as the 
high public expectations that independence inspired. Most importantly, the article has 
argued for the necessity of taking into account two sets of relationships in the under-
standing of the everyday state: between ‘citizens and officials’ and those between 
‘government servants, lobbying groups and political interests which often sought to 
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co-opt the services for their own ends’.79 The latter became particularly important 
with the transition to independence, as government functionaries, including middle 
and lower level civil servants and policemen, came to make their own demands upon 
the state and assert rights that came with citizenship. 
     
     This new turn towards everyday practices in the analysis of state-society relations 
have been inspired by anthropological perspectives on the nature of the state and how 
it is experienced. A brief discussion of this literature, therefore, is essential to position 
the present thesis in the existing literature. The following section attempts this, but 
explicates its significance in the context of some older discussions on state-society 
relations specifically pertaining to the last years of the Raj.  
 
State-Society Relations and the Transition to Nationhood 
 
     One of the first group of historians to doubt the ability of the late colonial state to 
dominate and transform society were those who had studied the impact of the Second 
World War on India.80 However, there were debates about the degree of autonomy the 
colonial state enjoyed in relation to Indian society. 
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     Indivar Kamtekar has suggested that the end of British rule should be understood 
in terms of a crisis of state institutions.81 Until the Second World War, Kamtekar has 
argued, the colonial state was successfully building new institutions through constitu-
tional negotiations. During the War, however, the state over-stretched its resources. 
Post-war political upheavals made heavier economic exactions from India difficult 
and expensive. This, according to Kamtekar, precipitated Britain’s withdrawal from 
the subcontinent. Central to his thesis is an idea of a colonial state autonomous from 
the society it governed.  
 
Others have proposed a more ‘embedded’ view of state institutions. In his 
study of state propaganda during the Second World War, Sanjoy Bhattacharya has 
shown how local state functionaries often subverted directives from higher officials, 
and were deeply integrated into the dynamics of local society.82 Subsequently, the 
fundamental premises of the ‘autonomous state’ model came under conceptual criti-
cism. 
 
     Kamtekar has explicitly drawn his conceptual framework from Theda Skocpol’s 
idea of the ‘autonomous state’. 83  Skocpol accounted for the collapse of the pre-
revolutionary states during the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions as outcomes 
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of flawed policies that these states autonomously pursued.84 The social composition 
of the ruling elites, and class contradictions within these societies, played no role in 
her explanatory framework. Similarly, Kamtekar has explained the collapse of the co-
lonial state in India in terms of the fatal policies it (autonomously) pursued during the 
War. From this standpoint, the rebellion of government functionaries against the state 
(as in the Royal Indian Navy mutiny or revolts within the constabulary) represented 
the ‘infiltration’85 of the state by society. This military metaphor was used to suggest 
how the entry of socio-political forces into state institutions was an anomaly, pro-
foundly limiting the choices available to the colonial state for manoeuvre. This, Kam-
tekar suggests, led to its ultimate collapse.  
 
Timothy Mitchell has been the most vocal critic of the ‘autonomous state’ 
model.86 Mitchell argues that those who subscribe to it fail to sustain this binary with-
out adopting an extremely narrow view of policy-making impulses of the state, often 
having to reduce it to intentions of state-actors, indeed even to the will of monarchs.87 
Rather than conceiving of the boundary between state and society as rigid and exter-
nally demarcated, Mitchell proposes that we should see it as one that is drawn from 
within. He emphasizes the need for careful, historically-grounded, studies of institu-
tional mechanisms and practices through which networks of power maintain a socio-
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political order. Drawing upon Michel Foucault, Mitchell argues that the polymor-
phous forms of modern power that operate through the elaboration of hierarchical in-
stitutional arrangements of authority to produce disciplined governmentalized popula-
tions, also produce, through the same mechanism, a ‘state effect’.88 The operation of 
governmental techniques produces the illusion of the modern state as a coherent, lar-
ger-than-life, singular entity capable of exercising its autonomous agency, completely 
abstracted from the socio-political realm. 
 
     Anthropological perspectives on the Indian state resonate with some of Mitchell’s 
formulations.89 Through a rich ethnography of a North Indian village, Akhil Gupta, 
for example, has shown how the state at the local level is no more than a cluster of 
fragmentary institutions and mundane practices of local officials. These blur any con-
ception of a coherent state structure standing in opposition to the society it governs.90 
On the other hand, his study has revealed how the state, as a distant trans-local entity, 
has entered the consciousness of villagers through various government schemes of 
rural development. The inhabitants of the village also exhibited a grasp over the hier-
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archical distribution of power within the state apparatus, and were able to call upon 
the help of higher authorities to remedy their victimization by corrupt local officials.91 
 
     Mitchell’s analysis has one important lacuna, however. He is critical of Michel 
Foucault for overstating the omnipresence and success of governmental technologies. 
He argues that Foucault underestimates the role of resistance in destabilizing the dis-
ciplinary project of modern institutions of power. But he does not explore what impli-
cations this critique might have on his own postulation of the ‘state effect’. If discipli-
nary power is under constant challenge, the ‘state effect’ it produces must also be per-
ennially unstable. How, then, is the image of the state as a coherent, all-powerful, dis-
tant entity sustained? In the Indian context, Thomas Blom Hansen’s works offer use-
ful insights. 
 
     Thomas Blom Hansen has pointed to a long legacy in British legal theory of imag-
ining the state through a ‘deep and constitutive split’ between its ‘sublime’ and ‘pro-
fane’ aspects.92 This imagination of the state, he has argued, has had its imprint upon 
post-colonial India as part of its colonial inheritance. The profanity of the state con-
sists of the ‘incoherence, brutality, partiality and banality’ of everyday governance 
and ‘the rough and tumble of negotiation, compromise and naked self-interest dis-
played in local politics’.93 On the other hand, the state’s sublime dimension consists 
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of a conception of an all-powerful, distant entity, far removed from the contaminating 
proximity of the pettiness of everyday life. The state, in its sublime aspects, embodies 
rationality and appears as a repository of impartial justice. Thus, when state function-
aries participate in, or even orchestrate, social conflicts, this imaginary of the state 
facilitates its relegation only to its profane dimensions. Its sublime aspects retain their 
sanctity, and are called upon to deliver justice and resolve conflicts in the socio-
political realm. Commissions of inquiry, the ‘impartial’ judiciary and such other insti-
tutions represent this sublime aspect of state power. 
 
     Extending Mitchell’s formulation, it may be argued, therefore, that the sublime 
dimension of the state restores the ‘state effect’ every time its profanity drives it to the 
point of crisis. This is how even in the most unjust, majoritarian and xenophobic re-
gimes, the state manages to retain a degree of legitimacy as a signifier of a higher 
good and as an embodiment of a higher notion of justice. Even when state power is in 
acute crisis, those who operate the state machinery strive to perpetuate the sublime 
imaginaries of the state; because, in the interest of its own survival, ‘the myth of the 
unity and coherence of the state must be kept alive’.94 
 
     This thesis proposes that the specificity and, indeed, the profundity of the moment 
of transition from the colonial to the post-colonial order in South Asia may be under-
stood as a crisis of state power when both the sublime and the profane dimensions of 
the state’s imaginary had fallen apart. This moment is the subject of this thesis. It was 
marked by a loss of hope in the capacity of the state to deliver any higher justice. 
 
                                                 
94 Ibid., p. 64. 
37 
     The thesis embarks upon a detailed study of the patterns of street agitations and 
communal violence in Calcutta that exhibit a sense of deep crisis of state power. 
However, the depth and complexity of the historical material that this research had to 
deal with does not allow for a simple reduction of the state’s imaginary into a sub-
lime/profane binary. The framework is useful nonetheless, however, in conveying the 
degree of erosion of public confidence in state institutions.95 The victims of violence 
and injustice saw no remedy immanent in the state. They had no one to turn to, no au-
thority who could intervene on behalf of the state and restore faith in its institutions. 
This also prompted people to question state authority in radical ways. They could di-
rectly threaten state officials during ‘anti-imperialist’ street action; they could kill 
their communal ‘others’, confident of their impunity from state sanction. In fact, it 
was the depth of the sense of complete erosion of state authority that presented direct 
street action as the only mode of securing justice. The transition to post-colonial na-
tionhood, this thesis argues, thus needs to be understood as a project of a nationalist 
elite having to rescue the state from an unusual crisis. They had to resurrect, once 
again, a state imaginary with sublime attributes – rational, benevolent, just, incor-
ruptible and impartial – so as to reclaim their legitimacy to rule. However, building 
upon the new historiography of the everyday state, this thesis shows how this process 
lacked coherence or consistency. Despite suffering a great loss of public confidence in 
the efficacy and neutrality of the state, the institutions of governance survived and 
came to be strengthened, extended and elaborated by the nation state. However, even 
this process remained haphazard; some colonial institutions were strengthened, some 
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marginalized, while others acquired new content. Thus, it defies any simple teleologi-
cal explanation of a progressive strengthening of institutions of governance in post-
colonial India matched by a similar process of recovery of public confidence in them.     
 
     The thesis argues, however,  that the crises that state institutions encountered dur-
ing this interregnum provided the new rulers with a great opportunity to rearrange the 
distribution of social power on the ground. It created a moment when it was possible 
to reorder society in such a way that enabled the new ruling elites to consolidate their 
authority with greater ease. They frequently took recourse to suppression of all those 
who challenged their authority, by a combination of both persuasion and muscle-
flexing. Sunil Khilnani reminds us that universal suffrage and constitutional democ-
racy were not bestowed upon the people of India through popular demand: ‘it was 
given to them by the political choice of an intellectual elite’. 96 But before these 
enlightened constitutional provisions were implemented by this nationalist elite, local 
elites did everything they could to ensure that these enlightened constitutional provi-
sions would not endanger their ability to rule. Segments of society who were seen as 
stumbling blocks to their dominance were either won over or subjugated. This brutal 
task was accomplished in the interregnum before constitutional safeguards and de-
mocratic procedures obliged them, at least theoretically, to uphold the sanctity of the 
state’s sublime status. 
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Sources and Methodology 
 
     The thesis is an empirical study of state power at a moment of crisis. It explores 
the forms and possibilities of popular politics opened up by this transition to post-
colonial nationhood. It uses many sources, including memoirs of leaders, archival 
documents of political organizations and newspapers; but the focus remains upon a 
variety of official sources.  
 
     The work looks at interactions between different levels within the state apparatus – 
local, regional, national and imperial – and analyses how these interactions catalysed 
developments at the local level. Among official sources, it uses sources from archives 
in London, New Delhi and Calcutta to understand the context within which local de-
velopments took shape and how these local issues informed discussions at higher offi-
cial levels. Yet the most important source base that it brings to the fore – much of it 
for the first time – is the archive of the Special Branch of the Calcutta Police. 
 
     Political intelligence gathered by the city police constituted the lowest level of of-
ficial intelligence about political goings-on in the city-space. It is a unique source for 
a variety of reasons. It defies many of the usual characteristics of official sources. 
First, it lacks the authoritative, ‘truth-proclaiming’ voice of the state that official 
sources typically display. It remains perennially fragmented, incoherent and inconsis-
tent. The police often deployed more than one agent to collect information about im-
portant political incidents. This often produced multiple, and sometimes even diver-
gent narratives of the same incident. This makes available to the historian a poly-
phonic perspective on events. Second, higher echelons of the government used these 
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fragmentary and disjointed records to arrive at the authoritative voice with which they 
strove to proclaim the ‘truth’. This gives historians a unique opportunity to study how 
this seemingly unquestionable state knowledge is produced - the assumptions it 
makes, the knowledge that it elides, the gaps to which it turns a blind eye. It also pro-
vides the historian access, admittedly limited and incomplete, to the ‘official mind’. 
Which versions of events higher officials choose to accept, what ‘facts’ they reject 
and on what grounds, gives the historian a sense of the selectivity of official versions 
of events. Third, unlike many other official repositories, police intelligence does not 
completely exclude the voice of non-state actors. They enter the police archives 
through a variety of means, even if they are heavily mediated. These unofficial voices 
articulate themselves through intercepted letters, leaflets and pamphlets, newspaper 
cuttings, confessions during police interrogations and many other ways. But, above 
all, the police often used non-official networks, including ‘informers’ within criminal 
gangs, to gather intelligence on vital issues.97 This again demonstrates how closely 
the everyday state and local society remain intertwined. 
 
     Of course, police sources have many limitations. The police archive is one whose 
ultimate preoccupation is with criminality. It therefore has its own biases in terms of 
the subjects it chooses, the people it talks about, the nature of events and actions that 
finds space within it. This thesis aims to address these shortcomings in two ways. 
First, it tries to read police records alongside other kinds of sources – official archives 
produced at other levels of the government hierarchy, as well as non-official sources. 
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Second, it seeks to read the archive both along and against the grain98 – to go along 
with what the narrators want the readers to know, the way they tell the stories, as well 
as to remain alert to what the narrators do not want the readers to know, their omis-
sions and silences, and what they choose to leave out at the margins. 
 
 
Outline of the Chapters 
 
     The thesis opens with official discussions of the trial of the Indian National Army. 
Three officers of the INA – a Hindu, a Muslim and a Sikh – were selected for trial at 
the Red Fort in Delhi. The chapter examines the official rationale for these decisions, 
which are seen by many as a major faux pas of the government (qua Kamtekar, a fatal 
policy pursued by the autonomous state). Next it analyses the agitation against the 
trial of these officers in the streets of Calcutta. It exposes the myth that this agitation 
was a model of cross-communal anti-imperialist harmony, which supposedly charac-
terized mass movements in India in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
 
     If the agitation against the Red Fort trials deviated from the model of an ideal 
cross-communal anti-imperialist agitation, the campaign against Rashid Ali’s convic-
tion in Calcutta moved even further away from this ideal. The second chapter seeks to 
question the ‘revolutionary’ character that some historians have ascribed to this agita-
tion. The chapter shows that the celebration of this agitation is often premised about a 
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lack of knowledge of the details of the Rashid Ali case itself, as well as a misrepre-
sentation of some details about the agitation that followed. It will show that the al-
leged ‘injustice’ in Rashid Ali’s conviction became a mere symbol around which an 
anti-state (and anti-police) sentiment coalesced. More than a ‘cross-communal’ ‘anti-
colonial’ protest, the street agitation represented deep resentments against the  
government, especially the police. 
 
     The third chapter shows how relations between Hindu and Muslim inhabitants of 
Calcutta began to fall apart during the last phase of the Second World War. It is inter-
ested in the deterioration of everyday interaction and the low-scale pervasive violence 
in the city in the war’s aftermath. It deliberately takes the story beyond the Great Cal-
cutta Killing to show that this catastrophic communal riot was not a sudden develop-
ment, but an exacerbation of everyday hostilities between communities. Again, these 
hostilities represented a lack of faith in the government’s capacity (or willingness) to 
arbitrate between contending interests within the social domain. 
 
     Chapter four focuses on symbols for the articulation of communal grievances that 
gained currency in early 1947. Punjabi Muslim policemen, newly recruited into the 
Calcutta Police by the Muslim League government, became the target of street agita-
tions. Hindu propagandists highlighted this strategy of police recruitment to argue that 
not only was the everyday state biased and corrupt, but that such biases and corrup-
tions were being encouraged by higher echelons of the government. Therefore, Hin-
dus could not expect justice from any state authority anymore. This campaign mobi-
lized support for the Hindu demand for Bengal’s partition, which sounded the death-
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knell for alternative vision’s of Bengal’s (and India’s) future, especially the move-
ment for a sovereign and united Bengal. 
 
     The final chapter explores how the new Hindu elite who came to control the gov-
ernment of West Bengal after partition reordered community relations in society in 
significant ways. Despite being a minority within the city’s population, pre-partition 
Bengal was a Muslim-majority province ruled by Muslim political formations through 
Calcutta. The new rulers of West Bengal overturned these power relations by reduc-
ing the city’s Muslims to a vulnerable minority. This was accomplished through bru-
tal force, this thesis argues, in the crucial years before constitutional guaranties prom-
ised minorities protections and safeguards. 
 
     The aim of the thesis, on the whole, is to bring both so-called anti-imperialist agi-
tations and communal violence in the same city-space, and analyze them within a sin-
gle frame. Through this, it hopes to contribute to the understanding of India’s transi-
tion to nationhood and the transformations this brought about in the everyday prac-
tices of its state apparatus. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Post-War Dilemmas and the Indian National Army:  
Agitations in Calcutta against the First Red Fort Trial 
 
     Studies of popular politics after the Second World War have understood the 
protests against the first Indian National Army (INA) trials at the Red Fort as 
representing the consolidation of widespread anti-colonial resentment. Some 
historians consider the INA demonstrations in Calcutta in November 1945 as the 
apogee of this popular mood. Of the three INA officers who were tried at the Red 
Fort, one was a Muslim, one a Sikh and the third a Hindu. Historians have argued that 
this made people of all faiths come together to protest against the colonial 
government. 1  Gautam Chattopadhyay goes on to insist that the protests had the 
potential to change the very nature of decolonization, had they been taken to their 
logical conclusion by the national leadership; the ‘bourgeois’ leaders, however, 
preferred compromises with imperialism to a radical revolutionary movement which 
could have endangered their own social dominance.2 
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     Sumit Sarkar also celebrates the November agitations in Calcutta as ‘non-
communal’ and ‘anti-colonial’, but recognizes that such agitations had their limits. 
Protests against the trial of INA officers, he points out, were confined to only a few 
cities, and the vast majority of India’s population living in the countryside remained 
largely indifferent.3 Sucheta Mahajan is also critical of these agitations. She agrees 
that these were emotional outpourings of popular nationalism, but concludes that 
Congress leaders rightly distanced themselves from such ‘militancy’ as the agitations 
were ‘premature’. She prefers turning the ‘spotlight’ to the ‘vast, non-heroic, non-
militant multitudes’ who were equally stirred by anti-colonial feelings, who went to 
nationalist meetings, subscribed to nationalist funds and rejoiced in nationalist 
celebrations. 4  Their support shows that far from being ‘bourgeois’ and 
‘compromising’, the Congress leaders were, in fact, the true champions of popular, 
cross-communal, anti-colonial sentiments. 
 
     Instead of turning the spotlight away, this chapter hopes to intensify the focus on 
the precise unfolding of the November agitations in Calcutta. In so doing, it 
challenges the consensus that the agitations represented a ‘non-communal’ and ‘anti-
colonial’ mood that rose above narrow communal or party-political affiliations. 
 
     The chapter begins by refuting the contention that the decision to try INA officers 
belonging to different religions and to hold the proceedings at the Red Fort was a 
misjudgement on the part of British India’s military establishment. The first two 
                                                 
3 Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership’. 
4 Sucheta Mahajan, ‘British Policy, Nationalist Strategy and Popular National Upsurge, 1945-
46’ in Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-
47, New Delhi: Manohar, 1987, p. 80. Also see Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and 
Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India, New Delhi; London: Sage, 2000. 
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sections demonstrate that rather than being random, capricious and ‘autonomous’ 
decisions of state actors, these were products of negotiations between different layers 
within the colonial government who responded to a variety of pressures in the socio-
political realm. 
 
     The last two sections delve deep into the details of the protest as it unfolded on the 
streets of Calcutta in November 1945. It shows that the dominant description of these 
protests as ‘non-communal’ and ‘anti-colonial’ obscures its underlying complexities, 
which reveal the nature of Calcutta’s politics in the post-war period, but also provide 
critical insights into the nature of mass mobilizations and popular politics.  
 
Post-War Debates, Judicial Processes and the First Red Fort Trial 
 
     The trial of INA officers Shah Nawaz Khan, Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon and Prem 
Kumar Sahgal staged at the Red Fort – an insignia of precolonial Indian glory – 
backfired upon the colonial government. It allegedly provided the occasion for 
different communities and political parties to come together to agitate against the 
colonial state. Many historians assume that this decision was either borne out of 
imperial arrogance or the government’s lack of foresight. 5  They hold the army, 
especially the Commander-in-Chief, Claude Auchinleck, responsible for the terrible 
lapse of judgment. Penderel Moon, for example, insists that the details of the trial 
                                                 
5 See, among others, Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership’; Chattopadhyay, 
‘Bengal Students in Revolt against the Raj’; Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj: A 
Biography of Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose, New Delhi: Viking, 1989; Suranjan Das, 
Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991.   
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were decided upon by the army ‘against the advice of the Home Member’.6 But Peter 
Ward Fay believes that the decisions were ‘practical’, and that Auchinleck ‘did not 
mean to send a signal’.7 The Red Fort was ‘a known and public place’, its walled 
enclosure made it secure, and its clerical staff could be easily mobilized to provide 
‘logistical support’.8 The choice of a Hindu, a Muslim and a Sikh for the trial was also 
not deliberate. They were brought to trial, Fay argues, ‘because they were at hand and 
eminently triable’. 9 He reiterates, ‘There was no guile in the business, no hidden 
agenda’.10 
 
     The accounts, while at odds with each other in some respects, both explain 
government decisions as if these were ‘autonomous’. In these narratives, state 
institutions or actors – ‘the army’ or the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ – emerge as free 
decision-makers, untouched by socio-political pressures. The exact discussions that 
led to fixing the precise details of the trial remain unavailable. But, through a 
contextual reading of debates that animated the post-war government, this section 
suggests that decisions about the first Red Fort trial, were, in fact, products of 
complex negotiations at different echelons of government. State actors at various 
levels had their own concerns and responded to pressures of many kinds – 
international opinion about British colonial policies in India, public opinion within 
India, opinion of Indian and British political leaders as well as concerns about ‘law 
and order’. 
                                                 
6 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, London: Oxford University Press, 
1973, p. 173. 
7  Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army: India’s Armed Struggle for Independence, New 
Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1994, p. 471. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
48 
 
 
     The INA issue came to the forefront of public debate in the context of a land-slide 
victory for the Labour Party in the British general election of 1945.11 In India, this 
raised hopes of a speedy advance towards India’s self-government, although the 
pronouncements of Labour leaders soon robbed them of their illusions.12 So as to 
‘retain the initiative’, both London and New Delhi recognized the need for a ‘suitable 
gesture’.13 However, different echelons of government had different ideas about how 
Britain should proceed to address India’s future. Differences of opinion with London 
were fuelled, to some extent, by Viceroy Wavell’s personal apprehensions about 
Labour politicians. He feared that Pethick-Lawrence, the new Secretary of State, 
could have ‘fixed and old-fashioned ideas derived mainly from his Congress 
contacts’.14 
 
     Soon after assuming office, the new government in Britain invited Wavell to 
London to discuss issues concerning India’s problems.15 The meetings that followed 
exposed the deep differences in outlook between the Indian establishment and the 
India Office. 
 
     The priority of the Labour government, as became evident to Wavell during his 
meetings with the India and Burma Committee, was to relieve itself of the burden of 
                                                 
11  Telegram from Government of India, Information and Broadcasting Department to 
Secretary of State, dated 1 August 1945, Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Transfer of Power, 1942-7 
(Henceforth TP), vol. VI, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976, no. 1, p. 1. 
12 ‘Press Adviser’s appreciation for the second half of August 1945’, L/PJ/5/152/45, India 
Office Records (Henceforth, ‘IOR’). 
13 Telegram from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, New Delhi, 6 August 1945, TP, vol. VI, no. 5, 
pp. 34-35. 
14 Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 161. 
15 Letter from Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, dated 18 August 1945, TP, vol. VI, no. 38, p. 92. 
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ruling India. War-ravaged Britain wanted to beat an honourable retreat as quickly as 
possible, while securing Indian cooperation in strategic sectors such as trade and 
commonwealth defence. 16  The Labour ministry was keen to demonstrate to their 
wartime allies, especially the United States, as well as political parties in India and 
Britain, that they were taking energetic steps in that direction. But, even before a 
formal ‘transfer of power’ could be negotiated, London wanted to portray British rule 
in India as benevolent and just. It wanted immediate replacement of wartime 
emergency ordinances with peacetime laws, fair trial to all those who had been jailed 
during the war, a degree of political freedom and a free press. Through these 
measures, the Labour government in London hoped to convince international opinion 
and Indian leaders of their genuine desire to promote self-government in India and 
secure Indian cooperation for commonwealth strategic interests after British 
withdrawal from the subcontinent. In other words, the Labour government wanted to 
project its immediate post-war policy priorities in India as guided by ‘rule of law’ – 
conditions that facilitated impartial dispensation of justice through legally constituted 
courts and according to rational peacetime laws. They were motivated, therefore, by 
the desire to uphold the ‘sublime’ aspects of the state.17 They also wanted laws to be 
interpreted in the most generous terms to generate ‘goodwill’ among Indians; this, the 
government in London thought, would encourage Indian leaders to participate in a 
balanced dialogue on India’s future relationship with Britain with open minds. 
                                                 
16  See Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, 
London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975; Partha Sarathi Gupta, ‘Imperial 
Strategy and the Transfer of Power, 1939-51’ in Amit Kumar Gupta, Myth and Reality: The 
Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-47, New Delhi: Manohar, 1987. 
17 For a discussion on ‘sublime’ and ‘profane’ dimensions of the state, see: Thomas Blom 
Hansen, ‘Governance and Myths of State in Mumbai’ in Fuller and Benei (eds.), The 
Everyday State and Society in Modern India. Also see Thomas Blom Hansen, Violence in 
Urban India: Identity Politics, Mumbai and the Post-Colonial City, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 
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     The priorities of the government of India were different. During the war, it had 
ruthlessly suppressed dissent, as was evident from the manner in which it crushed the 
Quit India movement in 1942.18 Its wartime economic policies unleashed a disaster 
that claimed lives and livelihoods of millions.19 It had replaced ordinary laws with 
draconian executive ordinances – including the infamous Defence of India rules – that 
enabled the state to throw thousands of political workers behind bars as a preventive 
measure, even before they attempted subversion.20 All these factors, the government 
of India feared, had eroded whatever legitimacy it presumed it had among its Indian 
subjects. It suspected that widespread dissension was brewing below the surface, 
which would erupt the moment wartime regulations were relaxed. It therefore 
preferred a cautious approach. The government of India wanted to regain its 
                                                 
18 Studies on the Quit India Movement include F.G. Hutchins, Spontaneous Revolution: The 
Quit India Movement, Delhi: Manohar, 1971; Gyanendra Pandey (ed.), The Indian Nation in 
1942, Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1988; Gyanendra Pandey, ‘The Revolt of August 1942 in 
Eastern UP and Bihar’, ibid; David Hardiman, ‘The Quit India Movement in Gujarat’, ibid; 
M. Harcourt, ‘Kisan Populism and Revolution in Rural India: The 1942 Disturbances in Bihar 
and East United Provinces’ in D.A. Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian 
Struggle, 1917-47, London: Heinemann, 1997; Bidyut Chakrabarty, ‘Political Mobilization in 
the Localities: The 1942 Quit India Movement in Midnapur’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 26, 
no. 4, 1992, pp.791-814; Bidyut Chakrabarty, Local Politics and Indian Nationalism: 
Midnapore, 1919-1944, Delhi: Manohar, 1997; Stephen Henningham, ‘Quit India in Bihar 
and Eastern United Provinces: The Dual Revolt’ in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies: 
Writings on South Asian History and Society, vol. II, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
19 Wartime economic policies precipitated the Great Bengal Famine in 1943 that, according to 
reliable estimates, claimed about three million lives. See Amartya K. Sen, Poverty and 
Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982; Paul R. 
Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943-44, New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; Bikramjit De, ‘British Policy in Bengal, 1939-
45’, Unpublished D.Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2002; Bikramjit De, ‘Imperial 
Governance and the Challenges of War: Management of Food Supplies, Bengal, 1943 - 
1944', Studies in History, vol. 22, no. 1, 2006, pp.1 – 43; Sugata Bose, ‘Starvation Amidst 
Plenty: The Making of Famine in Bengal, Honan and Tonkin, 1942-1945’, Modern Asian 
Studies, vol. 24 no. 4, October 1990; Janam Mukherjee, Hungry Bengal: War, Famine and 
the End of Empire, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
20 Taylor C. Sherman has suggested that the colonial state always used a range of techniques 
other than proper court trials to punish its colonial subjects. However, such practices became 
acute during times of emergency, such as during the Second World War. See Taylor C. 
Sherman, State Violence and Punishment in India, London; New York: Routledge, 2010. 
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legitimacy by slowly buttressing Indian cooperation at various levels. Accordingly, 
the Viceroy recommended reconstitution of his Executive Council even before 
elections were held in India.21 Following elections to the provincial legislatures, he 
wanted to appoint a Development Council with elected Indian representatives to 
advise the central government on post-war reconstruction and development 
schemes.22 But given that his priority was to prevent violence at all costs, and ‘stiffen 
the morale’ of administrative functionaries, especially the police and the army, 
Wavell was reluctant to give up wartime emergency powers immediately. His 
commitment towards release of political (‘security’) prisoners or giving them a fair 
trial was tenuous. As opposed to the attitude of the new government in Britain, the 
main concern of the government of India was to maintain ‘law and order’. 
Establishing ‘rule of law’, which Indian administrators interpreted merely as 
‘appeasement’ of public opinion, was not Delhi’s priority. 
 
     Frictions between the India Office in Britain and the government in India were 
hardly a new feature of late colonialism. Wavell himself had faced considerable 
challenges dealing with the Churchill government during the war.23 Yet, the nature of 
antagonism between the post-war Labour government and the government of India 
was significantly different. During the War, the British government’s policy priorities 
involved maintaining the status quo in India and mobilizing its resources for the war 
effort. It was the government of India under Wavell which pressurized London to 
                                                 
21 ‘Agenda, Memoranda and Minutes of the Governors’ Conference’, 1-2 August 1945, TP, 
vol. VI, no. 2, p. 23. 
22 Ibid., p. 17; Also, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 6 August 1945, ibid., no. 5, pp. 36-37. 
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initiate dialogue with Indian political leaders to secure their cooperation during the 
War. After the War, under the Labour regime, the dynamic was reversed. As Wavell 
put it in his diary after several sessions of discussion with the new India and Burma 
Committee, ‘Compared with last time [during the Churchill regime], I have had to 
raise my right foot – the one on the accelerator pedal – and put down my left foot – 
the brake pedal… – gently but firmly.’24 Wavell thought that the Labour government 
needed to slow down; they seemed to be too much in a hurry to solve India’s complex 
problems. 
 
     Of course, differences between the government of India and the Labour 
government in Britain about immediate post-war policies were not irreconcilable. It is 
better understood as a difference of priorities and emphases. Despite advocating a 
cautious approach, Wavell knew all too well that he had to return to peacetime 
administrative arrangements soon enough, and ensure press freedom and promote fair 
trial, however limited in scope this might be. Neither did the British government want 
a violent flare-up or an administrative breakdown. The way post-war ‘India policy’ 
played out, therefore, was the outcome of give-and-take between different policy 
imperatives, all of which aimed at projecting the ‘sublime’ dimensions of state-power, 
albeit at different paces and in different ways. Also, all of these imperatives emanated 
from concerns about socio-political dynamics – international opinion, the need to 
secure ‘goodwill’ of Indian leaders or prevent outbreak of ‘disorder’. These 
compromises and negotiations provide vital clues about how the government of India 
arrived at the controversial decisions about the first Red Fort trial. 
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     The INA trials, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation. They need to be 
contextualized in their full entanglement with a range of other issues concerning the 
sanctity of judicial processes that claimed the attention of India’s post-war 
administration. One such issue was that of punishments for those accused of violent 
crimes during the Quit India Movement of 1942. 
 
     As is well-known, Congress, the largest all-India political party had opposed 
India’s involvement in the Second World War. In 1942, the Congress had launched a 
Quit India movement to force Britain to grant India immediate independence. This 
had invited state repression. The government of India imposed a ban on the Congress 
and other allied organizations, confiscated their property and arrested their leaders and 
activists. 
 
     Among the cases concerning Quit India violence, those linked to incidents at 
Chimur and Ashti gained considerable publicity.25 The Chimur case involved two 
connected incidents: in the first instance, a magistrate and a revenue officer were 
dragged out of a rest house and were ‘battered to death’; in the other, a mob chased 
down a retreating police party and murdered an Inspector and a Constable. Twenty 
death sentences were passed in this case, of which five were still standing in court in 
August 1945.26 In the Ashti case, an entire police station was ‘over-run and burnt’; 
one Sub-Inspector was killed on spot, while a Head-Constable and two Constables 
                                                 
25 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 11 August, TP, vol. VI, no. 13, pp. 44-45. 
26 Ibid. 
54 
 
were beaten up and burnt alive. Another Constable was killed and thrown into a 
pond.27 
 
     Government of India knew that the decisions on Chimur and Ashti cases would 
also affect at least three others. In the Fatwa district of Bihar, two pilot officers of the 
Royal Air Force were dragged out of a train and murdered in the railway station. 
Seven death sentences were originally passed in this case, out of which four were 
standing. 28  Similarly, at Kulasekharapatnam, two death sentences were passed in 
connection with the attack and murder of an Assistant Inspector in a salt factory.29 
Again, there was a case in Jaunpur District in Uttar Pradesh, where three Constables 
on duty in a village were attacked by a mob; two of them were brutally beaten to 
death. This case differed from the rest in that the incidents occurred after the Quit 
India agitations had passed its peak. Thus the trials on the last case, which led to five 
death sentences, took place under the ordinary criminal procedures, unlike the others, 
which were tried according to the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (II of 1942).30 
 
     Death sentences in all these cases were contested up to the level of Privy Council, 
after the High Courts, Governors and the Viceroy had rejected the petitions. This had 
resulted in delay in executing the sentences and the convicts were languishing in jail 
for about two and a half years.31 
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     After Labour’s victory in the elections in Britain, the India Office received several 
representations on behalf of the offenders.32 Pethick-Lawrence took up the issue with 
the Viceroy. He assured Wavell that he was aware of the dangers of interfering with 
the criminal justice system. He understood, Pethick-Laurence reiterated, that the 
convicts had been given a fair trial and all the appeals had been rejected by the highest 
tribunals; he was also aware of the importance of protecting the police force and 
ensuring that brutal attacks on them did not go unpunished; it was also extremely 
necessary, he agreed with Wavell, to discourage ‘the belief that persistent use of the 
law’s delays would finally be rewarded by a mitigation of the original sentence’.33 
However, he insisted, there were other facts that also deserved attention. The crimes 
were actually committed about three years ago and convicts were living under the 
sentence of death for the past two and a half years. The public perceived this as 
inordinate delay. At the same time, he thought, there was no evidence of 
‘premeditation’ in any of these incidents and that most of these were ‘constructive 
murders’34. Finally, the demand was for mere commutation of the death sentences and 
not complete remission of punishments altogether – exactly what the courts had 
decided to do in case of others who were accused in the same incidents. 
 
     But, the Secretary of State mostly emphasized certain political considerations. He 
explained that both in Britain and in India, there was widespread hope that the 
inauguration of the Labour regime in Britain ‘would coincide with some act of 
                                                 
32  Pethick-Laurence to Wavell, 7 August 1945, ibid., no. 8, p. 40; Pethick-Lawrence to 
Wavell, 8 August 1945, TP, ibid., no. 9, p. 41. 
33 Pethick Lawrence to Wavell,10 August 1945, ibid., no. 12, p. 43-44.  
34 Ibid., p. 43, emphasis in original. ‘Constructive murder’ is a murder where the accused is 
known to have been present, but where it was not proven that the accused dealt the fatal blow 
to the victim. It is akin to the law on ‘joint enterprise’ in England and Wales.  
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clemency’.35 Concessions, if granted, would be welcomed at a time when the relation 
between the Government of India and the Congress ‘has been relaxed’.36 Moreover, 
he insisted that Wavell should also see the advantages in ‘securing and retaining 
popular goodwill and of the undesirability of forfeiting it by turning these persons into 
martyrs’.37 
 
     Wavell, for his part, thoroughly disapproved of granting clemency on political 
grounds. Especially in cases concerning Quit India agitations, Wavell pointed out, the 
Congress seemed to have rejected the path of non-violence altogether. Even Gandhi 
was defending violent criminals, one Mahendra Choudhury in particular, whose 
activities had no apparent connection with Congress politics. When Choudhury was 
hanged, Gandhi had issued a statement accusing the government of judicial murder. 
Jenkins, the Viceroy’s Private Secretary, described this press statement as ‘typical of 
Gandhi [at] his most tiresome’.38 however the implication, the Viceroy explained, was 
significant. Congress, in his opinion, was again on a collision path with the 
government, and any commutation of judicial sentences on political grounds would be 
treated as appeasement and hailed as Gandhi’s victory. This would only encourage 
further acts of defiance towards government authority.  
 
     He further pointed out that delay in the execution of the death sentences resulted 
from repeated appeals ‘on purely legalistic grounds’39 and, except the Jaunpur Case, 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 44. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell,10 August 1945, ibid., no. 12, p. 43-44. 
38 Sir E. Jenkins to Mr. Turnbull, 13 August 1945, ibid., no. 21, pp. 63-65; Also, see Wavell 
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consisted of challenging the validity of Special Criminal Courts Ordinance under 
which they were prosecuted. 
 
     However, after a prolonged debate, Wavell reluctantly agreed to commute the 
death sentences to transportation for life on ‘humanitarian grounds’.40 He followed it 
up, nevertheless, with a lengthy statement on the adverse consequences that might 
follow from showing too much clemency to violent offenders.41 First, he pointed out, 
this would cause resentment in the fighting services. In the Fatwa Case, for example, 
the Royal Air Force may be particularly unhappy given how brutally their men were 
attacked and murdered. More importantly, Wavell explained, this would lead to 
severe loss of morale among the Civil Services in the Provinces. Disaffection in both 
the civil and military establishments would have serious repercussions on how 
situations of ‘disorder’ would be handled in the future. There would be an increased 
tendency to ‘exact retribution on the spot’ if the law and order machinery felt that the 
authorities were incapable of punishing the most barbaric acts against them; this 
would make prevention of ‘irregular action’ on the part of government servants 
practically impossible.42 
 
     The debate between Pethick-Lawrence and Wavell around punishment of Quit 
India ‘agitators’ shows how differences on policy priorities were negotiated within the 
colonial state apparatus. Pethick-Lawrence’s objective was to project the image of the 
post-war government as merciful and benevolent. This, he thought, would secure 
‘goodwill’ among Indian politicians and prevent the latter from using petty offenders 
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as symbols of state oppression. For Wavell, such populism could demoralize 
government officials and encourage agitators and law-breakers to exploit 
government’s perceived leniency. The outcome was a compromise: even as Wavell 
gave in to Pethick-Lawrence’s wishes, he insisted that the decision had to be projected 
as motivated by ‘humanitarian’ concerns and not perceived as political back-
pedalling. Moreover, both were responding to pressures from the socio-political 
realm. If the Secretary of State was concerned about bringing Indian leaders to the 
negotiation table, the Viceroy was responding to the alarm that top Congress leaders 
were causing through public statements on the Quit India cases. Similarly, as will be 
shown below, decisions concerning the first Red Fort trial were also products of 
negotiations between different levels of colonial officialdom responding to different 
pressures emanating from the socio-political domain. 
 
     Another issue that critically framed debates about the INA trials was the 
desirability of continuing with war-time practices of ‘detention without trial’. During 
the war, the government had imprisoned members of political parties who had 
opposed its war-time policies. Armed with emergency rules sanctioning ‘preventive 
detention’, the government had rounded up large numbers of such ‘security prisoners’ 
without evidence of their participation in any illegal activity.43 With the war coming 
to an end, public pressures mounted on the government to either release these 
prisoners or bring them to trial. 
 
     The government in London, keen on perpetuating its image as ‘fair’ and 
‘benevolent’, insisted that the government of India should either release political 
                                                 
43 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 11 August 1945, ibid., no. 16, pp. 48-49. 
59 
 
prisoners or put them up for trial. Pethick-Lawrence was candid about the Labour 
government’s rationale: ‘We are likely in the immediate future to come under strong 
pressure from Indian public opinion to release persons still under restraint for political 
reasons’.44 It was important, from London’s perspective, that the initiative for their 
release came from the government and not appear to be forced upon it ‘by public 
pressure or outcry’.45 
 
     Wavell, on the other hand, was determined to avoid such trials at all costs.46 The 
government had rounded up suspected offenders before they were able to commit any 
act of violence. This was the logic of preventive detention – to detain suspects not 
because they had committed any crime but because they could potentially do so. 
Therefore, there was no evidence to prove the guilt of most such ‘offenders’. If the 
government had to renounce its power of making preventive arrests, it had to put up 
the detainees for trial, in which case, they were sure to be released for the lack of any 
incriminating evidence. That would cause serious embarrassment to the government, 
and Wavell knew it. 
 
     Wavell also wanted to avoid the other option, that of releasing prisoners without 
trial. He feared that this would plunge India into chaos, as these prisoners, upon their 
release, would start agitating against government, probably with support from 
mainstream political parties. With the government’s power of making arrests severely 
curtailed, the administration would not be able to control the resulting mayhem. 
Therefore, Wavell wanted to release only those who could safely be classified as 
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‘non-violent’ political prisoners. This led to lengthy debates between Wavell, voicing 
concerns about the Indian administration, and Pethick-Lawrence, representing many 
of his colleagues in London. This controversy remained inconclusive. The 
government of India did not agree to large-scale release of political prisoners. Neither 
were they successful in restricting the release of prisoners only to ‘non-violent’ 
Congressmen, partly because they found it impossible to make a clean separation 
between violent and non-violent prisoners. The outcome was a compromise. It led to 
slow but steady streams of releases, which also included many ‘violent agitators’ – 
many of whom would certainly go on to participate in the Calcutta agitations in 
November 1945 against the INA trials. The latter included (much to the Bengal 
Governor’s annoyance), Sarat Chandra Bose, Subhas Bose’s elder brother, whom the 
protesters chose as their leader.47 
 
     Again, it is telling how the Labour government’s decisions were influenced by the 
possibility of strong public pressures in the future for the release of political prisoners; 
the government of India’s views, on the other hand, were coloured by the need to 
avoid public embarrassments or collapse of ‘law and order’. It demonstrates that, far 
from being autonomous decision-makers, state actors were always in a dialogic 
relationship with pressures from the public domain. 
 
     Debates concerning Quit India violence as well as detention of political prisoners 
were closely linked with issues that came to the fore during discussions on INA trials. 
The Quit India-related cases raised questions about the desirability of interfering with 
judicial procedures. Debates on the fate of political prisoners raised issues concerning 
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the necessity, or otherwise, of holding trials in court. Both became relevant when 
officials at different levels of government discussed the trial of former officers of the 
INA. 
 
 
Towards the First Red Fort Trial 
 
     On 11 August 1945, the Governor-General of the War Department sent a detailed 
report to the Secretary of State describing how the government of India intended to 
deal with rebel soldiers under its custody.48 The War Department divided them into 
three categories – Blacks, Greys and Whites. All Whites and Greys were members of 
the INA. Among those classified as Blacks, some were members of the INA while 
others were soldiers of the 950 Regiment who had allegedly served the Army of Nazi 
Germany.49 
 
     The Whites were those whose loyalties were ‘beyond question’. 50  The War 
Department decided that they would be released forthwith and reinstated in the Indian 
Army. The Greys were those who had served the ‘enemy’, had been subjected to Axis 
propaganda, but were not ‘fundamentally and incurably disloyal’.51 They would be 
dismissed from the services of the Indian Army, forfeit their pay for the period they 
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had spent as prisoners of war, and would become ineligible for war gratuities. A press 
communique pointed out: 
 
The offence of going over to the enemy and fighting against their former comrades is 
the most serious that a soldier can commit. It is punishable with death by the laws of 
almost all countries, and those who have committed this offence and been recaptured 
can claim no rights as belligerents or prisoners of war. The Government of India feels 
however allowance must be made for the circumstances in which the rank and file 
found themselves placed after their capture in Malaya and Burma. From that date they 
were in no position to learn the truth of the progress of the war or to hear any news but 
false and propagandist Japanese reports. Some of them were misled by this propaganda 
or gave way to pressure or the desire for better treatment and joined the enemy with no 
motives beyond an immediate improvement in their living conditions. Those men 
therefore who seem to have been merely misled – and they are the great majority – will 
be treated with clemency.52 
 
This ‘clemency’ included release from detention, leave with pay for forty-two days 
prior to their discharge from the Indian Army and exemption from having to refund 
allowances paid to their families during the time they spent under Japanese pay.53 
 
     The fate of the Blacks, however, became a matter of intense disagreement between 
Indian authorities and the Labour government. By August 1945, the War Department 
had identified about 7,600 captured INA personnel as Blacks. But evidence against 
the vast majority of them, about 5,600 in number, were either lacking or insufficient 
to secure conviction through court martial procedures. Out of the remaining 2000, the 
War Department wanted to try only 600 INA personnel. The Governor-General of the 
War Department intended to dismiss the remaining 1,400 from the British Indian 
Army, against whom incriminating evidence did exist, along with the 5,600 against 
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whom sufficient evidence did not exist, and detain all of them as ‘security 
prisoners’.54 
 
     Punishments in cases of trial of Blacks were either death or transportation for life. 
It was obligatory for courts to award one of the two. However, the confirming officer, 
usually the Commander-in-Chief, could commute either of these sentences to a period 
of imprisonment. Government of India decided that, in the interest of uniformity, 
death sentences would be confirmed only for the following categories of offenders: 
 
(a) Any person actively instrumental in causing the death of any British or Allied 
subject, whether in or out of battle. 
(b) Any person responsible for brutal treatment of any British or Allied subject. 
(c) Any person taking a responsible part in the capture and handing over to the enemy 
of any British or Allied subject. 
(d) The Senior officer, V.C.O. [Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer] or I.O.R. [Indian 
Other Ranks] of any party of over ten in number which deserted to the enemy and 
joined the I.N.A. 
(e) Any person who accepted an appointment as a member of Bose’s Government. 
(f) Any officer of rank of substantive Major and above in the Indian Army who joined 
the I.N.A. and took a prominent and active part in furthering opposition to the 
Allied war effort. 
(g) Officers and V.C.O.s who were Fujiwara volunteers.55 
 
     In total, death sentences were likely to be confirmed in no more than fifty cases. 
The rest would be reduced to periods of incarceration.56 The press communique, after 
dwelling on the ‘mercy and generosity’57 with which the government intended to treat 
the INA prisoners, concluded: 
 
It is well to remember that the behaviour of all these men makes more glorious 
by contrast the courage and endurance of those brave soldiers, the great majority 
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of the prisoners of war, who stayed true to their salt and stubbornly resisted the 
efforts of the enemy to undermine their fidelity.58  
 
     Pethick-Lawrence, however, was ‘much averse’ to ‘a proposal to detain any 
persons without trial and for an indeterminate period’.59 While he appreciated that 600 
courts martial were a huge number in itself, his colleagues would not agree, Pethick-
Lawrence warned, to permit the detention of 1,400 prisoners without trial, even more 
so for the 5,600 Blacks about whom ‘there is a strong presumption of guilt [not] 
sufficient on which to bring to trial’.60 This was not so much because the Labour 
government was obsessed with fair-play; they feared that this would compromise their 
international reputation, and breed mistrust among Indian leaders, jeopardizing the 
chances of a smooth and speedy exit from India. 
 
     The Governor-General of the War Department argued that his policy was dictated 
by logistical constraints.61 He reminded Pethick-Lawrence that the Indian Army was 
understaffed by about five thousand officers. The numbers would only go down 
further with the end of the war, as many British officers would now want to retire or 
be repatriated. Among those who would be available, officers with legal training (who 
could act as prosecutors and judges) were even fewer. Every military court required at 
least five officers. If trials were to be completed within a year’s time, two hundred 
and fifty officers had to sit on courts martial as a whole-time commitment. Again, 
completing the trials of two thousand cases within a reasonable time-frame of twelve 
months would mean that the Commander-in-Chief would have to consider, in person, 
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about forty cases each week for confirmation. As a result of these difficulties, trials 
would have to be limited to the minimum number possible.62 But above all, socio-
political imperatives limited his choices. He had to be fair to those Prisoners of War 
(PoWs) who had ‘resisted enemy attempts to subvert their loyalty’.63 On the other 
hand, he had to take into account the public support for the INA and Subhas Chandra 
Bose – head of the government-in-exile of Free India of which the INA was the 
military arm. Thus, the War Department had to ‘steer a middle ground’. This entailed 
putting only a small number of INA officers on trial, whose trial would certainly lead 
to convictions. 
 
     It would also be impossible to release those INA personnel who would not be tried, 
argued War Department officials. The Governor-General explained that this was not 
only because of military concerns; civilian governments were adamant at ensuring 
that INA Blacks were not let loose on the countryside, where they could fuel civil 
disorder. They were ‘indeed apprehensive about “Greys”’. The Bengal Governor, in 
particular, thought that ‘[t]errorists were eagerly awaiting the return of these 
determined persons trained in the use of arms, and methods of violence’.64 
  
     The response of Pethick-Lawrence to the War Department reveals London’s 
priorities. ‘I regret’, wrote Pethick-Lawrence, ‘I cannot agree to the indefinite 
detention under Ordinance without any prospect of a trial of the men in question’.65 
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He was prepared, however, to agree to detain the accused in ‘military custody’66 while 
their cases were investigated for making a fair trial possible. His objection, then, was 
merely about how the practice of detention without trial of rebel soldiers was 
presented by the government to the public. It demonstrates London’s obsession with 
‘appearances’. The fact of detention without trial did not trouble them too greatly so 
long as it could be portrayed as consistent with the idea of ‘rule of law’. 
 
     It is in this context, of intense and somewhat polarized intergovernmental debates 
surrounding the INA trials, that the Commander-in-Chief worked out the details of the 
first Red Fort trial. Although the exact process of settling the nitty-gritty of the trial 
remain obscure, the tenor of arguments and negotiations between the Labour 
government in Britain, the Indian military establishment and the civilian 
administration in India, leaves no ground for doubt that the decisions around the Red 
Fort trail was a compromise. The Indian military and civilian government stuck to 
their ground of putting up only a few INA officers for courts martial. They did not 
agree to any large-scale release of those who would not be tried. But, as part of the 
bargain, they had to agree to the Labour government’s demand that the limited 
number of trials that would take place should demonstrate the government’s 
commitment to impartiality and justice. Red Fort was the preferred choice precisely 
because it would draw public attention. The trial, as a performance of justice, would 
show that the government had no intention of brushing the INA issue under the 
carpet, or to dispose of the cases in secrecy. The choice of a Muslim, a Sikh and a 
Hindu officer for the first trial also had similar motivations. It was aimed at avoiding 
charges of divide-and-rule. The government wanted to appear impartial and above 
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community differences, and prove that they were not trying to victimize one 
community and appease another. 
 
     The first Red Fort trial was neither an arbitrary nor an autonomous decision by 
Auchinleck. Neither was it, as Fay believes, a casual decision based only upon 
practicality. The details of the trial were settled upon, of course, to ‘send a signal’. 
This signal was not that of imperial high-handedness or thoughtlessness. It was meant 
to make a show of government’s commitment to fair-play, and shore up the 
imaginaries of the state as the repository of impartial justice. Of course, it failed, but 
its failure must not be interpreted teleologically. 
 
The Beginning of the November Agitations in Calcutta 
 
     While colonial officials debated whether INA personnel were to be detained under 
civilian or martial law, the Congress and the ‘nationalist’ press demanded that INA 
officers had to be judged in the light of international law. According to its provisions, 
they argued, Bose and the INA personnel were ‘entitled to all the honours of war and 
are not liable to punishment’.67 Congress was keen on championing the INA cause, at 
least in part because elections loomed during the winter of 1945-46. The Red Fort 
trial was scheduled to start on 5 November 1945. On 15 October, Bhulabhai Desai 
and Asaf Ali, important Congressmen and celebrated lawyers, informed Wavell that 
the three accused – Shah Nawaz Khan, Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon and Prem Kumar 
Sahgal – had entrusted their legal defence to the INA Defence Committee set up by 
                                                 
67 Sir J. Colville to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 3 September 1945, ibid., no. 85, p. 197.  
68 
 
the Congress.68 It was a high-profile Defence Committee. Apart from Desai and Ali, it 
included luminaries like Jawaharlal Nehru, K.N. Katju as well as Sir Tej Bahadur 
Sapru. Sapru’s inclusion was particularly irksome to officialdom as he was a liberal, 
and had opposed the Congress in the past. In the letter to Wavell, Desai and Ali 
asserted that the INA was the ‘well-organized, well-trained and well-disciplined’ 
army of the ‘provisional Government of Free India’, which had a ‘definite 
international status’. 69 Their members were inspired by ‘selfless patriotism’ and a 
‘great desire’ for ‘the achievement of the Independence of India’.70 This was the line 
the Congress INA Defence Committee took in a celebrated legal battle at the Red Fort 
that has become a nationalist legend. 
 
     A.G. Noorani has examined the trial in detail.71 Maybritt Jill Alpes has also shown 
how, by championing the INA cause in the courtroom and outside, the Congress 
appropriated the INA within its version of nationalism.72 However, the protests that 
the INA trial precipitated in different parts of India have not been probed in detail. 
This is not because the agitations are of no interest to historians. In fact, in studies of 
‘popular protests’, the agitations against the Red Fort trial, especially those in 
Calcutta, have found a prominent place.73 But all of this literature has assumed that 
the protests were guided by a ‘non-communal’, ‘anti-imperialist’ spirit. Criticisms of 
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these street actions have been restricted to pointing out their limited geographical 
reach: their location in a few cities. This section revisits the protests in Calcutta and 
offers a new analysis.  
 
     Forebodings of the storm appeared early in the morning of 21 November 1945. A 
police agent reported a ‘morning procession’ at 6:15 a.m., when he spotted about 
thirty individuals meandering through the streets of north Calcutta. 74 They carried 
large framed photographs of Subhas Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru. As the day 
progressed, several students’ processions emerged from different educational 
institutions and poured into Wellington Square - a large open space in the heart of the 
city, just south of College Street, the hub of student life in Calcutta. The Special 
Branch of the Calcutta Police, whose agents made copious records of the events, 
estimated the total number of protesters at the Square to be around one thousand. 
About fifty women were among them.75 
 
     Three organizations dominated student politics in Calcutta at the time: the Bengal 
Provincial Students Federation (BPSF) led by the Communist Party of India (CPI); a 
rival group also calling itself the Bengal Provincial Students Federation, referred to as 
BPSF (New) and led by the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) and the Revolutionary 
Socialist Party (RSP); and, finally there was the Congress-led Bengal Provincial 
Students Congress (BPSC).76 The Congress had taken up the legal defence of the INA 
men; unsurprisingly therefore, the BPSC was initially at the forefront of the Calcutta 
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agitation, and its president, Dilip Kumar Biswas, presided over the Wellington Square 
meeting. The CPI-led BPSF had supported the call for a students’ general strike, ‘but 
there was no formal joint action’.77 
 
     This meeting continued till about 3:15 p.m. Speakers refuted the charge that the 
INA was a Japanese-sponsored force and insisted that Indians should learn discipline 
and communal camaraderie from its ‘own army’. 78  The protesters unanimously 
adopted a resolution calling for the suspension of the INA trials. Finally, Dilip 
Biswas, the President, announced that a students’ procession would march to 
Dalhousie Square to demonstrate outside the Writers’ Building, the headquarters of 
the Bengal government. 79 A large procession of students came out of Wellington 
Square and headed towards Dalhousie Square. Almost immediately, the police 
stopped it at Dharamtalla Street, long before it could reach its destination. Angry 
students protested by squatting on the main thoroughfare, dislocating the heavy traffic 
in the area.  
 
     It was at this stage that the police began to show signs of panic. Special Branch 
(SB) sources estimated the strength of protesters at one and a half to about two 
thousand. The police were hugely outnumbered. A few of them were in plain clothes, 
and they mixed with the crowd to gather intelligence. One such ‘watcher’ shadowed a 
few students, who rang up student leaders of other colleges to join them. A few hours 
later, this new procession of students arrived. The police party, frightened of being 
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surrounded on all sides by protesters, attempted to push back the new students’ 
procession. This angered the protesters even further. Thus began a veritable 
commotion. A lathi-charge by an understaffed police party was met with a rain of 
brickbats back at them. Both parties suffered injuries.80 
 
     For hours, Dharamtalla Street, a major urban thoroughfare became a battlefield. 
The police force became scattered and communication broke down between its 
members. Protesters chased a section of a police batallion standing at the portico of a 
cinema hall. The scared policemen took shelter in its lobby. Inspector Hammond, the 
senior officer commanding this section of the force, tried in vain to disperse the crowd 
with a lathi-charge, but this only infuriated the protestors further, and brickbat-
throwing became more intense. Someone set fire to a police lorry standing just outside 
the cinema. Now the policemen began to fire bullets at the crowd. This resulted in the 
very first casualty reported in police sources. A student, Rameswar Banerjee, died 
having been struck by police bullets. The situation then got out of hand very quickly. 
The protesters, after a brief retreat, began to reassemble and push through the police 
cordon once again.81 
 
     Finally, after considerable damage had been done, a party of senior police officers 
-  consisting of the Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police 
(Headquarters) and Deputy Commissioner of Police (South) - arrived to survey the 
scene. But this hardly helped to bring the situation under control.82 
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     In the meanwhile, another intelligence agent shadowed two students who called up 
Sarat Bose and asked him to lead the students. He refused. Then they called up Syama 
Prasad Mookerjee, the Hindu Mahasabha leader, but he was not at home. Next they 
rang Kiran Sankar Roy, another top leader of the Bengal Congress. He agreed to come 
and speak to the protesters. Eventually, Kiran Sankar Roy, along with two other 
Congress leaders – Atul Kumar and Indu Beed – arrived at Dharamtalla Street. They 
carried a message from Sarat Bose. The police sources report the message as follows: 
 
Students! You have broken my heart by your indiscipline. I appeal to you two dozen 
times to disperse peacefully and I sent Kiran Sankar Roy, Atul Kumar and Indu Beed to 
appeal to you. They appeal to you in the name of the Congress, but you have failed. 
They appealed to you in my name, but you have refused. You have allowed yourself to 
be influenced and guided by agents-provocateur and not by reason. You have by your 
action broken my heart. Still I appeal to you for the last time in the name of the 
Congress to disperse peacefully. May you have the good sense and wisdom to accept 
the address you have been rejecting since 5 p.m.83 
        
     The protesters paid no attention to Sarat Bose; in fact, his message seemed to 
incense them.  One student tore up the paper that contained his message.84 The rest 
refused to disperse. At about 10 p.m., by the time the Governor arrived at the scene, 
many leaders had tried to pacify the students, urging them to disperse. Dr. Syama 
Prasad Mookerjee, the charismatic Hindu Mahasabha leader, also spoke to the 
protesters. 85  Women leaders took a very prominent part. Bimal Pratibha Devi, a 
socialist trade-union leader with Forward Bloc leanings, but who, by the mid-1940s 
was becoming ideologically closer to the Congress Socialist Party86, played a vital 
role in leading the students’ protests. She was allegedly beaten up by the police. 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86  An undated Special Branch report entitled ‘The responsibility for the disturbances in 
Calcutta from 21.11.45 to 23.11.45’ in K.P.M. No. 01687/05, S.B. File No. 868D, P.M. 
(1945).  
73 
 
Jyotirmoyee Ganguly, a leader of the women’s movement who had been close to 
Subhas Bose in the 1930s, was also present in solidarity with the students. The very 
next morning she was killed in a tragic road accident.87 
 
     Students continued to occupy Dharamtalla Street all night, although their numbers 
fell to about two hundred. The police reported only the death of one student, 
Rameswar Banerjee, in police firing, but it seems that there were other casualties 
too.88 Gautam Chattopadhyay mentions Kadam Rasul, a young factory worker, who 
was also killed by bullet wounds.89 
 
     The next morning, Nagarmal Sharma, a Marwari businessman of Burrabazar and a 
prominent Congress worker, fed the assembled students. At 6:30 a.m., Bimal Pratibha 
Devi addressed them and implored them ‘to move as a disciplined army and to spread 
revolution among the people’. She reminded them that their mission was not merely 
to march to Dalhousie Square; their objective was to ‘attain the freedom of their 
motherland’.90 Upon Bimal Pratibha Devi’s advice, according to police sources, the 
students divided themselves into groups and dispersed through the city streets urging 
the public to observe a general strike.91 
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     The protests on the first day, 21 November 1945, demonstrated considerable unity 
among students. They challenged the legitimacy of judicial procedures under the aegis 
of the colonial state through street action. They also rejected attempts at top-down 
control by the established political leadership. Even the BPSC – the students’ wing of 
the Congress, as well as the Forward Bloc, the party created by Subhas Bose, defied 
Sarat Bose’s authority. Yet the apparent unity conceals the restricted support-base of 
the protests. Large sections of the political spectrum of the province remained aloof 
from the first day’s street action. Communist students continued to sit on the fence, 
until P.C. Joshi, the General Secretary of the CPI, sent a wire on 22 November, urging 
the BPSF to ‘be with the people’.92 Again, beyond the rather passive presence of 
Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the Hindu Mahasabha did not actively participate. Most 
importantly, students affiliated with the Muslim League largely kept away from the 
agitation. 93  In a Muslim-majority province with an increasingly assertive Muslim 
population and an influential Muslim League political leadership, this was a major 
weakness of the movement. Protesters celebrated the non-communal spirit of the INA, 
but the street action of 21 November did not break the communal divide. 
 
The Changing Complexion of the November Agitations 
 
     Whatever unity there was on the first day of the demonstration soon began to 
crumble. Dissensions and rivalries between political outfits and their factions came to 
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the forefront, to such a degree that it was impossible to sustain the image of these 
protests as united struggles against colonialism any more. 
 
     On the first night of the demonstration, 21 November, at an emergency meeting at 
the BPSF (New) office in Mirzapur street, student representatives of BPSC, BPSF 
(New) as well as other smaller groups such as the Chatra Samsad, the Medical 
Students’ Union and the Marwari Students’ Union attempted to form a joint council 
of action.94 The younger members of the RSPI, Forward Bloc and other parties were 
‘very agitated’, a Special Branch agent observed, who were ‘in favour of creating 
chaos and disorder similar to the August 1942 Disturbances’.95 But Samarendra Basu 
apparently withdrew the BPSC from any such ‘adventurism’.96 The meeting broke up 
in disagreement. 
 
     The CPI, as has been pointed out before, stayed largely aloof from the 21 
November agitations. But on 22 November, once the BPSF received directives in 
favour of joining the movement from its party leadership, communist students 
plunged into action, using CPI’s foothold among labour unions to orchestrate a 
workers’ strike.97 However, an SB agent described speeches of communist student 
leaders at a CPI-organized meeting the same evening as rather tame. It is significant 
that despite the usual readiness of the colonial state to blame any ‘disruption’ as 
communist-inspired, an SB report had to confess: ‘…there is no evidence in the SB or 
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Intelligence Bureau (IB) to show that they engaged in acts of violence as a party 
although individual members might have done so.’98 It also expressed grave doubts 
about the sincerity of Communist participation and wondered whether this was a mere 
tactical manoeuver to retain mass popularity.99 
 
     The second day’s protest was, nonetheless, impressive. All shops were shut, all 
educational institutions went on strike, transport came to a standstill, and workers 
downed tools in many factories in the industrial suburbs of Calcutta. Buses, trams, 
taxis and even rickshaws were invisible on the city’s streets. Massive student 
processions came out. Police reports mention that the largest procession, which 
marched from College Street, consisted of about ten thousand students. 100  Large 
numbers of workers affiliated with communist trade unions also joined. The Special 
Branch reported strong anti-British feeling. A swadeshi mood also seemed palpable. 
Protesters forced the public to discard their hats, ties and coats – as alleged symbols of 
western cultural domination. They made them throw away their cigarettes and forced 
them to smoke bidis instead.101 
 
     Different processions eventually converged at Wellington Square early that 
afternoon. It was a huge gathering – a Special Branch report produced on the day put 
the figure at thirty thousand. 102  Another report, compiled about two weeks later, 
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reported of a crowd of twenty thousand. 103  Protesters carried Congress and 
Communist flags, along with Muslim League standards, for the first time during the 
protest.104 To all outward appearances, the moment of cross-communal unity seemed 
to have arrived at last. It soon descended into anticlimax, however, as the unity 
proved to be a chimera. The meeting dissolved in a complete fiasco; the audience 
booed RSPI speakers. BPSC and Forward Bloc members accused the RSPI of taking 
over and dominating the proceedings. They stalled the meeting and urged their 
supporters to march to Dalhousie Square instead. 105  Protesters dispersed, and 
members of different organizations marched out in different directions. 
 
     While the meeting was breaking up in disarray, Sarat Bose at last made a public 
appearance. He had finally managed to gather a coterie of student supporters and 
marched along Wellington Street at the head of a procession of about five thousand 
students and entered the Square. 106  He attempted to give a speech, but nobody 
bothered to listen; his voice was rendered inaudible ‘in the midst of tremendous 
confusion.’107 The Special Branch reporter observed, ‘As far as could be gathered, he 
was requesting the students to obey the orders of trusted leaders and to stop being 
violent.’ 108  At that moment, news arrived of further police firings on student 
protesters in Dharamtalla Street. There was a stampede for the gates of the Square, 
and within a few minutes it was empty. Sarat Bose, deprived of an audience, walked 
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to his car and the police reporter lost sight of him in the midst of the departing 
crowd.109        
 
     Police firing on the second day resulted in heavy casualties. Every political party 
seemed taken aback at the level of violence. Leaders realized that they were fast 
losing control over their followers. They made a second attempt to set up a joint 
‘Council of Action’, this time with the express purpose of stopping ‘further acts of 
hooliganism’110 and ‘rowdyism’.111 The need for asserting control over ‘mobs’ had 
thus gained precedence over protests against the colonial government.  
 
     This was not a betrayal by the Congress ‘bourgeois’ leadership alone. Every 
political party was anxious to quell ‘leaderless’ mass action. In fact, that was the only 
plank upon which leaders of all parties really tried to come together; but even on this 
cause, fractious Bengal politics proved incapable of reaching agreement. Both the 
BPSF (New) and BPSC were represented in the council. ‘It is vague what actually 
took place’, reported one SB agent.112 But, by the following day, BPSC withdrew its 
support from the Council. ‘In effect’, the SB report concluded, ‘the council of action 
had hardly been established before it disintegrated, having achieved nothing.’113 
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     By that time, however, almost all political groupings wanted the agitation to come 
to an end. On 23 November, the RSPI formed six ‘peace squads’ and urged people to 
remain peaceful. In the meanwhile, the Congress High Command had denounced the 
movement in no uncertain terms; the Bengal Congress followed suit. 114  But the 
general strike continued unabated. That afternoon, the Congress leaders also sent out 
groups of Congress activists to ensure peace, with the active support of the CPI.115 
Vans fitted with loudspeakers and taxis flying both Congress and Communist flags 
were visible all over the city, pacifying protesters who still thronged the streets; 
everywhere they urged labourers to go back to work. A Special Branch officer 
observed: 
  
The communist volte-face from the previous day, and also from the same morning, was 
very noticeable. Previously party members had been urging workers to go on strike and 
demonstrate… and now they were aligning themselves with the Congress and asking 
the public to be quiet and to return to work.116 
 
     On the afternoon of 23 November, the government called out the army. 117 
Protesters had attacked military trucks since the first day of the uprising. But the 
Bengal government had not authorized the army to use force against protesters. Now 
it gave them a free hand, and there was hardly a protest from the political 
establishment. Congress leaders like Dr. Nalinakshya Sanyal, who was soon to be 
purged from the provincial Congress as part of a drive by the High Command to 
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cleanse it of ‘dissidents’,118 were happy to allow the law and order machinery to take 
over the city streets.119 In a conversation with the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of SB 
at Bhawanipore Police Station on 23 November in the evening, Dr. Sanyal reportedly 
said, ‘…he and other leaders were not heeded by the hooligans and [they] ran the risk 
of being assaulted.’120 He wanted Congress leaders to make a last ditch attempt to go 
into troubled areas to pacify the public, but ‘[t]hereafter, if they fail, they [Congress] 
will be quite prepared for the police or other authorities to maintain order.’121 He went 
on in this vein saying that ‘…police parties should refrain from becoming aroused by 
minor irritations and should avoid irritating the crowd with minor actions.’122 The DC 
appreciated Dr. Sanyal’s concerns but was firm in pointing out, ‘…the one “irritation” 
police parties were not prepared to put up with was being bombarded with 
brickbats.’123 
 
     The CPI organized two small meetings on the same day. One was in South 
Calcutta at Hazra Park, the other was at Manashatala Bayam Samiti in North 
Calcutta.124 In both meetings communist leaders urged the public to remain peaceful. 
The BPSF (New) held the last well-attended public meeting at Sraddhananda Park. 
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According to police estimates, about ten thousand people assembled at the venue. But, 
by then, signs of fatigue were unmistakable.125 There was some mismanagement and 
there was no microphone for the speakers to use. By the time one was found, the 
crowd had reportedly dwindled to a fraction of its initial size. But participation was 
wider and more inclusive; Khaksars, 126  Fazlul Huq’s group 127  as well as some 
students from Islamia College were present. Many prominent leaders addressed the 
gathering, including Amiya Nath Bose, Sarat Bose’s son, who had, by this stage, 
become something like a private secretary to his father. 128  He explained how 
‘valuable strength would be dissipated in fruitless action’ unless discipline was 
maintained till the ‘right moment’ arrived.129 
 
     Matters came to a head, however, when Badrul Hyder Chaudhuri of RSPI, who 
was presiding over the meeting, rose to speak. In a rather tactless remark, he 
suggested that Sarat Bose was ‘responsible for the loss of numerous students’ 
precious lives’ which could have been averted if he had come to the first day’s protest 
at Dharamtalla Street. 130  He went on to describe Sarat Bose’s actions as 
unstatesmanlike, arguing that ‘…such men would have to be eliminated from leading 
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positions’. 131  Utter chaos erupted that instant. Bose loyalists disrupted the 
proceedings, declaring that the meeting had been ‘captured’ by the RSPI. In the 
pandemonium that ensued, Chaudhuri had to be sneaked out of the meeting to the 
BPSF (New) office at 18 Mirzapore Street.132 The trouble did not end there. Shortly 
thereafter, batches of Forward Bloc students attacked the BPSF (New) office at 
Mirzapore Street.133 The road outside it was filled with angry students who attempted 
to break into the building. Fearing a riot, BPSF (New) leaders addressed the crowd 
with loudspeakers from the balcony, pacifying them by singing praises of the Bose 
brothers and eulogizing their contribution to the students’ movement in Bengal. In 
due course, the situation calmed down and the crowd dispersed.134 
 
     This was not just a manifestation of party-political rivalries. In order to unravel the 
full import of the event described above, one has to delve deeper into the murky 
waters of Bengal politics and its constantly shifting configurations. It has generally 
been argued that political and communal unity was better forged at the barricades than 
in legislative bodies.135 However, close historical examination of agitational politics 
reveals the impossibility of any neat separation between the two domains. Unity of 
purpose did create a façade of concord when observed from a distance. However, any 
tiny ripple could easily blow away the entire fabric of political consensus, exposing – 
not quite the emperor’s new clothes - but the delicate balance of factional adjustments 
that had to be assembled in order to produce the illusion of unity. Influential leaders 
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invested in legislative and party-oriented factional politics each had their coterie of 
supporters in street agitations; and these supporters, even in moments of street action, 
often reproduced the factional alignments of high politics at the barricades. 
 
     Sarat Bose, a successful Calcutta lawyer, had actively participated in Congress 
politics since the 1930s along with his brother Subhas Chandra Bose.136 The Bose 
brothers emerged as a powerful faction within the Bengal Congress. Initially their 
rival was J.M. Sengupta. But, after his death in 1933, the Bose faction operated in 
opposition to a rival faction led by Bidhan Chandra Roy, a prominent Calcutta 
physician. Around this time, to buttress the influence of their faction, the Bose 
brothers had begun patronizing a group of young revolutionaries, who provided a 
backbone of support in intra-party rivalries.137 
 
     The largest revolutionary societies in Bengal were Jugantar and the Anushilan 
Samiti. In the post-Swadeshi phase, these revolutionaries had adopted militant 
terrorist modes of political self-expression, and had caused considerable consternation 
in British bureaucratic circles, with the result that most of their cadres were rounded 
up at the first signs of unrest in the wake of Gandhian mass uprisings in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. 138  During the mid 1930s, precisely at the point when the Bengal 
Congress was undergoing radical factional readjustments, the revolutionaries began to 
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return to active politics, many after long periods in jail.139 The Jugantar cadres mostly 
joined the Congress and formed the base of support for the Bose brothers within the 
party. The Anushilan Samiti’s members took a somewhat different political trajectory. 
 
     The late twenties and the early thirties of the twentieth century was also a 
watershed in the history of the Indian left-wing movements.140 This was the time 
when the colonial state was devising elaborate judicial procedures to criminalize 
leftist, especially communist, ideas and staged a number of high-profile court trials in 
a series of ‘conspiracy cases’. While serving their long jail sentences as political 
prisoners, members of the Anushilan Samiti often found themselves in the company 
of Marxist leaders and political activists. Tanika Sarkar points out that Anushilan 
activists were relatively more open minded and receptive to newer ideas than their 
Jugantar counterparts. 141  Marxist ideas attracted many of them. So, once the 
Anushilan members came out of prisons, many of them joined the Congress Socialist 
Party (CSP), the left wing lobby within the official Congress that had adopted 
Marxism as their official ideology in 1936.142 However, they were careful to maintain 
their separate identity even within CSP. The Anushilan group had actively supported 
Subhas Bose’s candidacy for Presidentship of the Congress Party at the Tripuri 
Congress in 1938 – that fateful All India Congress session that led to Subhas Bose’s 
expulsion from the Congress. However, CSP’s vacillation under Jayaprakash 
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Narayan’s leadership, and its ultimate ‘betrayal’ of Bose for the sake of ‘Congress 
unity’, fuelled resentment amongst Anushilan’s members.143 
 
    Subhas Bose formed the Forward Bloc after the Tripuri debacle, as a vehicle to 
consolidate left wing support under his leadership. The Anushilan group, despite their 
growing discontent against the CSP, was skeptical about joining it, although they did 
take part in the Left Consolidation Committee under Bose’s initiative.144 The latter 
initiative fell to pieces very soon, as the Second World War transformed the context 
of Indian politics altogether. Anushilan members, still loosely affiliated with CSP, 
decided to strike out on their own. In March 1940, they launched their own 
Revolutionary Socialist Party by joining hands with some activists of the Hindustan 
Socialist Republican Army of the legendary Punjab revolutionary, Bhagat Singh.145 
Unlike the CPI and the Royists, RSP took the line that the best way of fighting 
fascism and defending the Soviet Union was to overthrow colonial rule in a civil 
war. 146  This was not very different from Subhas Bose’s position, and the RSP 
continued supporting the initiatives of the Bose brothers from outside the Congress. 
Yet the very same RSP clashed with Bose’s supporters in the evening of 23 
November 1945.  
 
     It is noteworthy that the nature of affinity between the Bose brothers and the RSP 
activists was more in the nature of personal loyalty than ideological attraction. The 
latter were at pains to retain their separate identity from both the Bose faction within 
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the official Congress as well as the Forward Bloc. Thus, the public fight between RSP 
and Bose’s supporters was not a tussle between two rival political outfits with distinct 
political positions. It was more of fratricidal hostility, an inter-familial struggle within 
the same political formation that brought the fragility of the alliances forged in the 
1930s under the spotlight. 
 
     In any case, after the public fiasco at Sraddhananda Park and Mirzapore Street, the 
November movement largely fizzled out. The situation returned more or less to 
normal the next morning. Transport services ran as usual and labourers went back to 
work.147 The only political activity on 24 November involved the funeral processions 
of young men, some of them in their early teens – school children – who had died of 
gunshot wounds.148 There was a political gathering of sorts at Muhammad Ali Park, 
where Abdus Salam’s body was brought in. Salam was a Khaksar activist and had 
been killed by police bullets. Important political personalities attended, including 
heavy-weight Congress leaders like Kiran Sankar Roy, Aurobindo Bose, the Jugantar 
Congressite Surendra Mohan Ghosh, Dr. Nalinakshya Sanyal and Bimal Pratibha 
Devi. Kiran Sankar Roy congratulated the students on their ‘success’ while 
condemning ‘hooliganism by mischief-mongers’.149 
 
     Of course, Adbus Salam’s ‘martyrdom’ had to be made much of by those who 
were keen not to waste the symbolic value generated by the November protests. Now 
that the movement had come to an end, it was important to salvage whatever could be 
of any value for buttressing the credentials of political parties and leaders as 
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‘vanguards of anti-colonial resistance’. One way of achieving this was to actively 
promote the appearance of unity in what was essentially a heterogeneous movement. 
Uncomfortable incidents of violence and defiance of the organized leadership had to 
be relegated to the domain of ‘hooliganism’ carried out by ‘mischief-mongers’, while 
the struggle of the ‘true’ students and workers had to be celebrated as a groundswell 
of popular anti-colonialism of a homogeneous and united ‘citizenry’ of a subjugated 
nation.150 
 
     The major problem in this endeavour was the persistence of a palpable communal 
divide. In a Muslim-majority province, the lack of active participation of Muslim 
political formations, especially the Muslim League, was a major stumbling block.151 
In this context, Abdus Salam’s death had immense symbolic value; leaders, especially 
of the Congress, were keen to harness the symbol in order to sustain the illusion of a 
cross-communal alliance that supposedly ‘characterized’ the INA agitation in 
November 1945. 
 
     A brief account of Muslim League’s position vis-à-vis the November agitations is 
in order. On the second day of protest on 22 November, Muslim League students, 
especially those from Islamia College, had attended the mass rallies organized by 
BPSC and BPSF (New). But they were immediately ordered by some of the League 
leaders not to get involved any further. In a confidential statement, Muhammad 
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Usman, Secretary of the Calcutta Muslim League, assured the Bengal government 
that the Muslim League had absolutely no sympathy for the INA cause because had 
Bose’s army ‘succeeded in occupying India they would have ignored the Muslim 
League and its demands for Pakistan.’152 He confessed that the Muslim League passed 
resolutions expressing sympathy with the INA men merely to avoid criticism from 
rival political parties across the country.153 Of course, the Muslim League was as 
faction-ridden as any other political party in Bengal. But whatever fragmentary 
evidence is available suggests that at least a significant section of Muslim League 
leaders was at best lukewarm in their support for the November agitations in Calcutta. 
In fact, many Muslim League followers were actively hostile to the INA personnel on 
trial, especially Shah Nawaz Khan. 154  Despite being a Muslim, he had publicly 
expressed his support for the Congress. At a time when Indian Muslims, including 
those in Bengal, were attempting to articulate a distinct national identity in opposition 
to the Hindus, a ‘nationalist’ Muslim with country-wide popular support was hardly 
welcome to those who had deep faith in the League cause. 
 
     It seems, therefore, that hailing the Calcutta agitations in November 1945 as the 
epitome of a spontaneous ‘cross-communal, anti-colonial’ mass sentiment is a post 
facto construction. It possibly started as a nationalist folklore, and then found its way 
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into historiography. The last two sections have made an attempt to open up such 
received wisdom to historical scrutiny. 
 
Conclusion 
 
     This chapter aimed at refuting two assumptions about the INA agitations in 
Calcutta in November 1945 that remain pervasive in the historiography of popular 
politics in post-war India. The first assumption is that the colonial government had 
arbitrarily and autonomously decided to hold a joint trial of a Muslim, a Sikh and a 
Hindu at the Red Fort. The second assumption is that the potent symbols invoked in 
the staging of the trial stirred people of all faiths to come together and launch a united 
struggle against the colonial government. 
 
     The chapter has suggested that in order to understand how the first Red Fort trial 
came to be staged in the way it did, a contextual reading of sources becomes 
necessary. The specific decisions on the trial becomes intelligible only when these are 
studied alongside debates on other issues that claimed the attention of the post-war 
administration in India and the newly elected Labour government in Britain. It shows, 
first, that bureaucratic decisions, especially of such magnitude, cannot be seen as 
‘autonomous decision-making’ on the part of state-actors. This chapter has 
demonstrated how, every argument, every detail of the decisions arrived at through 
discussions between different echelons of government responded to pressures in the 
public domain. 
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     The public protests that erupted in Calcutta against the trial of the INA officers at 
the Red Fort, this chapter has also suggested, cannot be easily reconciled to any 
simple narrative of çross-communal anti-colonial protests. A careful examination of 
the way the protests unfolded, the nature of leadership and participation in these 
agitations, and the divisions that emerged among the ranks of the protesters, bear 
testimony to complexities that existing historiography has consistently overlooked, 
deliberately or otherwise. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Aftermath of the First Red Fort Trial: The Rashid Ali  
Agitations in Calcutta 
 
     In the historiography of popular politics on the eve of India’s independence, the 
street agitation in Calcutta in February 1946 against the conviction of Indian National 
Army officer Captain Rashid Ali is held as the high watermark of cross-communal 
anti-colonialism.1 Gautam Chattopadhyay describes it as the ‘Almost Revolution’.2 
Under suitable leadership, Chattopadhyay holds, this could have saved the people of 
the subcontinent from the tragedy of partition. 
 
     This chapter argues for a reassessment of the agitation. It takes a closer look at the 
trial of Rashid Ali to reveal how the trial was used as a symbol in the popular protests 
that erupted in Calcutta. It suggests that the agitations only strategically invoked the 
trial, ignoring its more controversial dimensions, and represented it as an exemplar of 
state oppression. These agitations, this chapter will further argue, must be understood 
as the unfolding of a progressive crisis of the late colonial state apparatus, brought 
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about by relentless criticism of its justice system, public denunciations of its coercive 
practices and defiance of its order-enforcing machinery during street actions. 
 
     The chapter opens with a reassessment of the government’s policy towards the 
INA, and the changing disposition of political parties on the INA question, after the 
Calcutta agitations in November 1945. Just as the Government became reluctant to 
push for further INA trials, Congress leaders also attempted to distance themselves 
from the street militancy that the trials had precipitated. Yet, they were also reluctant 
to cede the glory that came with championing the INA cause, and all too aware that 
Congress’ competitors were eager to appropriate the INA issue for their own benefit. 
Congress’ success in setting free the INA officers after the first Red Fort trial raised 
the value of the INA to all political parties. Rashid Ali’s turn towards the Muslim 
League provided the latter with a golden opportunity. 
 
     The second section examines how the League championed Rashid Ali’s trial. It 
will show how the arguments voiced in favour of Rashid Ali were very different from 
the line the defence took during the first Red Fort trial. It will show how, given the 
tenor of arguments in court, Rashid Ali’s case cannot be fitted into the pattern of anti-
communal anti-colonialism. 
 
     The discomfiting details of the court proceedings in the Rashid Ali case, the next 
two sections show, barely found mention during the street agitations in Calcutta in 
February 1946. Rashid Ali was invoked merely as a symbol to voice a deeper resent-
ment against the colonial state. 
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Changing Attitudes towards the Indian National Army after  
the Calcutta Agitations in 1945 
 
     Protests in Calcutta against the trial of Shah Nawaz Khan, Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon 
and Prem Kumar Sahgal in November 1945 forced colonial officials to rethink their 
policy of holding more INA trials. Even before the Calcutta protests, Auchinleck, the 
Commander-in-Chief, had expressed doubts about how far the rank and file of the In-
dian Army were hostile towards the INA ‘traitors’.3 Intelligence reports revealed that 
returning prisoners of war were not doing enough to proselytize against the INA in 
their native villages and towns. 4  After the November agitations in Calcutta, 
Auchinleck held a meeting with senior military officers, Home Department officials 
and provincial representatives, to discuss government’s INA policy.5 Despite opposi-
tion from several senior officials, Auchinleck decided to limit future INA trials only 
to cases that involved acts of brutality or murder. He was now convinced that ‘…there 
was a growing feeling of sympathy for the INA’ in the army.6 He responded to his 
critics by asserting that no ‘senior British officer today knows what is the real feeling 
among the Indian ranks regarding the INA’. Except for those convicted on grounds of 
brutality and murder, Auchinleck’s preference was to release guilty officers if the tri-
                                                 
3 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 2 November 1945, Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Transfer of Pow-
er, 1942-7, (Henceforth TP), vol. VI, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976, no. 
185, pp. 433-6. 
4 Home Department to the Secretary, Political Department, Government of India, India Of-
fice, 20 November 1945. See enclosed report from the Intelligence Bureau, Home Depart-
ment. Ibid., no. 222, pp. 512-5. 
5 Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November 1945, ibid., no. 233, pp. 530-1. 
6 Auchinleck to Wavell, 26 November 1945, ibid., no. 241, p. 544. 
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als proved that they had acted in ‘good faith’.7 If they were held in prison, he feared, 
new governments after the elections in the spring of 1946 would release them and 
even attempt to reinstate them in the British Indian Army. The Governor of the North 
West Frontier Province (an important base for army recruitment) went even further 
than Auchinleck. He argued that the Commander-in-Chief, ‘on his own volition and 
his own responsibility’, should immediately announce the withdrawal of all future tri-
als against the INA. Although this course of action was ‘repugnant’ to him, he be-
lieved that this was the only solution. The trials, he thought, were increasingly becom-
ing an ‘Indian versus British’ issue and ‘[t]he only way of stopping the rot is by a 
clean cut… and at once’.8 
 
     Two factors prompted this rethinking. First was the idea that no British army of-
ficer really understood what Indian soldiers felt about the INA; it was possible that 
many were sympathetic to the INA cause. Auchinleck referred to the ‘sepoy mutiny’ 
of 1857 to strengthen this argument. He was not alone: Governor Twynam of the Cen-
tral Provinces and Berar spoke directly about how troops might respond if ordered to 
fire on mobs (including violent protests against the INA trials). He went so far as to 
compare the present state of affairs with ‘the days of the mutiny’.9 He had actually 
taken the trouble to revisit old files from 1857 and found it ‘extraordinary how Units 
which were thought to be perfectly loyal suddenly decided to throw in their lot with 
the mutineers’.10 This confirmed his fears, though he was careful to insist that he did 
                                                 
7 Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November 1945, ibid., no. 233, pp. 530-1. 
8 Sir G. Cunningham to Wavell, 27 November 1945, ibid., no. 243, p. 546. 
9 Twynam to Wavell, 26 November 1945, TP, vol. VI, no. 239, p. 542.  
10 Ibid., pp. 542-3. 
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not mean to suggest ‘any widespread disposition on these lines’.11 It was the twitching 
of an old wound that had never quite healed. The second factor was worry about the 
way Indian politicians were using, and would continue to use, the INA issue for their 
‘selfish’ interests. 
 
     The November agitations in Calcutta had also made Indian politicians rethink their 
stance. Emerging after a period of incarceration, disarray and inactivity, the Congress 
championed the INA cause just as the leaders had begun their electoral campaigns in 
earnest. The Congress had taken the lead in defending the INA officers in court, and 
had made the trials a major election issue. Yet, once the November agitations broke 
out in Calcutta, Congress leaders wondered whether they had gone too far in whip-
ping up mass frenzy around the INA cause. The Congress High Command soon began 
singing a different tune. At an election rally in Bombay on 24 November, only a day 
after Calcutta had calmed down, Sardar Patel condemned the ‘frittering away’ of en-
ergies in ‘trifling quarrels’ with the police.12 From 7 to 11 December 1945, when the 
Congress Working Committee met in Calcutta to draw up its manifesto for provincial 
elections, it reaffirmed its commitment to the doctrine of non-violence. Patel clarified 
Congress’s attitude towards the INA in a public speech, which proclaimed that while 
the INA soldiers deserved to be celebrated for their courage, self-sacrifice and com-
munal unity, members of the INA who wished to join the Congress had to abide by 
the Congress creed of non-violence and ‘put their swords back into their scabbard’.13 
 
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 543. 
12 Indian Annual Register, July-December 1945. Quoted in Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and 
National Leadership’, p. 682. 
13 Hindu, 10 December 1945. Quoted in Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army: India’s Armed 
Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945, New Delhi: Rupa, 1994, p. 503. 
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     In Bengal, the BPCC’s attitude towards the INA remained somewhat different. 
Subhas Bose had by then attained a heroic status in Bengal and the INA enjoyed huge 
popular support in the province. Sarat Bose basked in the reflected glory of his broth-
er Subhas’s achievements. If Congress were to strengthen its shaky foothold in Ben-
gal during the elections, the High Command had to forget the past and invite Sarat 
Bose, a long-time Congress rebel, back into the fold.  
 
     Early in January 1946, after the tortuous and historic Red Fort Trials, Shah Nawaz, 
Sahgal and Dhillon were found guilty on a number of charges. But Auchinleck remit-
ted the sentence of transportation for life and released all three men. Changes in the 
attitude of the Congress High Command towards INA agitations notwithstanding, this 
was a moment of glory for the party and its INA Defence Committee. It was duly cel-
ebrated with huge fanfare in Delhi. So, when Shah Nawaz came to Calcutta in the lat-
ter half of January 1946, his popularity was at its peak; on his arrival, Major Shah 
Nawaz Reception Committees sprang up in various districts of Bengal;14 he was, at 
this stage, receiving invitations from all parts of India to visit.15 Unsurprisingly, Sarat 
Bose was determined to make most of this to recover his reputation, damaged by his 
refusal to lead the INA protests in November. He celebrated ‘INA weeks’ and his 
brother’s birthday with pomp; and the Working Committee meeting in Calcutta in 
December 1945 gave him the opportunity to invite All-India Congress luminaries to 
some of these celebrations. The resolutions and public utterances of some of these 
leaders, as we have seen, might have dampened the INA spirit somewhat, but Sarat 
                                                 
14 See, for example, letter from Mr. Fazal Karim, Kharagpur to the Secretary, INA Relief 
Committee, Calcutta, dated 30 January 1946, K.P.M. No. 01690/05; S.B. File No. 868 II, 
P.M. (1946), SBR, CP. 
15 See, for example, letter from the Councillor, Corporation of Madras to Sarat Bose, Calcutta, 
dated 6 February 1946, ibid. 
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Bose counter-balanced this by persuading Shah Nawaz himself to visit Calcutta and 
participate in some of these events. 
 
     Although Congress leaders attempted to lower the temperature of mass agitations, 
they could ill-afford to let go of the INA’s glory. If they did, opponents of the Con-
gress could use this powerful political symbol to their benefit. The All India Hindu 
Mahasabha (AIHM), for example, was desperate to appropriate the INA and Subhas 
Bose’s legacy for all that it was worth. The Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha, for 
its part, instructed its supporters to celebrate Subhas Bose’s birthday on 23 January ‘in 
a fitting manner in cooperation with all sections of people irrespective of party affilia-
tion’.16 This was, the circular explained, a directive from the All-India organization, 
which was also organizing Bose’s birthday celebrations at an all-India level. Senior 
leaders instructed party workers to emphasize how ‘the life work of Netaji Subhas 
Chandra as represented through the INA movement is the national corollary of the 
policy of militarization pursued by the Mahasabha during the War’.17 Party propagan-
dists were asked to explain that Netaji stood for India’s integrity, just as the 
Mahasabha had always opposed vivisection of the country, against the designs of the 
Muslim League.18 Support also seemed to be forthcoming from INA officers them-
selves. Correspondence between Mahasabha leaders intercepted by the Calcutta Po-
lice reveal, for example, that Major General Bhonsle, the Chief of Staff of the INA, 
                                                 
16 Circular from Hindu Mahasabha, issued by Debendra Nath Mukherjee, General Secretary, 
Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha, K.P.M. No. 01689/05; S.B. File No. 868, P.M. (1946), 
SBR, CP. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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had expressed his inclination to join the Mahasabha rather than the Congress. 19 
Bhonsle knew that the Congress would not let him contest elections on its ticket un-
less he agreed to sign the non-violence pledge; the Mahasabha, on the other hand, was 
more than happy to ‘honour him’ with an election ticket.20  
 
     The Hindu Mahasabha was not the Congress’s only opponent. The Forward Bloc 
was also determined to claim the achievements of the INA. As long as the fate of the 
INA officers on trial remained uncertain, the Forward Bloc’s leaders had maintained a 
low profile. But now that the INA officers had become national heroes after their re-
lease, they resented the Congress for monopolizing all the kudos. The Bloc was 
Subhas Bose’s party established after he was expelled from the Congress; so Bloc 
members felt entitled to the INA legacy. At a Working Committee meeting in Calcut-
ta in January 1946, a Forward Bloc leader asserted that the Congress was ‘exploiting’ 
Shah Nawaz, Sahghal and Dhillon, ‘for its own electioneering purposes’;21 no sooner 
than the ‘Fascist dictators’ of the Congress feel that ‘they had outlived their utility’ 
than ‘the same heroes of today will become the condemned individuals [of] tomor-
row’.22 The proof was that the Congress had given election tickets to few members of 
the Forward Bloc, despite the fact that during the Quit India Movement in 1942 it was 
their leaders ‘who were shedding their blood in the prisons while Patels, Nehrus and 
                                                 
19 See ‘Hindu Affairs: 25.1.46 – All India Hindu Mahasabha’, ibid. The report is a summary 
of a letter dated 21 January 1946 from Ashutosh Lahiri to B. S. Munjee, intercepted on 23 
January 1946.  
20 See ‘Hindu Affairs: 1.2.46, Hindu Mahasabha – INA’, K.P.M. No. 01690/05, S.B. File No. 
868 II, P.M. (1946), SBR CP. 
21 Dawn, 27 January 1946. 
22 Ibid. 
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Pants were fattening themselves in the Agha Khan Palace’.23 The Forward Bloc want-
ed to save the released INA officers from the ‘Congress Goebbels’.24 
 
     The Muslim League’s growing interest in the INA trials had the most far-reaching 
consequences. The League’s disposition towards the INA was lukewarm until they 
realized the extent of popular enthusiasm the issue was capable of generating. During 
the November INA agitations in Calcutta, the League’s involvement was minimal. 
However, once the INA officers were released and the credit for this feat was in dan-
ger of being claimed exclusively by the Congress-sponsored INA Defence Commit-
tee, the League took up the issue with greater seriousness. The fact that one of the 
three officers was a Muslim made the situation more pressing and embarrassing. The 
Central Assembly election results had given the League considerable satisfaction – its 
candidates had trounced almost all rival claimants, including the ‘Nationalist Mus-
lims’ of the Congress.25 Yet there were still the provincial elections to be fought.26 
Shah Nawaz’s support for the Congress might enable it to recover some lost ground 
among Muslim voters.  
 
    Whatever the realities of communal harmony within the INA, the INA issue had 
done little to repair the divisions between the Congress and the Muslim League. This 
was proved once again when Shah Nawaz was being considered as a candidate for the 
Punjab Legislative Assembly. The idea was floated by the Punjab Provincial Congress 
Committee in November 1945 while Shah Nawaz was still under trial. The plan was 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Fay, The Forgotten Army, p. 500. Some Congress Muslim candidates did enter the Central 
Assembly, such as Asaf Ali who contested from the Delhi open constituency. 
26 Ibid., pp. 485-486. 
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to make him stand from a Muslim reserved constituency that encompassed Rawalpin-
di.27 This proposal was quietly withdrawn by December 1945 once the Congress real-
ized that the League had decided to put up its own candidate to fight Shah Nawaz in 
the same constituency.28 It proved, on the one hand, that the Congress lacked confi-
dence in the ability even of Shah Nawaz, at the height of his popularity, to defeat a 
League candidate. On the other, it showed that the League would not play soft-ball 
against any Congress-sponsored Muslim, no matter how much Jinnah was keen to 
cultivate the support of the INA and the officers on trial. 
 
     The mood of the League leaders changed when the INA officers walked free in 
January 1946. The very fact of his release swelled the popular appeal of Shah Nawaz 
even further. The League busied itself with devising a strategy for damage control, to 
show that Shah Nawaz was not a ‘confirmed Congressman’. Dawn, the League’s 
mouthpiece, published two interviews of Shah Nawaz, both of which claimed that he 
was thankful to both the Congress and the League for their joint effort at defending 
him in court. These interviews also alleged that Shah Nawaz wanted all parties to ac-
cept the Pakistan demand, if this was the only stumbling block to India’s independ-
ence.29 Very soon, however, Shah Nawaz was off to Calcutta at the invitation of Sarat 
Bose. His association with Sarat Bose, and his public appearances in Calcutta on the 
latter’s initiative, during a time when election propaganda was in full swing, linked 
him with the Congress in public perception. League leaders felt that their pursuit of 
INA glory was a lost cause.  
 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 501. 
28 Ibid., pp. 501-502. 
29 For the two interviews, see: Dawn, 5 January 1946 and Dawn 19 January 1946.  
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     However, the situation soon took an unexpected turn. As new INA trials began to 
be staged, events moved fast. First, Captain Burhanuddin, and then Singhara Singh 
and Fateh Khan, were brought before a Court Martial.30 The choice of Red Fort as the 
venue of the trials was very soon recognized to be a blunder, and these were shifted to 
the Delhi Cantonment at the fringes of the city.31 The defence was led by the Con-
gress INA Defence Committee. If these trials went well, Congress would be able to 
claim credit for defending two more Muslim INA personnel. This was, by no means, 
good news for the Muslim League, especially with provincial elections around the 
corner. However, Captain Rashid Ali upturned all assumptions by refusing to appoint 
the Congress Committee as his counsel and asking Muslim League to take responsi-
bility for his legal defence. 
 
 
The Trial of Captain Rashid Ali 
 
     Historians have barely studied the trial of Rashid Ali.32 This can be explained, to 
some extent, by the fact that even contemporary newspapers, especially ‘nationalist’ 
ones, did not give it the same coverage as the first Red Fort Trial. Dawn, the League’s 
mouthpiece, was the exception. Drawing upon reports that appeared in the newspaper 
during the course of the trial, this section examines the trial in some detail. These de-
tails show how difficult it is to accommodate the Rashid Ali agitations in February 
                                                 
30 Fay, The Forgotten Army, pp. 496-497. 
31 Dawn, 1 February 1946. 
32 Only Peter Ward Fay has discussed briefly some aspects of the trial. See Fay, The Forgot-
ten Army, pp. 497-498. 
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1946 in Calcutta within the paradigm of ‘anti-communal anti-colonial popular  
protests’. 
 
     Rashid Ali’s court martial began on 9 January 1946 at Delhi cantonment. He had, 
as mentioned above, declined to be defended by the Congress INA Defence Commit-
tee. Congress was aware that many of the INA accused were Muslims. To head off, 
perhaps, the accusation that its Defence Committee was a caste-Hindu body, it had 
chosen Asaf Ali as the convener of the Committee, and defended all Muslim INA per-
sonnel who had already been put up for trial until then. But Rashid insisted on being 
defended by the INA Defence Committee set up by the All-India Muslim League.33 
 
     Rashid Ali was accused of three offences: waging war against the King-Emperor, 
cruelty, and abetment of cruelty towards Indian Prisoners of War (PoWs) to induce 
them to join the INA. Mr. F.R.S. Surita, Counsel for Prosecution, proclaimed in his 
opening address that he would put forward ‘overwhelming evidence’ to show that ‘the 
accused practiced brutalities, put Indian PoWs into cages, starved them, made them 
do fatigues and otherwise ill-treated them if they refused to join the INA.’34 Rashid 
Ali had supposedly committed or connived at these atrocities in his capacity as the 
Officer Commanding of the Bidadari Concentration Camp in Singapore. 
 
     On 22 January 1945, Rashid Ali read out a written statement in the Court that cre-
ated a sensation across India. He said that he had no doubt that non-Muslims were the 
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‘moving spirit’ in the INA.35 He was also convinced that if the INA had managed to 
occupy India, it would establish non-Muslim rule with the support of the Japanese 
Government. In order to safeguard the interests of the Muslims in case the Army’s 
aims were successful, he decided to arm himself. He pleaded that he was ‘cut off from 
the rest of the world’ and the only news that was available to him were those that 
were supplied by the Japanese. Under such ‘unprecedented and peculiar circumstanc-
es’ he had no means of judging whether the Japanese were going to win the War, in 
which case he felt obliged to do everything to protect the brethren of his own creed – 
just like most other Muslims in the INA had done, he assured the Court. Thus, he in-
sisted, ‘I never waged war against the King. It was never my intention.’36 As far as 
allegations of atrocities were concerned, he pleaded that these were ‘incorrect’ and 
motivated.37  
 
     However, one after another, prosecution witnesses recounted harrowing experienc-
es of torture at the Bidadari Camp, either at the hands of Rashid Ali himself, or under 
his direction and with his knowledge. But, as the Defence Counsel, Mr. Abdul Aziz 
Khan, pointed out, the chronology of the incidents recounted by the witnesses excul-
pated Rashid Ali from any role in the torture. Most of the witnesses referred to inci-
dents at a time when Rashid was posted at the General Headquarters as the Deputy 
Provost Martial. Although he was technically in charge of the Bidadari Camp, the De-
fence counsel argued, he could not possibly have known what was going on in the 
Camp on a day-to-day basis. The defence insisted that Rashid could not be held guilty 
for any ill-treatment the witnesses may have suffered in the Camp till March 1943, 
                                                 
35 Dawn, 23 January 1946. 
36 Ibid. 
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when he was appointed the Officer Commanding of the Bidadari Camp. Except in one 
case, Aziz Khan pointed out, none of the accusations of torture pertained to the period 
when Rashid had direct responsibility for the Camp. 
 
     Jamsher Khan was the sole witness who accused Rashid of torturing him to force 
him to join the INA after the latter had taken over as the Commander of the Camp. 
When he had refused to join the INA, Rashid allegedly ordered a Japanese sergeant to 
beat him up, while he ‘stood by and watched’.38 Aziz Khan objected that Jamsher 
Khan had, in course of time, joined the INA. By joining the INA, he had himself 
committed treason against the King and therefore was an accomplice. Under the Evi-
dence Act, an accomplice’s evidence could not be taken at face value; it had to be cor-
roborated. As no such corroborative evidence was available, Aziz Khan urged the 
Court to dismiss Jamsher Khan’s testimony. 
 
     As far as the charge of waging war against the King was concerned, Aziz Khan 
argued that the accused never intended to do so. He merely wanted to safeguard the 
interests of Muslims in case INA’s occupation of India led to non-Muslim domination 
in the country. ‘Intention’, he pointed out, ‘always plays an important part in deciding 
a criminal matter.’39 Therefore, Rashid Ali could not be held guilty of waging war 
against the King. 
 
     Rashid Ali’s defence team had cleverly marshalled their arguments. These moved 
in directions quite different from those at the first Red Fort trial. Rather than arguing 
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for a belligerent status for the INA and drawing attention to international law protect-
ing the rights of such armies, Rashid’s defence attempted to dissociate him from the 
INA and its objectives. The personal intent of the actor was, for his lawyers, the cen-
tral issue of contention for deciding the charge of treason. On the face of it, this 
seemed like a smart move. The first trial had proved that the Court Martial had for-
mally refused to accept the belligerent status of the INA. Therefore, by dissociating 
Rashid’s actions from the objectives of the INA, if the Defence Counsel could prove 
that Rashid Ali had not committed treason at all, then acts of brutality in themselves 
would not constitute a very grave offence. The first trial had set the accused free even 
when treason was actually proved. Shah Nawaz, in particular, was found guilty of 
abetment of murder as well. Rashid Ali’s offence, even if he was found guilty of cru-
elty or of abetting cruel treatment towards PoWs, could not be more serious than that 
of Shah Nawaz. This course of action, Rashid Ali’s defence counsels must have sup-
posed, was sure to secure his release. 
 
     However, they were in for a surprise. The Prosecution counsel, Mr. Surita, insisted 
that many witnesses spoke of torture at Bidadari Camp when Rashid was in over-all 
charge of the Camp as the Deputy Provost Martial. In all such cases, Surita insisted, 
‘responsibility must be fixed on the accused’.40 This amounted, he argued, to ‘a solid 
case of consistent ill-treatment at the hands of the accused, or at his instance, or with 
his knowledge, for which the accused is responsible’.41 
 
                                                 
40 Dawn, 26 January 1946. 
41 Ibid. 
106 
 
     As far as waging war against the King was concerned, Surita pointed out that this 
charge was proved by the simple fact of Rashid being an INA officer. But even if the 
argument was accepted that he joined the INA to safeguard Muslim interests, the 
claim was belied by how ‘Muslim after Muslim’ who had been called before the 
Court as witnesses spoke of ‘inhuman treatment and constant beatings’.42 
 
     In the end the Judge-Advocate agreed with the Prosecution counsel. By the very 
fact of being an officer of the Indian National Army, he agreed, Rashid Ali had bro-
ken his oath of loyalty to the King. ‘[P]articipation in methods designed to increase 
the power of or improve an organization actively assisting an enemy force against the 
forces of the Crown was sufficient to prove the charge of treason.43 As far as the 
charge of cruelty was concerned, the judge concluded that even if he dismissed the 
accounts of cruel treatment of other witnesses against Rashid, he had to accept 
Jamsher Khan’s deposition. He insisted that Jamsher Khan’s testimony could not be 
rejected simply because he was an accomplice, as that would deprive him the status of 
a witness at all. 
 
     It became clear that the Court was unlikely to decide in favour of Rashid. Sensing 
this, the defence counsel Aziz Khan changed his line of argument at the fag end of the 
trial. He now urged the Court to take ‘judicial notice’ of the outcome of Shah Na-
waz’s trial.44 The latter was found guilty of waging war against the King as well as 
abetment of murder, despite which he was set free. On that occasion the Advocate-
General had also declared that the motive of men of the Indian National Army was 
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‘honourable’.45 Comparison with the Red Fort Trial, as well as drawing attention of 
the Court to INA’s ‘honourable’ legacy, amounted to backpedaling on what Rashid 
Ali and his defence team had insisted upon – that the INA was a non-Muslim-
dominated, Japanese-sponsored army with the dishonourable aim of enslaving Mus-
lims upon the success of its mission. This sudden shift in strategy was surely prompt-
ed by the realization that the ‘honourable’ personal intentions of Rashid Ali, which 
had allegedly motivated him to infiltrate into the ranks of the INA to safe-guard his 
co-religionists, did not impress the Court in the least. On 5 February 1946, Dawn an-
nounced on its front page that in Rashid Ali’s case, the Commander-in-Chief had 
commuted a sentence of ‘transportation for life’ to ‘seven years’ rigorous imprison-
ment’. He had also confirmed the sentence of cashiering as well as forfeiture of pay 
and allowances.46 
 
     For a few days thereafter, brief reports of popular protests against Rashid Ali’s 
conviction began to appear in the newspapers. Reports of demonstrations on the issue 
did appear in Dawn during this time, but these were confined to brief commentaries, 
which invariably portrayed these as exclusively ‘Muslim’ protests. 47 Finally, on 8 
February 1945, about four days after the sentence had been confirmed, Dawn finally 
devoted an entire editorial entitled ‘Discrimination’. It was surely emboldened by 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s statement against the Court verdict. He had gone so far as to 
demand that the Commander-in-Chief had to ‘explain and give his reasons and 
grounds for this discrimination observed by him’. If he refrained from doing so, the 
Qaid-e-Azam threatened that the Muslims would not ‘rest content’ and this would 
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46 Dawn, 5 February 1946. 
47 See Dawn, 6 and 7 February 1946.  
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lead to a ‘very serious situation’.48 The latter had called for all the files pertaining to 
Rashid Ali’s case as well as those pertaining to the first Red Fort trial. He declared 
that he wanted to personally compare the legal intricacies of these cases.49 
 
     Jinnah’s personal interest in the case prompted other Leaguers to follow their lead-
er. Sir Firoz Khan Noon speculated that Rashid Ali’s treatment resulted from the fact 
that the League had not exploited the case as an ‘election stunt’ as the Congress had 
done with the Red Fort trials; or that government was interested in gaining the favour 
of the Congress for ‘some reasons’.50 Malik Barkat Ali insisted that the Commander-
in-Chief owed the ‘bewildered public’ an explanation for his discrimination.51 He 
bemoaned how arbitrary discrimination in ‘two identical cases’ had caused ‘the deep-
est resentment in Muslim circles’.52 Dawn insisted that Rashid Ali’s guilt in the eyes 
of the law was at least equal to the accused in the Red Fort trial, if not less, especially 
in comparison with Shah Nawaz. It wondered whether Rashid Ali was victimized for 
exposing the ‘real non-Muslim character’ of the INA and for declaring that he, like 
most other Muslim soldiers, joined the INA to safeguard the interests of his communi-
ty.53 
 
     On the face of it, it does appear true that charges against Shah Nawaz were equal-
ly, if not more, serious than Rashid Ali’s. ‘Gross brutality’, the most serious charge 
levelled against Rashid, could not be a greater crime than ‘abetment of murder’. Yet, 
on closer scrutiny, there appears to be a significant difference in the two cases, which 
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League propagandists were happy to gloss over. Shah Nawaz, Sahgal and Dhillon 
were charged for punishments allegedly given and executed in the course of Court 
Martial proceedings against INA soldiers for indiscipline; these proceedings, moreo-
ver, were held in accordance with the procedures the INA adopted from the Indian 
Army Act of the British Indian Army. The thrust of the defence in the Red Fort trial 
was to argue for the legitimacy of the INA as a legally constituted army of a legiti-
mate government-in-exile. This, its defence counsel had argued, made the INA enti-
tled to be treated as a defeated but a belligerent army as per provisions of international 
law. This also empowered the INA to hold Court Martials, sentence the guilty to death 
and execute such death sentences, just like the British Indian Army. This argument 
was formally rejected during the trial. During confirmation, however, some scholars 
feel that the Commander-in-Chief almost granted the INA a belligerent status by re-
mitting the sentence of transportation for life for all three of the accused.54 
 
     In case of Rashid Ali, however, the charge was substantively different. Accusa-
tions of brutality that the Court Martial took cognizance of, and held to have been 
proved in the course of the trial, consisted of extra-judicial torture. These were not 
outcomes of Court Martial procedures of the INA, but were apparently aimed at mak-
ing Indian PoWs join the INA. The tortures were directed against those who were yet 
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to be part of the INA and hence fell outside its jurisdiction. The decision of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, therefore, was not completely arbitrary. Yet the Muslim League 
propaganda machine insisted that Rashid Ali was unfairly punished because unlike in 
Shah Nawaz’s case, the Muslim League INA Defence Committee had represented 
him. League propaganda reduced the difference in punishment between the two cases 
to government’s victimization of Muslims who subscribed to the League ideology. 
Thus, the initial expression of outrage against Rashid Ali’s conviction had a clear 
communal edge. There was no ‘anti-communal anti-colonialism’ in the initial con-
demnation of the judgment against Rashid, as voiced in Muslim League propaganda. 
 
     To some extent, Nehru’s and Prem Sahgal’s statements of support for Rashid Ali 
complicated this complexion of grievances against Rashid Ali’s conviction. Nehru 
disliked the way Rashid had maligned the INA, and had no sympathy for acts of cru-
elty against PoWs; yet he thought that the Court should have kept in mind that the 
‘circumstances were very special’ and that ‘extraordinary and normal standards’ could 
not be applied on any of the INA cases.55 He concluded that Rashid Ali’s ‘heavy sen-
tence’ ought to be ‘revised’.56 Sahgal, on the other hand, did not like Rashid Ali per-
sonally and believed that he was ‘a coward and a bully’.57 He was convinced that Ra-
shid was, in fact, guilty of mistreating PoWs.58 Yet, he thought that as ‘an officer of 
the Azad Hind Fauj’, the army of the ‘Provisional Government of Azad Hind’, no 
British Court had the legitimacy to bring him to trial for whatever offence he may 
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have committed.59 But however half-hearted Nehru’s and Sahgal’s support for Rashid 
Ali may have been, their condemnation of his conviction imparted a ‘non-communal’ 
colour to the popular protests that followed. 
 
     Newspapers carried both Nehru’s and Sahgal’s statements to their subscribers in 
the morning of 11 February 1946. The same day, a massive protest broke out in the 
streets of Calcutta that, according to one historian, amounted to an ‘Almost Revolu-
tion’.60 The obvious hyperbole aside, it remains extraordinary that an issue with such 
divisive connotations and such ambivalent support at the top managed to produce 
such an impressive alliance across political and ideological divides at this fraught 
moment. Even in comparison to the November INA agitations,61 the February move-
ment exhibited much greater ‘unity’ among the participants on the ground.  
 
     The following section will examine this in detail, and suggest that this solidarity 
across party-political affiliations was forged on grounds that had very little to do with 
the issue of Rashid Ali’s conviction. Of course, the apparent injustice meted out to 
Rashid Ali and the demand for the withdrawal of the sentence passed against him 
were invoked during the course of the agitations. Yet, it remained a very selective and 
strategic appropriation of the cause. A general anti-state sentiment seemed to have 
fuelled the bonds and alliances forged in the course of the street action. In concrete 
terms, it manifested in robust opposition to the city police. Rashid Ali’s conviction 
was merely a rallying point that facilitated the articulation of a deeper resentment 
against the state. 
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The Beginning of the Rashid Ali Agitations in Calcutta 
 
     Gautam Chattopadhyay, the historian of the Rashid Ali agitations in Calcutta, was 
also one of its organizers. He was then the Secretary of the Calcutta branch of the All 
India Students’ Federation (AISF) led by the Communist Party of India (CPI). The 
two essays he wrote on these events are based on official archives and notes from a 
personal diary. 
 
     Despite the apparent thoroughness of Chattopadhyay’s account, any researcher 
will be struck by a curious factual error that persists in both essays. Both contend that 
Rashid Ali’s trial began on 10 February 1946 at ‘the famous Red Fort’ in Delhi.62 But 
even a cursory glance at the newspapers reveals that Rashid Ali’s trial had begun 
more than a month before, on 9 January 1946, and that his sentence was confirmed by 
the Commander-in-Chief on 4 February 1946, about a week before the Calcutta agita-
tions began. Moreover, Rashid Ali’s trial commenced not at the ‘famous Red Fort’ 
but at the Delhi Cantonment, on the fringes of the city.63 
 
     In both essays, Chattopadhyay makes this erroneous statement very briefly, before 
moving on to a thick description of the street action from 11 February 1946. He had 
very little interest in the trial of Rashid Ali itself, but this one quick sentence height-
ened the drama of the agitations that followed, conveying a sense of absolute sponta-
neity. This oversight facilitated his reconstruction of the events as a ‘revolutionary 
outburst’. This is symptomatic of how the actual trial of Rashid Ali was deployed in 
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the logic of street action, this section will argue, even when the agitation was in pro-
gress. To many of its participants, Rashid Ali was a vague symbol around which a 
powerful anti-government (and, indeed, an anti-police) sentiment coalesced. 
 
     This section aims to re-narrate the course of the agitations, starting with 11 Febru-
ary 1946, bringing into focus a range of sources that have hitherto remained unused. 
Political intelligence gathered by the Special Branch of Calcutta Police constitute by 
far the richest corpus of contemporary reports gathered while the protests were in 
progress. This invaluable material has remained unutilized till now. This section will 
weave insights from this body of fresh archival sources with those that are already 
known. 
 
     On the afternoon of 11 February 1946, Sub-Inspector S. Ahsan of the Special 
Branch of Calcutta Police went to the Writers’ Building, the headquarters of the pro-
vincial government, to run some errands. On his way out, he noticed a procession of 
angry students marching towards Wellington Square.64 Ahsan estimated that the par-
ticipants numbered roughly about one hundred and fifty and appeared to be mostly 
Muslims. He immediately rang up the office of the Assistant Commissioner, Special 
Branch, to let them know what he had seen and set about making further enquiries. 
 
     Ahsan discovered that around half past noon, two policemen came out of Lal Ba-
zar, the police headquarters in Calcutta, to find a procession of about three hundred 
young men marching towards Dalhousie Square. They were protesting against the 
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conviction of Rashid Ali. Like the November 1945 protests, the procession headed 
towards the ‘prohibited area’ to register their grievances. It was a students’ procession 
and it was composed mainly of Muslim students, but they were carrying flags of the 
Muslim League and the Congress, as well as a plain green flag. As the two officers 
tried to talk to the leaders of the procession, some of the younger students ‘filtered 
through and started running towards the Writers’ Building’.65 Vastly outnumbered, 
these officers called the Lal Bazar headquarters for help. Meanwhile, the 
processionists had already reached the General Post Office adjacent to Dalhousie 
Square. The Deputy Commissioner (Southern Division) rushed to the square with a 
police force and stopped the procession from proceeding any further. 
  
     Upon being thus obstructed, the protesters squatted in the middle of the road, dis-
locating traffic in this busy area. The police asked them to disperse; when they re-
fused, a lathi-charge followed. The police attempted to arrest ‘ring leaders’, which 
inevitably led to a scuffle.66 Finally, they arrested thirteen students and took them to 
the lockup at Lal Bazar. Maniklal Roy Chowdhury was the only Hindu among those 
arrested. The others were all Muslims. Except for one university student, the rest were 
school boys, mostly from Presidency Muslim High School and M.L. Jubilee Institu-
tion. The procession seemed loosely organized. Students had got together in their re-
spective schools, then assembled at College Street and marched towards Dalhousie 
Square to protest. 
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     This brief – and none-too-serious – scuffle with the police became the nucleus of 
the chain of protests that ensued. As demonstrations intensified, more police lathi-
charges and arrests followed and the more agitated the demonstrators became. Police 
brutality slowly emerged as the main plank of popular support for the protests, around 
which solidarities were forged, glossing over the murkier details of Rashid Ali’s trial. 
Rashid’s mud-slinging against the INA and its intentions in open court, the anti-Hindu 
insinuations in his legal defence, the public projection of the case as a ‘Muslim’ issue 
both during and after the trail – these less-palatable dimensions of the cause were un-
derplayed and wider alliances built by reifying the image of the police as the brutal 
face of a foreign despotic regime that had to be brought to its knees. 
 
     Outraged by the first scuffle, Sub-Inspector Ahsan reported, the students marched 
towards Wellington Square to hold a public meeting.67 It fell upon Assistant Sub-
Inspector Abdul Aziz to cover the proceedings of the meeting on behalf of the Special 
Branch.68 Perhaps due to the short notice, he got to the spot slightly later. Protesters 
had already gathered around a wooden podium from which the speakers were to ad-
dress the crowd. This made it difficult for government reporters to position them-
selves at a suitable angle, with the result that none of them could actually see the 
speakers on stage. The local police had arrived earlier and had deputed twelve 
‘watchers’, but they were of no help. Not only were they hugely outnumbered, the 
palpable anti-police temper of the gathering did not permit any negotiation with the 
organizers to secure convenient seats for the reporters.69 Aziz might not have been 
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able to see the speakers, but he could not miss the huge poster of a police constable 
wearing a red pugree, with the Bengali inscription, ‘police julum bondho koro’70 
(‘End police atrocity’). 
 
     Ananda Sankar Bhattacharya of the CPI-controlled Bengal Provincial Students 
Federation (BPSF) presided over the meeting. It adopted resolutions calling for im-
mediate release of Rashid Ali and other INA prisoners. Speakers denounced British 
imperialism and called for Congress-League unity.71 But this optimistic mood was 
soon threatened. Despite criticizing the government for attempting to create a split 
between Hindus and Muslims, one speaker, Jamiruddin, did not please everyone when 
he declared that Rashid Ali was punished only because he was defended by the Mus-
lim League.72 This remark opened the doors to further allegations of sabotage: the 
Secretary of the City Muslim League, Mushirul Hossain Chaudhuri, accused the 
‘BPSF of 18 Mirzapore Street’ of preventing students of Scottish Church College 
from observing the strike called by Muslim students.73 This organization was an alter-
native BPSF led by the Congress Socialist Party and the Revolutionary Socialist Party 
which had played an important role in the November INA agitations in Calcutta in 
1945. Ananda Sankar Bhattacharya, who chaired the meeting, had to step in to pre-
vent it from degenerating into squabbles. He told the audience that the party that de-
fended Rashid Ali in court was not the issue at stake. He wanted to tell the ‘imperial-
ists’ on behalf of everyone in the meeting that ‘they were one when fighting imperial-
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ism, although they quarrelled among themselves’.74 To further strengthen the sense of 
unity among the audience, he began to talk about the police lathi-charge earlier in the 
afternoon. It immediately ‘created an excitement among the audience’, reported As-
sistant Sub-Inspector Aziz.75 Bhattacharya raised the temperature even further when 
he declared that a lathi-charge was now useless as students were ready for bullets.76 
He was astute enough to know that ‘police atrocity’ was the only battle-cry that could 
effectively prevent the fractures within the ranks of the protesters. 
 
     At the last moment, however, Suhrawardy arrived. Expecting to be the Premier of 
the Province soon after the elections, he had no intention of repeating Sarat Bose’s 
blunder.77 With the elections around the corner, Surahwardy could not endanger his 
popularity, but hoped to act as the safety-valve and control the agitation so that it did 
not precipitate violence. He spoke in Bengali, declaring that he had come to the meet-
ing ‘to associate himself with their object’.78 He admitted to having criticized the 
Congress in the past, but now he ‘wanted unity with the Congress for acquiring na-
tional freedom’. He went even further: ‘The day was not far off when the League 
would unite with the Congress.’ Then he turned to pacifying the crowd: ‘This move-
ment was made for getting Rashid Ali released. They had come there not for breaking 
the law.’ He insisted that the students should protest ‘to prevent which none had a 
right’; however, ‘they should do so lawfully’. The students should keep out of Dal-
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housie Square as it was a ‘protected place’.79 The protest would be successful only if 
they remained peaceful and broke no law, he told the protesters. A quick negotiation 
followed and Ananda Bhattacharya announced that they would take out a procession 
through a route that avoided Dalhousie Square. So as not to appear to be weak-kneed, 
he added that they would observe a general strike the following day and register an 
even stronger protest.80 
 
     After the meeting ended, on his way out, Suhrawardy briefly spoke to A.G. Khan, 
a senior Inspector of the Special Branch who had also arrived at the scene by then. He 
asked that the police should not interfere with the procession as the students had 
promised him that they would not enter Dalhousie Square.81 However, Khan immedi-
ately noticed a commotion; a section of students was refusing to listen to Suhrawardy 
and was intent on marching into the prohibited area.82 He was experienced enough to 
smell trouble already, and wasted no time in alerting his headquarters. 
 
     By now, the procession had built up to about five thousand protesters.83 After me-
andering through different streets of the city, it arrived at Clive Street. As Inspector 
Khan predicted, it forced its way towards Dalhousie Square. The local police stopped 
the procession immediately, and thousands of protesters squatted on the street.84 It 
seemed like a repeat of the November INA agitations, the crucial difference being that 
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top leaders of the Muslim League had arrived at the spot soon after. Muhammad 
Usman, the Secretary of the Calcutta District Muslim League addressed the protesters, 
assuring them that all their leaders, including Suhrawardy, were with them in their 
fight. But the protesters paid him little heed. They got up and ‘made a dash to proceed 
further’ when they were met with a brutal lathi-charge. A number of students were 
badly hurt.85 
 
     This scattered the procession, as participants ‘took to their heels’ and dispersed in 
the adjacent streets and by-lanes.86 Utter chaos followed. Suhrawardy returned to try 
to pacify the crowd. The situation calmed down, briefly, and the police managed to 
resume the flow of traffic in the area. No policemen thought this to be the end of the 
trouble, however. Inspector Khan perceived an ominous current in the air, warning his 
headquarters of possible ‘serious repercussions’ the same night or the following day.87 
The police establishment was keenly aware that breaking up processions by police 
action could only aggravate the situation, as the focus of protests would steadily shift 
towards ‘polize zulum’. The Deputy Commissioner specifically instructed policemen 
on duty ‘to do nothing to aggravate the situation’.88 
 
     Meanwhile, the crowd, dispersed by the lathi-charge, had spread throughout the 
city. Reports of angry mobs stopping traffic and shutting shops poured in from all 
parts of Calcutta. The evening witnessed a series of direct attacks on policemen and 
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police stations. The ease with which anti-police sentiment could be worked up and 
crowds moved to action was demonstrated by incidents later that evening. 
 
     It so happened that Constable Kashi Singh had gone to see his relatives in the 
Koilaghat Police Station area. On his way home at around 6 pm, he spotted an 
‘externee’ at the junction of Harrison Road and Strand Road, prominent thoroughfares 
in the north of the city.89 As part of the War-time security arrangements, a large num-
ber of ‘bad characters’ and ‘habitual criminals’ had been removed from the Calcutta 
area under provisions of the Defence of Indian Rules.90 Many of these ‘externment’ 
orders were still in force, and hence the violation of such restrictions still constituted a 
criminal offence. Kashi Singh arrested the offender and took the help of another Con-
stable, Ram Naish Pandey, to bring him to the police station. However, as they passed 
through Harrison Road, ‘the accused started raising slogan of ‘Jai Hind’’.91 A crowd 
gathered around them immediately. As ‘passersby and local people’ started following 
them, the two Constables began to lose their nerve. They met another Constable, Deo 
Dutt Misser, at the Harrison Road and Clive Street crossing, and he agreed to accom-
pany the police party. But soon after, they were attacked from behind with brickbats, 
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soda water bottles and lathis; the angry crowd ‘snatched away the accused and as-
saulted the Constables’. In the course of the tussle, Deo Dutt Misser’s pugree fell 
from his head; when he attempted to recover it, the crowd tore it in front of his eyes 
and took away his Police Badge as a further sign of humiliation.92 
 
     Close by, the same evening, Bowbazar Police Station received frantic telephone 
calls informing them of military lorries aflame at Chittaranjan Avenue. On its way to 
the spot, the police party met with sudden attacks by ‘miscreants and hooligans’.93 
Fearing that they would be encircled by an excited crowd, the policemen beat a hasty 
retreat. Returning to their own police station was impossible, but they somehow man-
aged to fight their way to the nearby Hare Street thana. When they took shelter within 
the thana premises, a crowd of about seven hundred strong attacked the police station. 
The police attempted a lathi-charge, but the situation went beyond control – ‘the 
crowd receded… a little only to charge the police with renewed vigour’.94 Soon the 
thana gate gave way and the attackers rushed into the building. The outnumbered po-
licemen were completely overwhelmed, and the Officer-in-Charge opened fire on the 
crowd. Eight rounds of gunfire killed one person and injured several others. The 
crowd dispersed, but the police station suffered great damage.95 
 
     Much to the relief of the city police, there was no attempt to occupy Dalhousie 
Square later that night.96 But the situation was far from calm. Political leaders, espe-
cially of the Muslim League, toured across the city, attempting to persuade angry 
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crowds to return home and remain peaceful. Despite their efforts, at least seven mili-
tary trucks were set on fire and the public transport system was hugely damaged.97 
The Central Intelligence Officer (CIO) of Calcutta, reporting directly to the Home 
Department in Delhi, spoke of protesters setting fire to at least twenty lorries. The po-
lice made at least twenty-seven arrests, and resorted to firing three or four times in the 
course of the day.98 
      
     In an assessment of the day’s events, a senior Special Branch officer blamed the 
politicians for precipitating the crisis. He accused leaders of all political parties of 
propagating the false idea that ‘the police were already “cowed” since the last No-
vember riots and that they would not dare to interfere’.99 Gullible students, he said, 
had swallowed this propaganda wholesale. ‘Moreover’, he observed, ‘there is a belief 
among a certain class of Moslems that not only Hindus but the government itself are 
“afraid” of them.’100 There was a belief that police would not meddle with a Muslim 
League procession with support from the CPI and the Congress. ‘The result’, he la-
mented, ‘is well-known – about fifty injured and one killed.’101 He concluded, signifi-
cantly, that only the Muslims of the city were genuinely inspired by a sense of injus-
tice towards Rashid Ali, believing ‘that their honour is at stake’.102 This sentiment 
was being manipulated by the Communists and ‘a certain type’ of Congress leader, as 
they saw in this ‘the best chance to make the Moslems and the Government fight each 
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other and thereby drawing the Moslems closer to themselves for a united action 
against the Government’.103 
 
     This assessment was far too simplistic, as events the following day proved. De-
mand for justice for Rashid Ali was strategically voiced at specific moments by dif-
ferent groups that defied any neat classification between Muslim and non-Muslim, 
even League and non-League groups. The unifying rhetoric remained a common op-
position to police brutality. 
 
 
Escalation and End of the Agitations 
 
     12 February 1946 began with a general strike. The police were not taken by sur-
prise. The previous evening, a Special Branch officer had called up the office of 
Morning News – the mouthpiece of the Bengal League patronized by Nazimuddin, the 
former Premier of Bengal. He had posed as ‘a representative of the Taxiwalas’ and 
had asked whether the League had called for a strike the following day so that he 
could let taxi drivers know.104 The staff at the office of Morning News confirmed that 
the League had indeed called for a strike, with the support of other parties. 
 
     All Indian-owned businesses and shops remained closed on 12 February. A few 
British-owned retail outlets opened their stores in central Calcutta, only to become 
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targets of mob attacks.105 Indian traders did not require much persuasion to go on 
strike. They were already restive about increases in the provincial sales tax. This was 
a new war-time tax imposed in 1941. After the War, instead of it being withdrawn or 
reduced, the government had enhanced the rate from three quarters of an anna to one 
anna in a rupee.106 Rashid Ali’s cause and the issue of police brutality only added fuel 
to the fire. Thus, what historians have presumed to be spontaneous opposition to Ra-
shid Ali’s conviction was, in fact, an amalgamation of several forms of discontent. 
The economic grievances of Indian traders, resentment against police high-
handedness and brutality – all came together to produce solidarities (however fleet-
ing) that cut across community, class and ideology.  
 
     Leaders of the agitation summoned a protest meeting in the afternoon at Welling-
ton Square. But even before it began, violence broke out in different parts of the city. 
Transport had, in any case, come to a standstill since early in the morning. Angry 
mobs stoned the few private cars that had dared to appear in the streets, dragging the 
occupants out of vehicles and assaulting them.107 Even the few rickshaws and bicycles 
that came out became targets of attack.108 Thirty-five military vehicles were set on 
fire and the main thoroughfares blocked with barricades.109 Soon, rioting spread to the 
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northern parts of the city and mobs harassed the civilian police.110 Angry crowds 
felled trees to block the main roads at Bhawanipore in south Calcutta.111 The situation 
deteriorated to such an extent that the Chief Secretary asked the Eastern Command to 
make troops available at short notice to come in aid of civil power.112 By quarter past 
noon, three companies of troops were stationed at three strategic points in the city.113 
Another company was kept standing at Fort William for reinforcement.114 The Army 
was not called out that day, but officers were asked to spend the night at the Eastern 
Command headquarters so that they were just a phone-call away.115 Even before the 
Wellington Square meeting began, intelligence officers concluded that the situation 
was ‘very ugly’ and ‘worse than that in November 1945’, especially given how quick-
ly it flared up ‘in a matter of a few hours’.116 
 
     Whatever position the Muslim League had taken on the first day of the agitation, 
the Central Intelligence Officer had no doubt that by 12 February, it was actively 
sponsoring the agitation.117 The League was gaining strength and support from other 
student groups and political parties, but its main motivation was the Pakistan cause. 
Some intelligence officers believed that the Muslim League had taken Rashid Ali’s 
sentence as a sign that the Government was trying to side-line its political demands. 
The League feared that the Viceroy would form a Central Government with only 
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Congress representatives as the first step towards forming a single constitution-
making assembly, and dismiss the Pakistan demand. The Muslim League therefore 
saw the need to create a ‘strong atmosphere’ with League members ready to court ar-
rests and face repression.118 To save the Pakistan issue, the League was even prepared 
to launch ‘some sort of direct action’.119 While there may be some substance to such 
conjectures, it ignored the other reasons why the League championed the agitation in 
Calcutta, the forthcoming provincial elections being the most obvious among them. 
 
     A Special Branch reporter arrived at Wellington Square well in advance, on this 
occasion: given how difficult it had been to secure a good spot the previous day, the 
local thana took no chances. Constable Indrasan Tiwari of Muchipara police station 
had placed tables and chairs for reporters long before protesters began to gather at the 
park.120 This was critical, as the anti-police wave that prevailed in the meeting could 
have induced the crowd to actively prevent the police reporters from covering it. An 
angry crowd ‘jeered at’ the Special Branch officer as he took his seat. They started 
pushing and shoving all government reporters and insisted that they removed the 
chairs and left the meeting. ‘No notice was however taken of this angry demonstration 
and the tension automatically eased…’121 But the police were under constant pressure, 
in a profoundly hostile atmosphere. 
 
     By noon, a large number of processions began to pour into Wellington Square, 
shouting slogans, displaying banners and waving the flags of different parties. Some 
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protesters tied the Congress and the League flags together as a symbol of unity.122 No-
tably, the proceedings followed an unusual format. Two meetings followed each other 
back-to-back: the first was essentially a students’ meeting led by the All Bengal Mus-
lim Students’ League (ABMSL) and the CPI-sponsored BPSF; the second was ad-
dressed mainly by senior leaders of political parties, especially the Muslim League. 
Almost all prominent leaders of the League attended the meetings, except 
Nazimuddin.123 Conjectures about audience strength vary drastically. The Governor’s 
telegram to the Viceroy in the early hours of 13 February 1946 puts the figure at fifty 
thousand.124 The Special Branch speculated that there were about ten thousand pro-
testers inside the park, with the overflow crowd estimated at another two thousand.125 
 
     The first meeting began with Azizur Rahman of ABMSL in the chair. The most 
remarkable feature of this meeting was that the issue of Rashid Ali’s release was bare-
ly addressed. Speakers condemned the injustice of trying INA personnel and holding 
them in camps and prisons in general terms. An ABSML speaker insisted that except 
for ‘a small section of mercenaries’, no Indian was loyal to the British Government 
anymore. It was futile to try the INA soldiers for treason as every Indian was at war 
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against British imperialism.126 Arabindo Bose of the Congress repeated, ‘every youth 
of India was guilty of waging war against the King and wished to be punished for it’. 
He called upon the government to ‘congratulate’ the youth by punishing them. He 
went on to describe how the INA had ‘answered bullets with bullets in Manipur and 
Imphal’, and if the Indian youth had bullets they would have used it against the gov-
ernment.127 The official discourse on the INA as a mercenary force under Japanese 
control was turned on its head. Not just the British Indian Army, but the entire admin-
istrative establishment that enabled the colonial state to function, including the police, 
was projected as being run by mercenaries. 
 
     Another student leader pointed directly at the police reporters to declare that the 
‘agents and supporters of the Imperialist Government’ should understand that Indians 
were not willing to tolerate British rule ‘even for a day’.128 Despite his celebration of 
the INA, he made no specific demand for the withdrawal of the punishment of Rashid 
Ali’s sentence. The resolution passed at the meeting made no reference to it. The cen-
tral issue remained police atrocities, lathi-charges, firings and arrests the previous 
day. 
  
     The other striking feature of this meeting was the vocal demands by student lead-
ers that the political leaders of the main parties chart out a course of action ‘consistent 
with the vindication of the prestige and honour of the nation’.129 It amounted to a dec-
laration that the leaders would be allowed to guide the protesters only on the condition 
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that they laid down a programme of action that the followers thought was adequate 
and worthy. This was reiterated over and over again by several speakers, threatening 
the political leadership that if they failed to meet the expectations of those they pro-
posed to lead, they would be disregarded. One speaker insisted that the students were 
ready to follow the directions of the political leaders only if they ‘make clear what 
their next move was going to be’; he had no trust in the leadership, as both the Con-
gress and the Muslim League, he said, had betrayed popular expectations ‘on repeated 
occasions in the past’.130 This explicit statement of contractual nature of the relation-
ship between the leader and the led, with the latter setting the terms on which the for-
mer would be allowed to lead, was the most striking feature of the meeting. 
 
     Once this meeting came to an end, the next one started at the same venue immedi-
ately after, with Suhrawardy in the chair. Senior leaders of different parties, along 
with the presidents of important student bodies, such as the CSP and RSP controlled 
BPSF (New) and the Congress-sponsored Bengal Provincial Students’ Congress ad-
dressed it. The Muslim League took a leading part, with all its important leaders, ex-
cept Nazimuddin, explicitly supporting the cause. This meeting, as opposed to the 
previous one, spoke of the need to secure Rashid Ali’s release. Maulana Akram Khan, 
the President of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, assured the protesters that ‘de-
spite his old age and indisposition’, he would lead the ‘united campaign’ of Hindus 
and Muslims from the ‘forefront’.131 This enthused the crowd, as he set out the aims 
of the protest. The first object, he insisted, was to secure the release of Rashid Ali, the 
second was to secure redressal of police brutalities and the third was to remove the 
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ban on meetings at Dalhousie Square. Abul Hashim, the energetic Secretary of the 
Bengal Provincial Muslim League, spoke of how the Congress and the League, who 
were fighting each other in the election campaign, stood united against British imperi-
alism.132 
 
     However, it fell upon Suhrawardy, who was on the verge of becoming the Premier 
of the province, to provide leadership to the demonstration. The entire tenor of his 
speech was geared towards ensuring that the protests remained under his control. It 
was the anti-police sentiment that could potentially be the most explosive. If violence 
against policemen and police stations the previous day was any proof, playing down 
the anti-police agenda was the only way to keep the protesters under control. Atten-
tion could be redirected towards the attainment of distant objectives, such as the re-
lease of Rashid Ali and INA prisoners, which would provide at least temporary insur-
ance against uncontrolled conflagrations. Suhrawardy felt, however, that collective 
violation of the ban on Dalhousie Square was the most suitable programme of action. 
A controlled procession through the prohibited area could give the programme a radi-
cal edge, yet keep violence at bay. Accordingly, he declared his intention of leading a 
demonstration, along with Satish Das Gupta of the Congress, through Dalhousie 
Square to show the government that ‘Hindus and Muslims could act together in a dis-
ciplined manner’. They would voice their demands for the release of Rashid Ali 
through slogans, of course, but League and Congress volunteers were to ‘maintain 
order’. He warned the protesters that if they could ‘display discipline’, the govern-
ment would realize that they were a strong ‘disciplined army’. If they failed to do so, 
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‘they would be called rabble’.133 Finally, he assured that the Government had already 
accepted their demands of demonstrating at Dalhousie Square and had promised not 
to interfere. After this, a long procession of protesters proceeded towards the prohibit-
ed area under joint League-Congress leadership. 
 
     On the face of it, this description of the protest meetings at Wellington Square fits 
neatly into the paradigm of united bottom-up anti-colonial protests: radicalized stu-
dents, cutting across community and political affiliations, acting as the ‘revolutionary 
vanguard’, managed to force a radical political agenda upon a somewhat shaky and 
reluctant leadership. As shown above, much of this unity was forged on an anti-police 
agenda, rather than any ideological opposition to the INA trials themselves. But this 
does not destabilize the basic premises of existing left-wing historiography of the INA 
agitations that sees them as a cross-communal anti-colonial agitation with revolution-
ary potential, eventually frustrated by a bourgeois political elite. This body of scholar-
ship celebrates the fact that even the students’ organization affiliated to the Muslim 
League went to the extent of challenging its own provincial high command, joining 
hands with other students’ organizations which opposed the League. 134 It was as 
though the ABMSL pushed a radical agenda knowing well that it was sure to embar-
rass its own leadership. 
 
     There is no denying that a degree of unity between different groups with divergent 
political affiliations was evident in the way the protests took shape. Yet, just a scratch 
on the surface reveals other dynamics at play. The ABSML’s insistence on a pro-
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gramme of action that was awkward for the League leadership on the eve of provin-
cial elections is a case in point. The shifting contours of alignment within the provin-
cial League, and its relationship with the ABSML can be revealing. 
 
     Jinnah had effected a major reorganization of the Muslim League in 1943, insisting 
on a separation between party work on the one hand and electoral and governmental 
activities on the other.135 He had announced that no office-bearer of the party was to 
hold a parliamentary or government post.136 This led to an internal rearrangement 
within the provincial League organizations. At the annual general meeting of the 
Bengal Provincial Muslim League in Calcutta held from 6 to 8 November 1943, fac-
tion fights reached new heights. Suhrawardy resigned from the post of Secretary of 
the provincial League, replaced by Abul Hashim. A clear line emerged between two 
powerful factions. One group had Nazimuddin, the Premier of the province, control-
ling the electoral arena and aligning with Akram Khan, the President of the party in 
Bengal. Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim collaborated, on the other hand, to lead a rival 
faction. The first group held sway over the ministerial domain, while the latter came 
to dominate the party organization.137 Through the years of the Second World War, 
the party moved from strength to strength, largely as a result of Hashim’s energetic 
leadership and Suhrawardy’s influence among Calcutta’s Muslim labourers.138 By the 
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time of the provincial elections in 1946, the Suhrawardy-Hashim faction emerged as 
the stronger group, making Suhrawardy the obvious Prime Ministerial candidate. 
 
     This sharp divide within the Bengal Muslim League had repercussions on student 
politics under its banner. In 1944, when elections to the ABSML were held for the last 
time before Partition, it came to be dominated by the student group led by Azizur 
Rahman. He was an ally of Nazimuddin in the ministry and Akram Khan in the party. 
The rival group, aligned with the Suhrawardy-Hashim faction, came into prominence 
in the Calcutta District organization of the Students’ League, but remained marginal 
within the ABSML.139 
 
     By 1946, Hashim had clearly overshadowed Akram Khan within the party. Now, 
on the eve of provincial elections, Suhrawardy was clearly on the verge of capturing 
the parliamentary domain as well, displacing Nazimuddin and thereby marginalizing 
the entire Nazimuddin-Akram Khan faction. Internal rivalries within the League or-
ganization were thus at their peak when the Rashid Ali protests unfolded in Calcutta. 
Led by Azizur Rahman, who was aligned with the group that seemed defeated, it is 
not surprising why the ABSML had no qualms about pushing Suhrawardy into a dif-
ficult and embarrassing position. For the latter, it was a trap laid by his enemies with-
in his own party. He could either court unpopularity by dissociating himself from the 
agitation (as Sarat Bose had done during the INA protests of November 1945), a 
move he was too shrewd to risk just before the elections. Alternatively, he had to ac-
cept the terms dictated by his followers, at least in part, which would invite further 
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displeasure from British officialdom (who clearly had a preference for Nazimuddin). 
Thus, a story that seems on the surface to be one of pressures from below forcing a 
radical agenda onto an unwilling leadership, as the ‘agency’ of the followers dictating 
the moves of leaders, is in fact far more complex. 
 
     In the event, the procession that emerged from Wellington Square passed through 
various streets of the city without major incident. While passing through Dharmatalla 
Street, however, the crowd threw brickbats at British-owned shops. They smashed 
large glass window panes of fashionable showrooms in this central area of Calcutta, 
and then looted them.140 One Head Constable was stabbed in the back.141 Eventually, 
the procession reached Dalhousie Square, the prohibited area, and staged a demon-
stration without any opposition from the government. It was only when it was going 
past the police headquarters at Lal Bazar, on its way back, that the procession ran into 
trouble. A police lorry, returning to the headquarters loaded with injured Constables, 
emerged from the opposite direction and confronted the procession head on. A panic-
stricken police force, under relentless attack for more than a day, lost its nerve and 
fired tear-gas shells on the crowd.142 Mayhem ensued, with protesters attacking the 
police lorry with brickbats. More tear gas was used to disperse the crowd, aggravating 
the situation even further. Vehicles parked outside Lal Bazar became objects of  
attack. 
 
                                                 
140 Consolidated Report regarding Students’ Demonstrations including Four Public Meetings 
on 12 February 1946 at Wellington Square, K.P.M. No. 01694/05, S.B. File No. 868 D(2), 
P.M. (1946), SBR, CP. 
141 Bengal Governor to Viceroy, 13 February 1946, File No. 5/22/46-Poll (I), Home (Politi-
cal), NAI. 
142 Ibid. 
135 
 
     Thereafter, a policeman noted a fascinating, and unfamiliar, pattern of crowd be-
haviour in Calcutta: 
 
The crowd appears to have split up into gangs of hooligans spreading over centre of the 
town into European residential areas and indulging in looting shops (particularly arms-
dealers) and looting and setting fire to private houses, molesting peaceful citizens 
etc.143 
 
     According to this version, trouble spread rapidly, engulfing the whole city within a 
few hours and then spreading to its outskirts. It is difficult, of course, to ascertain the 
accuracy of this description, coming to us as it does from police sources. It is, of 
course, overloaded with the prejudices typical of official descriptions of protests that 
government found difficult to control. Implicit in this report is the assumption that the 
protesters were, after all, ‘hooligans’, or at least capable of turning to ‘hooliganism’ at 
the slightest provocation. This was characteristic of a ‘law and order’-centred perspec-
tive of popular protest that justified repression by depoliticizing collective action and 
criminalizing politics itself. This is a theme we will examine in some detail later. 
However, the import of this specific description becomes clear in the context of what 
took place thereafter. The Governor called an emergency meeting with military offic-
ers, the Commissioner of Police and other senior officers of his government. ‘Being 
furnished and on advice that situation was such that it was impossible to restore and 
maintain order…’, the Governor ‘authorized the invocation of military assistance in 
aid of civil power’.144 
 
     Meanwhile, a section of the protesters returned to Wellington Square. Addressing 
them, Suhrawardy insisted that since the mission of demonstrating at Dalhousie 
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Square was achieved, everyone should ‘return to their normal life and activities’.145 
This led to some murmurings of protest among the crowd. ‘What about Rashid Ali?’, 
some of the protesters wanted to know. 146  One student interrupted Suhrawardy’s 
speech and urged everyone to carry on with their protests. Confusion ensued. 
Suhrawardy resumed, insisting that no one should pay attention to any suggestion of 
continuing the agitation, and – in a tone of admonishment – spoke of ‘acts of indisci-
pline amongst processionists’. 147  In a tenor indistinguishable from official pro-
nouncements, he ‘strongly condemned acts of hooliganism’, insisting that this would 
not bring ‘freedom’: ‘Police would resort to shooting to stop goondaism and in  
these cases they would act as the servants of the public. Everybody had a home, and 
family.’148 
 
     The Governor’s radio broadcast soon thereafter had a similar tone. Informing the 
public that the army had been called out, Richard Casey announced: 
 
Within a very short time from the holding of the procession, unruly elements started 
looting shops and setting fire to buildings and transport… peaceful citizens are being 
molested in many parts of Calcutta. It is impossible to believe that any of the principal 
political parties are supporting the present state of affairs. The mob are [sic.] trying to 
take charge – and they are not going to be allowed to take charge.149 
 
He assured that the police and the army would not ‘interfere with any peaceful citi-
zens’, but they would take ‘all necessary steps’ against ‘malefactors’. His advice to 
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‘peaceful citizens’ was, ‘Keep off the streets and keep out of trouble.’150 However, the 
police and the army, he insisted, would not hesitate to ‘use their weapons’ if they 
faced any obstruction in the execution of their duties.151 His concluding remarks are 
worth quoting at length: 
 
You will remember that in the course of the last disturbances in late November I was 
extremely reluctant to ask for the assistance of the army. I am equally reluctant now but 
I believe that army assistance is essential in the public interest and in these circum-
stances I have not hesitated to invoke their aid. The lesson to be learnt – for the second 
time within a few months is that political processions however well intentioned prove 
nothing. They inevitably lead to public disturbances and casualties. I hope very much 
that this second costly experience will have its lessons for those responsible for the 
demonstrations in November and now.152 
 
It was, in short, a reiteration of the theme central to bureaucratic attitudes towards pol-
itics in India. It was seen as essentially disruptive, inevitably leading to chaos. It was 
the supposedly neutral arms of the colonial administration – the bureaucracy, the po-
lice and the army – that could alone preserve peace in an intrinsically violent society. 
 
     From the evening of 12 February 1946, the government unleashed a reign of re-
pression. There is little in the official record that contradicts Gautam Chattopadhyay’s 
description of the ruthlessness with which the army clamped down upon protesters.153 
Given free rein to curb ‘conflagrations’, state actors made few sound judgements 
about the objects of repression. Even bystanders and onlookers bore the brunt of the 
state’s show of might. Ordinary people, including women and children, lost their lives 
to bullets. 
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     The confrontation between the army and the police on the one hand, and angry 
demonstrators on the other, continued on 13 February 1946. In a statement early in the 
afternoon the Commissioner of Police lamented that there was no improvement in the 
situation. The Central Intelligence Officer reported continuance of ‘serious rioting’, 
especially in Muslim-majority areas, and reported that the mob was displaying ‘great 
ferocity’.154 The government also noted that, since 13 February morning, protesters 
had begun to adopt ‘tip and run tactics’.155 This involved setting up road blocks and 
barricades on the main thoroughfares, dispersing on the sight of the police or the army 
into the surrounding lanes and by-lanes, and then reassembling and replacing the bar-
riers once the police or the army had passed.156 
 
     Late in the night of 13 February, the Governor issued another radio broadcast, 
warning people to stay clear of the streets. This time he informed the public that he 
had authorized the police and the army to open fire to bring the situation under con-
trol.157 This, of course, meant that the whole city was virtually converted into a war 
zone. This had the desired effect of a ‘great stimulant to troops and Police’.158 A mes-
sage from the Headquarters of the Eastern Command the following morning men-
tioned with satisfaction that the Governor’s orders for free use of firearms had raised 
police morale by 200 per cent.159 ‘Firing’, it said, ‘had a steadying effect’ since 13 
February night, when the crowd seemed to have had ‘quite enough’.160 By 14 Febru-
                                                 
154 CIO Calcutta’s telephone report No. 3 received at 3:30 p.m. on 13 February 1946, File No. 
5/22/46-Poll (I), Home (Political), NAI. 
155 Governor of Bengal to Viceroy, 13 February 1946, ibid. 
156 Ibid. Also Report of G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 13 February 1946, 
ibid. 
157 Governor of Bengal to Viceroy, No. 28, 13 February 1946, ibid. 
158 MIO Calcutta, Situation Report No. 9, 14 February 1946, ibid. 
159 Message from HQ Eastern Command 08:40 hours, 14 February 1946, ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
139 
 
ary 1946, Calcutta seemed to have calmed down. ‘Crowds have ceased to stand about 
and appear to be going about their normal business’, reported the Military Intelligence 
Officer.161 
 
     Since the aftermath of the demonstrations at Dalhousie Square on 12 February 
1946, several political parties attempted to pour oil on troubled waters. Some organi-
zations, such as the Revolutionary Communist Party of India (RCPI), tried to prolong 
the protests. But these were voices from the fringe. All the main political parties be-
gan campaigns for putting an end to the agitation. By 15 February, the protests had 
petered out. 
 
     The army was slowly withdrawn. Troops patrolled the city streets till the night of 
14 February. Standing military pickets were withdrawn from the streets of Calcutta to 
test the waters on 15 February.162 But they were not yet sent back to the barracks.163 It 
was not until 18 February that troops were fully and finally withdrawn both from Cal-
cutta and its industrial suburbs.164 
 
Conclusion 
 
     The INA agitation of February 1946 in Calcutta enlisted participation across politi-
cal and community divides. Despite the reluctance of some of the associated political 
parties, such as the Bengal Provincial Students Congress, students affiliated to all ma-
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jor political organizations succeeded in forging solidarities. This, in some cases, al-
most amounted to open revolt against the party leadership, as seemed to be the case 
with the All Bengal Muslim Students League. 
 
     However, seeing this entirely as pressures from below, radicalizing the political 
programme despite vacillations of senior party leaderships, is somewhat naïve. 
Stretching this evidence to argue for an alternative political future for South Asia, de-
picting it as an ‘almost revolution’ that could have transformed the history of the sub-
continent if taken to its logical conclusion, is an exaggeration. 
 
     As this chapter demonstrates, much of this apparent revolt against party high 
commands, on closer scrutiny, appears far more complex when inter-party rivalries 
and factional disputes are taken into account. 
 
     Also, this chapter emphasizes the need to take the symbols of protests seriously. It 
shows how solidarities across party-political affiliations and community divides, al-
ready solidified into communal identities by then, could only be forged when the ac-
tual cause of Rashid Ali, or the divisive tones of the actual arguments made in his de-
fence in Court or by the League propaganda, were relegated to the background. Ra-
shid Ali’s cause became extraneous to the logic of the protests, sometimes invoked 
strategically, but for the most part forgotten. To retain a united front, these protests 
had to latch on to, and rally around, other symbols, such as government high-
handedness and police brutality. 
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     This is not to argue, of course, that by invoking symbols other than Rashid Ali’s 
conviction, the agitations became any less legitimate or ‘authentic’. However, it is 
pertinent to point towards how such apparently salutary anti-imperialist dispositions 
also created its own regimes of exclusion, the brunt of which, more often than not, fell 
upon the poor and some of the city’s vulnerable minorities. It is perhaps important to 
recognize how it was the lowest rung of the police, the Constables and Head Consta-
bles, not very different in socio-economic status from the urban proletariat of Calcut-
ta, who were mostly the recipients of public wrath. While the Commissioners and 
Deputy Commissioners went around the city in protected convoys, it is this lowest 
level of the constabulary that became targets of assaults and humiliation. 
 
     Again, Hindu-Muslim solidarity did not necessarily preclude possibilities of dis-
crimination, harassment and victimization against other vulnerable minorities. In 
South Calcutta, where resistance to the state machinery was the strongest, the 4/3 
Gurkha Rifles was deployed by the Eastern Command to bring the area under con-
trol. 165 They proved to be quite successful, and undoubtedly, very ruthless. Some 
Gurkha armed policemen were also employed in different parts of the city. This re-
sentment, however, spilled on to the Nepali community of the city as a whole. A small 
ethnic minority, mostly a part of the city’s casual labouring poor, Nepalis became tar-
gets of much harassment. Neighbourhood strongmen, the supposed champions of 
united anti-colonial resistance, threatened landlords against housing Nepali tenants.166 
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Some Nepali families panicked and left their homes to take shelter in safer places.167 
Many of them became targets of everyday harassment and humiliation. 168  This 
essentializing of community identities, holding one responsible for the actions of an-
other merely because both seemed to share a common identity, is the hallmark of 
communal stigmatization. The protests, no matter how united, were not immune to 
such vicious propensities against the minorities it obviously excluded.  
 
     This is not meant to debunk the agitations, but to argue for a less romanticized re-
assessment, and also to argue for a less abrupt ‘plunge’ into communal mayhem from 
an apparent mood of absolute solidarity represented by the INA agitations. This chap-
ter argues that the importance of the agitation lies in its a deeper questioning of the 
institutions of the state. The anti-police sentiment that pervaded street action during 
the February agitations was symptomatic of the state being reduced, in the public im-
aginary, solely to an instrument of colonial oppression. This was complemented by 
how the judicial process of Rashid Ali’s trial, that rarefied, sacred domain where the 
state acquires its status as a repository of ultimate justice, was repeatedly questioned 
and undermined even by the top leaders of political parties. Muslim League’s debunk-
ing of the trial of Rashid Ali as unfair and biased constituted a crisis of the state’s 
public imaginary, which only became acute when such questionings precipitated pop-
ular street action. The Calcutta agitations in February 1946, therefore, need to be situ-
ated in the context of a progressive undermining of state authority that would contin-
ue, and intensify, over the following months.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Communal Antagonism Beyond the Great Calcutta Killing 
 
     The historiography of popular politics during decolonization assumes a sharp 
break between a period marked by cross-communal camaraderie and one character-
ized by intense communal antagonism.1 On the other hand, scholars of communalism 
often chart a long history of the progressive intensification of communal identities and 
sentiments.2 A few historians have traced the origins of communalism back to pre-
colonial times.3 Others have argued that its genesis was co-terminus with colonial 
knowledge-production.4 Yet, wherever the roots of communal antagonism in the sub-
continent may lie, this strand of scholarship usually projects communal violence that 
accompanied decolonization as the culmination of a long-drawn out process. Longue 
duree histories of communalism move from one instance of major conflagration to 
another across time.5 On the other hand, analyses of partition violence, which concen-
                                                 
1 Sumit Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership, 1945-47’, Economic and Polit-
ical Weekly, vol. 17, no. 14/16, Annual Number, April, 1982, pp. 677-689; Suranjan Das, 
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the Emergence of Communalism in North India, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989; Gyanendra Pandey, Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1992; Das, Communal Riots in Bengal; William Gould, Religion 
and Conflict in Modern South Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.  
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Modern Asian Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 1985. David N. Lorenzen, ‘Who invented Hinduism?’ 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 41, no. 4, Oct., 1999.    
4 Pandey, Construction of Communalism. 
5 Freitag, Collective Action and Community; Das, Communal Riots in Bengal. 
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trate on the last few years of colonial rule, either study patterns of communal consoli-
dation6 or move from one instance of communal flare-up to another, across space.7 
 
     Micro-histories of communal violence, which pay close attention to shifts in eve-
ryday inter-community relations, remain scarce. It is this lacuna that this chapter seeks 
to address by delving into a rich, though fragmentary, corpus of material that throws 
light on everyday life in Calcutta on the eve of partition. In so doing, it deliberately 
takes the story of communal antagonism in the last days of the Raj beyond the Great 
Calcutta Killing. Also known as the August Killing, it has been hailed as the inaugural 
moment of partition violence, and hence has received considerable scholarly attention 
in recent years.8 This chapter will demonstrate that instances of major spectacular 
communal bloodshed often conceal patterns of ‘routine violence’.9 While the former 
reveals how the state’s authority is visibly challenged, the low-scale subterranean cur-
rents of daily violence throws light on the slower but more sustained processes of the 
erosion of the state power. 
 
     The chapter begins with a series of cases that show how communal hostility per-
vaded Calcutta’s social fabric during the period when historians have assumed Hindu-
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145 
Muslim solidarity to be the dominant political mood. It goes further to argue that en-
forcement of communal ‘unity’ by vigilante groups was symptomatic of a deeper in-
ter-community hostility rather than harmony. 
 
     The second section takes the story to the world of provincial politics. It shows that 
even at this relatively higher level of politics, attempts to forge political alliances 
across party lines were dictated more by political pragmatism than altruistic motives. 
Suhrawardy’s Muslim League Ministry, which assumed office in early 1946, attempt-
ed to form a coalition with the Congress. This section argues that despite its outward 
appearance as communal rapprochement, the effort was symptomatic of Suhrawardy’s 
vulnerability to intra-party intrigues. The Great Calcutta Killing, this section argues, 
has to be seen in the context of the Suhrawardy government’s fragility, together with 
the subterranean current of communal animosity that characterized everyday life in 
Calcutta well before August 1946. 
 
     Next, the chapter explores the aftermath of the Great Calcutta Killing. It charts the 
constant apprehensions and fears of a communal flare-up both among Hindu and 
Muslim groups, fuelled by rumour and propaganda. The fourth section moves back to 
the domain of organized politics to delineate patterns of communal consolidation in 
the formal political domain. It shows how, despite the persistence of inter-party com-
petition and factional rivalries, groups representing Hindus and Muslims emerged as 
antagonistic political formations, speaking with one voice while representing the case 
of the community they claimed to represent. 
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     The final section outlines broad contours along which everyday economic life was 
reorganized in Calcutta under the impact of communal suspicion and violence. It 
seeks to understand, albeit on the basis of fragmentary evidence, how widespread 
fear, apprehensions, and loss of faith in the state dislocated economic relations.   
 
 
Communal Violence in the Time of Communal Solidarity 
 
     Suranjan Das, historian of communal riots in twentieth century colonial Bengal, 
posits a clear distinction between religious and communal conflict. The former, ac-
cording to Das, constituted violence provoked by ‘sectarian and doctrinaire differ-
ences’, whereas communal conflict involved the quest for ‘political power and eco-
nomic resources’. Religious consciousness, according to Das, constituted ‘personal 
allegiance to a set of practices and dogmas’, in the hope of ‘rewards from a transcen-
dental reality’. Communalism, by contrast, entailed attempts at securing ‘worldly ad-
vantages at the expense of other communities’.10 However, as numerous instances of 
violence in colonial India show, the line between the two was often blurred. Commu-
nal conflict, especially Hindu-Muslim conflict, often revealed the impulse to secure 
material benefit, even at the cost of violence, precisely to create or preserve condi-
tions for religious or spiritual endeavour. At least, that is how social groups participat-
ing in communal violence often described the issues at stake, to themselves and to 
their co-religionists. Conflicts around sacred space, and the more recent twentieth-
century development of controversies around playing music in the vicinity of such 
sacred space or on religious occasions, epitomizes this blurring between ‘purely’ reli-
                                                 
10 Das, Communal Riots in Bengal. 
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gious and ‘purely’ communal conflicts. Religious practices in the subcontinent were 
never purely personal affairs, and hence demands over public space and the right to 
perform public acts – such as playing music and organizing religious processions on 
certain occasions or at certain places – constituted arenas where religious and com-
munal conflicts could merge.11 
 
    The months after the end of the Second World War, despite their reputation for 
cross-communal solidarity, did not witness even a temporary suspension of patterns of 
conflict usually associated with communal animosity. The police archives of the peri-
od in Calcutta are replete with such examples. 
 
     Historians have traced violent conflict between social groups imbued with ‘com-
munity consciousness’ in Bengal at least since the late-nineteenth century. Although 
Dipesh Chakrabarty and Subho Basu differ on the precise nature of the conflict that 
gripped Calcutta’s industrial neighbourhoods in the 1890s, they show at least some 
characteristics of what later came to be identified as hallmarks of communal antago-
nism.12 Nationalist ideas, too, as they emerged in late nineteenth century Bengal, 
showed distinct signs of Hindu chauvinism.13 In the early twentieth century, when 
mass agitations on ‘national’ political issues became increasingly widespread, the 
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mobilizing rhetoric and the programme of action had a strong Hindu bias.14 Simulta-
neously, in the course of the early twentieth century, increasingly conscious of their 
numerical advantage, Bengali Muslims emerged as a powerful political force.15 Dur-
ing the late 1930s, Muslim political formations came to dominate provincial politics, 
to the deep irritation and growing alarm of the Hindu bhadralok elites.16 In the course 
of the twentieth century, numerous riots had broken out in Calcutta, which showed 
some elements of solidification of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ identities. The outbreak of 
communal violence in 1926, some historians argue,17 had a deep impact on Hindu-
Muslim relations in Calcutta, which was only further accentuated with the increasing 
prominence of the Muslim League in Bengal politics from the 1930s and the conse-
quent marginalization of Hindu political elites.18 In this context, the instances of low-
scale but continuous undercurrent of communal animosity during the last years of the 
war, recounted below, should not come as a surprise.    
 
     In August 1945, a small patch under a pipul tree on a pavement beside the 
Belliaghata Road in Calcutta became the theatre of intense controversy.19 Some local 
Hindus considered the tree sacred and worshipped a few stones placed under it. Dur-
ing the Id festival, however, Muslims of the locality would gather under the tree to 
                                                 
14 Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908, New Delhi: People’s Pub-
lishing House, 1973. 
15 Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-1947, New Delhi: Impex, 1976. 
16 Chatterji, Bengal Divided. 
17 Das, Communal Riots in Bengal; P. K. Dutta, Carving Blocs: Communal Ideology in Early 
Twentieth Century Bengal, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999; Kenneth McPherson, 
The Muslim Microcosm: Calcutta, 1918 to 1935, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1973. 
18 Chatterji, Bengal Divided; Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal. 
19 ‘Communal Tension over the Construction of a Temple at or near 8/1, Beliaghata Road on 
the Footpath’, K.P.M. No. 01485/05, S.B. File No. 506/45, P.M. (1945), Special Branch Rec-
ords, Calcutta Police (Henceforth SBR, CP).  
149 
recite prayers. The Imam who conducted these prayers would stand in the tree’s shade 
while preaching to the congregation. 
      
     Trouble started when Haranandan Ray, a prominent Hindu of the locality, and 
Baccha Tewary, the local priest, erected a small permanent structure at the site to 
serve as a Hindu temple. The Muslims resented this and complained to the Calcutta 
Corporation. The Corporation duly served a notice on Haranandan and Baccha 
Tewary, instructing them to demolish the unauthorized structure. Both men ignored 
the notice. 
 
     The ‘neighbourhood’ controversy gripped the attention of the wider Calcutta pub-
lic when Muhammad Usman, the Calcutta District Secretary of the Muslim League, 
intervened on behalf of the Muslims, and filed a police complaint. This escalated ten-
sions, and the issue became a city-wide concern. When the police began their enquir-
ies on 18 August 1945, tension was palpable in the locality.  Haranandan and Baccha 
Tewary’s prosecution at the Municipal Magistrate’s court had, meanwhile, further 
fuelled suspicion between the communities in the area. The police reported that ordi-
nary social contact between Hindus and Muslims, previously rather cordial, had,  
indeed, completely broken down.20 
 
     Such conflicts were by no means a post-war development. Another controversy 
around a sacred site had erupted a few months before, in November 1944, around a 
mosque in Arpuli Lane. After a dispute about a plot of land in the area, Satyendra Lal 
Pyne, a lawyer, had obtained a High Court decree giving him possession of the land. 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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Trouble began on 7 November 1945 when Pyne, with the help of a High Court official 
and the local police, began to build a wall around the plot.21 A part of the mosque fell 
within its precincts, and Pyne’s masons demolished a water reservoir, a urinal and a 
pillar belonging to the mosque.22 This caused consternation in the area and a crowd of 
about three hundred Muslims gathered to stage a protest. Tension escalated. Muham-
mad Usman, the Secretary of the Calcutta League, and Nasiruddin Khondkar of the 
Khilafat Committee, both arrived to try to pacify the crowd. Eventually Usman wrote 
to the Commissioner of Police, urging him to stop the demolition and filed a petition 
at the High Court for a stay order on the execution of the decree. The situation eased a 
little, only to flare up again a few days later, when Pyne’s men attempted once again 
to construct the wall.23 Despite police protection, the situation got out of hand when a 
crowd, composed of local Muslims, demolished the wall soon after it reached barely a 
foot above ground. Four members of the Muslim National Guard appeared in full uni-
form, wielding lathis, with about five hundred men following them. The Deputy 
Commissioner of the Southern Division and the Assistant Commissioner of South 
Town rushed to Arpuli Lane and managed to prevent violence. 
 
     In a vain attempt to deal with the conflict, the police kept delaying the construction 
of the wall. Each time Pyne attempted to execute the High Court order, crowds gath-
ered within minutes and violence seemed imminent. Rumours were soon afloat that 
Pyne planned to demolish the whole mosque, with the result that, as days passed, the 
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size of the protesting crowds swelled, drawing participants from all parts of the city.24 
Now, as the issue began to have city-wide dimensions, both the League and the 
Khilafat Committee leaders kept away, fearing that the crowd would not listen to 
them. They were aware they could rapidly become unpopular if they tried to prevent 
the agitations, and that they would lose their authority if they failed to persuade ‘their’ 
people to back down.25 
 
     On 13 November, a mob gathered around Pyne’s house and attempted to break in. 
Police tried to prevent this, and one Constable was badly beaten up in the process.26 
The situation calmed down when the High Court issued a stay order on the construc-
tion the following day.27 Only after this did Asre Jadid and Rozana Hind, both popu-
lar newspapers among Calcutta Muslims, publish articles asking the public to remain 
calm. The latter also warned that any breach of peace ‘would be bad for the Muslims 
of their community in the Arpuli Lane area’.28 On 7 December 1944, the High Court 
issued an injunction against Pyne, while scheduling the next hearing in February 
1945. The Court also directed the ‘Muslims’ to deposit a sum of five hundred rupees 
as compensation for the financial loss Pyne had suffered. It also issued a directive to 
the Muslims that they were not to rebuild those parts of the mosque that had already 
been demolished.29 The deposit was raised by ‘the Muslims of Arpuli Lane’30 through 
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an organization that called itself the ‘Arpuli Lane Mosque Protection Committee’.31 
By February 1945, when the next Court hearing took place, the issue seemed to have 
fizzled out, and no further records are available of what became of the dispute. What 
remains significant, however, is not simply that huge crowds could be mobilized so 
quickly on such a local issue, but that entire institutional structures resisting assaults 
on communal interests could spring up overnight. The ‘Arpuli Lane Mosque Protec-
tion Committee’ was set up in the house of a Muslim resident of Arpuli Lane on 3 
December 1944 to organize the protests, collect funds and arrange legal defence to 
fight the case in Court. Although constituted at the spur of the moment, it did not lack 
the paraphernalia of full-fledged posts of President and Treasurer. Local Muslims 
elected the candidates for both positions.32 
 
     Historians have written a great deal about how controversies about ‘music before 
mosques’ precipitated communal violence.33 In Bengal, Das points out, this did not 
become a contentious issue till as late as the 1930s.34 Yet, just days before the agita-
tions against the Red Fort trial broke out in Calcutta – seen as a great moment of Hin-
du-Muslim solidarity – tension escalated around a procession that passed beside a 
mosque at European Asylum Lane.35 
 
     The Kali Puja festival was often a source of trouble in Bengal. The worship of the 
deity usually began late at night and, unlike most Hindu religious festivals, alcohol 
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consumption formed a part of the celebrations. Immersion processions of the goddess 
frequently led to street brawls. The administration remained watchful against drunken 
clashes throughout his period. The procession in question was one such Kali immer-
sion procession, which made a great deal of noise and played drums ‘in the very near 
vicinity’ of a mosque, allegedly to intimidate the congregation.36 A mob gathered al-
most instantly to challenge those in the procession. Local police had to intervene to 
prevent a violent affray. 
 
     A month later in December 1945, another controversy erupted, this time around a 
Muharram procession. It clashed with a group of students who were, ironically 
enough, preparing for Nehru’s speech at the Senate Hall of Calcutta University.37 
Nehru was visiting Calcutta to attend the All India Congress Committee meeting.38 
He had delivered several speeches in praise of the Indian National Army (INA) – the 
very issue that had supposedly unified Calcutta’s Hindus and Muslims in a bond of 
friendship and cooperation.39 This time, however, as the procession approached the 
Senate Hall, a bunch of students began to recite poetry, using the microphones at-
tached to roadside stalls, on the pretext of testing them for Nehru’s address later that 
evening. When members of the Muharram procession protested against this deliberate 
disturbance, some students apparently threw brickbats. The local police had to escort 
the procession to its destination to prevent further violence. The incident led to inju-
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ries on both sides and some damage to property, including the smashing of a portrait 
of Subhas Bose, the INA leader and the icon of Hindu-Muslim unity at this juncture.40 
 
     Congress-Muslim League unity in late 1945, so easily equated with Hindu-Muslim 
solidarity, also entailed, on occasion, the enforcement of such so-called ‘unity’ by co-
ercion, by its local champions and self-appointed guardians. For example, Muslim 
League flags hoisted at the Post-Graduate Muslim Women’s Hostel in North Calcutta 
invited the wrath of a bunch of Hindu boys in the area.41 One of them, claiming mem-
bership of a ‘Subhas Sangha’,42 handed a letter to the Hostel Superintendent demand-
ing that she pair the League flag with a ‘national flag’. When this did not yield the 
desired result, they threatened the hostel darwan that they would enter the hostel by 
force and remove the League flag if their demands were not fulfilled. 
 
     The hostel soon became the target of brickbat-throwing from neighbourhood build-
ings. This escalated to the point when the beleaguered Hostel Superintendent had to 
report the matter to the police, who identified one of the boys, and also the landlord of 
the house from where brickbats were thrown, and took them to the local police station 
to be ‘warned’.43 The thana also posted a Constable at the hostel gate to ‘keep [the] 
peace’.44 There the matter rested, but it proved that over enthusiasm for unity was of-
ten a symptom of its fragility. 
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     Incidents occurring outside Calcutta also affected the city. Calcutta had a vibrant 
press culture. Many important newspapers, printed in English and the vernaculars – 
whether Urdu, Bangla or Hindi – were published and based in the city. Their prestige 
and popularity often extended well beyond Bengal. Letters to the editors of many of 
these newspapers poured in not only from the districts but also from the neighbouring 
provinces. A letter to the Editor of Morning News, from Abdul Jabbar Khan in Bihar, 
for example, spoke of how Muslims of that province looked upon this newspaper ‘as 
the champion of their cause’ and urged him to ‘justify their expectations’ by publish-
ing items that spoke of the woes of Muslims in Muslim-minority provinces such as 
Bihar.45 Sometimes these letters spoke of the quotidian oppressions suffered by one 
community in the hands of the other;46 on other occasions, newspapers themselves 
were attacked for their editorial stance.47 Many such letters were intercepted at the 
post offices, but others reached the offices of newspapers. Some of these papers 
obliged by publishing such news of communal oppression and were glad to stoke the 
fires of controversy and communal hatred. This was evident even in late 1945 and 
early 1946. Take, for instance, an article in the Bengali daily, Ananda Bazar Patrika, 
in December 1945. This was about a seventy-year-old Muslim warden of the 
Midnapore Central Jail whose profession was government service but whose passion, 
allegedly, was to convert Hindus to Islam.48 In order to convert a Hindu prisoner to 
Islam, the paper reported, he had forced him to read the Kalma, observe the Ramzan 
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fasts and made him consume ‘roza food’49 – the last was, of course, an insinuation 
that he was compelled to eat beef. 
 
     The nature of inter-community conflict, as shown above, make the distinction be-
tween ‘religious’ and ‘communal’ animosity unsustainable. As examples of such low-
key but pervasive Hindu-Muslim animosity across this period – a period of supposed-
ly cross-communal camaraderie – show that the communal violence that gripped Cal-
cutta in the latter part of 1946 was not a sudden development after all. The Great Cal-
cutta Killing represented a sharp rise in the communal temperature, precipitated when 
certain imperatives in the domain of high politics intersected with everyday inter-
community tensions already rippling beneath the surface.  
 
 
Towards the Great Calcutta Killing 
 
     Several historians consider the Rashid Ali agitation of February 1946 as the high 
watermark of Hindu-Muslim unity in Calcutta.50 As discussed in earlier chapters, this 
was frequently equated with Congress-League unity. The arrival of the Cabinet Mis-
sion in India to discuss the terms of British imperial disentanglement with Indian 
leaders brought the divisions in Indian political life back into the limelight. As public 
attention shifted to the negotiation chambers of New Delhi and Simla, a new dynamic 
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emerged in Bengal politics. While F.J. Burrows, the new Governor of the province, 
replaced Casey on 19 February 1946, 51  polling for the provincial elections were 
scheduled from 17 to 24 March.52 On the surface, Bengal politics still appeared to ex-
hibit signs of a rapprochement between the Congress and the League. Yet a careful 
assessment reveals other, less high-minded, factors behind the drive for inter-party 
alliances. 
 
     Despite government’s anticipation of violence, the elections went smoothly. 53 
Election results in Bengal confirmed the popular appeal of both the League and the 
Congress. Smaller parties managed to secure very few seats.54 The League registered 
the most spectacular victory, winning one hundred and thirteen of the total one hun-
dred and twenty-one Muslim seats, making it the largest single party in the legislature. 
The Governor invited Suhrawardy, the leader of the Bengal Muslim League Parlia-
mentary Party, on 2 April 1946 to form a Ministry.55 Suhrawardy accepted the invita-
tion but said he wanted to negotiate a compromise with the Congress in the hope of 
constituting a League-Congress Coalition Ministry.56 The gesture can be read as a 
continuation of the spirit of communal unity fostered in street camaraderie during the 
INA protests. Unsurprisingly, Suhrawardy’s own public explanation for his move was 
couched in terms of lofty idealism: ‘in the interests of stability and for the more effec-
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tive implementing of [p]rovincial policy in matters of such importance to the popula-
tion as food and cloth supplies and post-war development.’57 
 
     Below the surface, however, other dynamics were at play. The League position in 
the Assembly, taken as a whole, seemed comfortable and strong. When the intra-party 
dynamics of the Bengal League was factored in, however, the Ministry was far more 
vulnerable. Leadership battles within the provincial League had created deep fissures 
between two rival factions – one led by Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim and the other 
by Nazimuddin and Akram Khan.58 After the elections, the division between the fac-
tions had become too wide to foreclose any realistic possibilities of building bridges. 
Suhrawardy thought it expedient not to facilitate interference in the working of his 
Ministry by inviting his rivals to join it. Instead, he decided to reward and work only 
with his own supporters. Only one among eleven Ministers and one among twelve 
Parliamentary Secretaries were chosen from the rival faction.59 Under these circum-
stances, cultivating new allies outside his party made perfect political sense.  Con-
gress, being the largest group in the opposition, was the obvious choice. If such an 
alliance were ever possible, this was the time to attempt it. The more provinces in 
which Congress was in charge, the stronger its position was going to be in negotia-
tions with the Cabinet Mission. Moreover, political impotence had plagued the Bengal 
Congress ever since provincial self-government came into effect in 1937. Deprived of 
power by the intransigence of its own High Command on earlier occasions, there was 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 See chapter two of this thesis. For detailed discussions, see Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, 
Harun-or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengal Muslim League and Muslim 
Politics, 1936-1947, Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987. 
59  Among his rival faction, only Muazzamuddin Hossain was retained as Minister and 
Nasarulla as Parliamentary Secretary. See Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, p. 203. 
159 
every chance that the provincial Congress leadership would be keen on a new offer.60 
For Suhrawardy, such a power-sharing arrangement could give his Ministry an inclu-
sive complexion while buttressing his position in the legislature, protecting him from 
enemies within his own party. 
 
     Suhrawardy’s negotiations with the Bengal Congress quickly collapsed. Coopera-
tion between the League and the Congress at an all-India level had often stalled over 
the former’s exclusive claim to represent Indian Muslims and the latter’s insistence on 
its right to speak for all communities, including Muslims. On this occasion, there were 
other reasons for failure. Despite posing as a secular party and claiming the ‘non-
communal’ legacy of the INA, the Congress had no base whatsoever among Bengal’s 
Muslims. The Bengal Congress had not a single prominent Muslim candidate whom it 
could push for inclusion in the proposed Coalition Ministry. 61  The negotiations, 
which dragged on for more than a fortnight, broke down instead on issues to do with 
the loaves and fishes of office. The Bengal Congress would not accept Suhrawardy’s 
offer of five seats in a Cabinet of twelve members. It wanted six seats in a Cabinet of 
thirteen or five seats in a Cabinet of eleven. Eventually, it accepted five seats in a 
twelve-member Cabinet provided the League agreed to the inclusion of an independ-
ent Hindu as the thirteenth member. When this was denied, the Congress agreed on a 
five to seven arrangement, if the League accepted Fazlul Huq, the former Premier of 
Bengal, as the Speaker of the Bengal Legislative Assembly. 
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     Congress’ new-found love for Fazlul Huq is difficult to explain, but Huq made it 
clear that Congress had proposed his name without consulting him. He went to the 
extent of indicating that he would refuse the post even if it was offered to him, for ‘the 
office of the Speaker in the present Assembly carries no more honour or dignity than 
that of the Superintendent of a zoological garden or the Manager of a lunatic asy-
lum’.62 The Governor’s conclusion, correct or otherwise, was that Huq’s hyperbole 
was ‘in fact a case of “sour grapes” as it has been common property for some time 
that Fazlul Huq coveted the Speakership’.63 
 
     The other issue was the allocation of government departments, which also revealed 
the Bengal Congress’ political inclinations. Retaining the Home Department for him-
self, Suhrawardy had offered the Civil Supplies portfolio to the Congress. The latter, 
however, insisted upon the departments of Education and Local Self-Government.64 
The choice of ministries reveals the social base of the Congress in Bengal. It claimed 
precisely those ministries that could play critical roles in safeguarding bhadralok priv-
ilege. It was this upper caste Hindu landed elite of Bengal, posturing as the custodians 
of Bengal’s cultural and educational superiority, who had felt most threatened under 
the provincial ministries ever since 1937. The bhadralok had looked upon attempts at 
reforms of secondary education and ‘interference’ in the affairs of Calcutta University 
by the Bengal Government as assaults on their dominance.65 It felt threatened by the 
increasing influence of a growing Muslim middle class in Municipal Committees, 
District Boards, Union Boards, Debt Settlement Boards and other institutions of local 
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government in small towns and district headquarters, even in areas where the Hindus 
enjoyed numerical majority.66 So Congress demanded exactly those departments that 
could safeguard bhadralok interests most effectively. It also held these demands to be 
absolutely non-negotiable. Such attitudes speak volumes about the upper-caste Hindu 
complexion of the Congress in Bengal. 
 
     Negotiations with the Congress finally collapsed on 20 April 1946. Suhrawardy 
went ahead and formed a ministry with only his own supporters. However, a solid 
group of thirty-five members within the Assembly continued to support the 
Nazimuddin-Akram Khan faction. This severely restricted the Ministry’s ability to 
function.67 
 
     Given the vulnerability of Suhrawardy’s ministry, his position threatened by con-
stant intrigues by his opponents, he turned towards the League High Command for 
support. Jinnah had always sided with Nazimuddin in the Bengal League and had 
looked upon Suhrawardy with suspicion. Suhrawardy now wanted to cultivate Jin-
nah’s support and was desperate to assure him of his obedience. 
 
     League politics at the all-India level in mid-1946 is too well-known to be repeat-
ed.68 No sooner had some agreement been reached at the negotiations between Indian 
political leaders and the Cabinet Mission than it collapsed, primarily due to Congress 
intransigence. The League, which had previously approved the Cabinet Mission pro-
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posals, now revised their stance, withdrew from all further negotiations with the Con-
gress and the British government, and adopted ‘Direct Action’ as the method to win 
the demand for Pakistan. Jinnah remained vague about what ‘Direct Action’ really 
entailed. But in Calcutta this led to an unprecedented communal ‘fury’. About five 
thousand people were butchered in the streets of the city.69 
 
     The reason why on 16 August 1946 no other part of India except Calcutta erupted 
in violence remains a mystery. It is arguable that this could be attributed to 
Suhrawardy’s ‘overenthusiasm’ in implementing Jinnah’s directives to win his confi-
dence.70 Suhrawardy’s culpability in the riots has now become a tradition. What one 
misses, however, in this blame-game is that the Great Calcutta Killing cannot be ex-
plained away by Suhrawardy’s personal ambitions or failures. It has to be located 
within a long-term culmination of progressive breakdown in inter-community rela-
tions. The failure of negotiations between the League and the Congress and its rea-
sons, as described above, show the extent to which communal fractures had become 
unbridgeable in the domain of high politics. But this was only symptomatic of a deep-
er, more everyday form of inter-community hostility, which came to the forefront on 
the streets. 
 
     The importance of the Great Calcutta Killing lay in the intensification of Hindu-
Muslim hostility, already been in evidence for a long time. Its aftermath witnessed a 
continuation of this trend, but in highly magnified proportions.     
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Fear, Rumour, and Propaganda in the Aftermath of the Great Calcutta Killing 
 
     The Great Calcutta Killing inaugurated a regime of fear, propelled by unremitting 
rumour and propaganda. This signified a deep crisis of state authority, and a loss of 
public faith in the institutions of governance. 
 
     Ms Meyer, a European resident of Calcutta, captured the widespread sense of 
trauma in the aftermath of the Killing. Writing to an acquaintance in Paris on 30 Au-
gust 1946, she described how the curfew imposed on 17 August still remained in 
force, how everyone shut themselves up in their homes by nine in the evening, and 
how the rampant looting of shops went on after nightfall. The ‘whites’ were safe as 
long as the British and their army remained, ‘but when they move out, we must too I 
think…’ ‘God knows what will happen’, she wrote in despair, ‘all we can do is hope 
for the best.’71 
 
     Such confidence in the government machinery, needless to say, was not shared by 
very large sections of Indian society. To the Hindu bhadralok, the provincial elite that 
found themselves excluded from political power,72 the Bengal government run by the 
League ministry exemplified Muslim tyranny. A resident of Dacca, writing to the Edi-
tor of the Amrita Bazar Patrika, spoke of how distressing it was for him to read about 
Calcutta Hindus making frantic calls to the police for help during the ominous days of 
the August Killing. ‘This reliance on the machinery of Government’, he lamented, 
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‘has developed into a morbid habit’.73 Now that it was amply clear that Hindus of 
Bengal could expect no help from either the police or the military during communal 
riots, he thought there were only two options available for his community. The first 
was to partition the province and create a ‘national home’ for the Hindus.74 But, he 
argued, ‘a whole history and a glorious tradition’ militated against this vivisection’.75 
The only choice, he insisted, was ‘to galvanize into action a Hindu ‘Risorgimento’ in 
the face of a collapsing ‘Pax Britannica’.76 He located the weakness of Bengali Hin-
dus in the absence amongst them of a ‘bold and healthy’ peasantry, ‘the mainstay of a 
community’.77 While such ‘hardy elements’ of Hindu society had been ‘uprooted’ and 
alienated from ‘contact with the soil’, Hindu youth ‘dissipate their energies in party 
conflicts’.78 He hoped that the Great Calcutta Killing had ‘shaken the Hindus out of 
their sloth and stupor’.79 He urged his Hindu brethren: 
 
[I]n this supreme moment let us all unite to awaken those sentiments of religion and 
chivalry, those virtues of patriotism and valour, which had been so much weakened by 
the misfortunes of the times, but is essentially necessary to drive back the foul invaders 
who are threatening to submerge us in a deluge of slavery.80 
 
     Suspicion of the government machinery and appeal to the traditions of ‘Hindu val-
our’ characterized an increasingly influential strand of Hindu communal discourse. 
The letter quoted above, authored by an ordinary provincial Hindu bhadralok, ex-
pressed sentiments that were gaining ground at an all-India level. On 25 August 1946, 
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days after Calcutta had begun to calm down, the Hindu Mahasabha held a meeting in 
Delhi ‘to consider the situation at Calcutta’.81 Mahasabha veteran Dr. B.S. Moonje 
reminded his audience of ‘the need of organization and solidarity of the Hindus’ and 
‘rousing martial spirit’ so that they could defend themselves.82 Moonje declared that 
not only did the Bengal Ministry fail in its duties, the Ministers themselves ‘played a 
disgraceful part of abettor and instigator of murder, arson and looting in an organized 
manner’.83 Swami Satyanand, the Founder President of the Hindu Mission of Calcut-
ta, who chaired the meeting, called for Bengal’s administration to be handed over to 
‘an impartial agency free from the influence of the Muslim League’, and for the estab-
lishment of a Commission of Judicial Inquiry into the Calcutta Riots.84 A Commis-
sion of Inquiry was eventually set up, but it did precious little to restore public faith in 
the state machinery.85 
 
                                                 
81 Secret Source Report, 25 August 1946, ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Once the Bengal government set up the Calcutta Disturbances Commission of Inquiry, 
there was widespread propaganda insisting that the Commission would never be able to func-
tion independently. The Calcutta Citizens’ Defence Committee, set up by leaders of both the 
Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha, claimed that the independence of the Commission was 
compromised from the beginning because the British government, which had set it up in the 
first place, would never allow the inquiry to go against the Muslim League. This was because 
the British government wanted the Muslim League to remain in power in Bengal. See ‘Bengal 
Provincial Hindu Mahasabha – Calcutta Riots’, 25 September 1946, K.P.M. No. 01817; S.B. 
File No. 938 Part I, P.M. (1946), SBR, CP. This has been discussed later in the chapter. Press 
propaganda also claimed that the Bengal administration was trying to conceal information 
from the Commission and interfering with its proceedings. Amrita Bazar Patrika claimed that 
senior officers of the Calcutta Police were taking their juniors to task for revealing infor-
mation about the functioning of the police force during the August Killing. See Amrita Bazar 
Patrika, 7 March 1947. The report titled ‘Police Official’s Dilemma – Calcutta Riots Enquiry: 
Report of Penalization for Giving Evidence’ has been filed by the Special Branch in K.P.M. 
No. 01823/05, S.B. File No. 938 (IV), P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. This issue has been discussed 
in the next chapter. 
166 
     For its part, Calcutta was in the grip of rumours about Muslims preparing for ‘an-
other attack’ upon the Hindus.86 These were fuelled by reports of low-key incidents of 
stabbing, acid-throwing and arson that poured in from different parts of the city. Such 
incidents stirred fresh waves of panic, which cracked the façade of public order. A 
few cases of stabbing in the night of 4 September 1946, for example, seemed to 
plunge the city once again into chaos. An intelligence agent declared the situation to 
be ‘explosive’; and thought the atmosphere was worse than that which prevailed on 
15 August 1946, the day before the Great Calcutta Killing.87 On the morning of 5 
September 1946, Hindu and Muslim mobs confronted each other across Calcutta. 
Rajabazar, in the north of the city, was the theatre of an open battle between groups 
divided along communal lines. According to the police, this violence was prompted 
by rumours of stabbings elsewhere in the city.88 
 
     The fear that engulfed Calcutta was evident from frequent calls to police stations 
about attacks that turned out to be false. The slightest noise in the streets rang alarm 
bells and prompted frantic calls for help.89 The routine of daily life broke down. Ru-
mours of stabbing and stone-throwing brought the transport services to a standstill.90 
Although tram services on certain routes continued to operate under military or police 
protection, shops remained closed and offices had to be shut for lack of attendance.91 
D.R. Hardwick, the Commissioner of Police, issued a circular describing ‘positive 
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actions’ required of the police force in order to prevent a further conflagration.92 He 
advised Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and Sergeants that they must not hesitate to open 
fire and make indiscriminate arrests ‘whenever possible’. Wherever they saw ‘assem-
blies’ – ‘groups of people brought together for a common purpose, such as a proces-
sion or a knot of people standing in the street talking together’ – they should arrest as 
many as they could. ‘If they are innocent’, the Commissioner advised, ‘they will be 
let off in Court’.93 The police must not, he ordered, enter into a discussion with the 
people they arrested: ‘let them do the discussion with the Magistrate’.94 Such direc-
tions from the very apex of the police establishment speak volumes about a panic-
stricken civil administration. Once these orders were put into practice, police action 
held city life to ransom quite as much as communal tensions did. 
 
     Rumours of communal assaults, more than anything else, fuelled administrative 
panic. Among the prime vehicles of rumours were leaflets, pamphlets, posters and 
handbills that surreptitiously circulated, exchanged hands and appeared in public 
spaces without warning. As violence erupted afresh on 5 September 1946, a Bengali 
manuscript poster created considerable turmoil in north Calcutta. It urged Hindus to 
take a solemn vow ‘to retaliate the inhuman murder of their mothers and sisters’ by 
boycotting Muslims ‘in every possible way’.95 No soon than the spurt of stabbings 
came under some control that fresh rumours emerged in circulation. These spoke of 
Muslims planning attacks on 9 September 1946 following the League’s Council of 
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Action meeting.96 One leaflet spoke of how Muslims had decided to attack southern 
parts of Calcutta during the afternoon when young Hindu men would be away from 
their homes at work and Hindu residential areas (that is, women and children) would 
be defenceless. 97  Similar rumours were afloat even in the Pataldanga Street and 
Mirzapore areas of north Calcutta.98 Panic-stricken Hindu merchants and shop-owners 
in the business quarters decided to shut down their shops and offices on that day, and 
advised the smaller establishments in the area to do the same.99 
 
    Sometimes leaflets contained rumours of other leaflets. One such leaflet entitled 
Shabdhan (‘Beware’) referred to leaflets allegedly distributed from the Nakhoda 
Mosque urging League goondas to attack Hindu localities on 9 September 1946 from 
11 am to 4 pm. With Hindu men gone off to work, the alleged leaflet suggested, this 
was a good time to massacre Hindu women and children. Then it apparently instruct-
ed goondas to shift their target to the business quarters so that Hindu men were caught 
unawares on their way home from work.100 Another leaflet found pasted at one of the 
city’s busy crossings contained similar references to leaflets being distributed from 
the Nakhoda Mosque. It added that the leaflet had been distributed at the express wish 
of Suhrawardy, the Premier of Bengal; he was now in agreement with Jinnah, it said, 
who had declared that those Muslims who refrained from killing ‘Congress Hindus’ 
would be declared kafirs.101 No handbill or leaflet of the kind was found by the police 
when they searched the Nakhoda Mosque. But the rumour did, nonetheless, cause 
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panic.102 Neither could the police afford to take it lightly. The Special Branch made 
arrangements to keep a watch on the Mosque on 9 September, for even if it was just a 
rumour, ‘the public’ seemed extremely ‘jittery’.103 Not much happened on that day, 
except for a brief commotion around the Mosque area because of rumours of Hindus 
stabbing Muslims in adjacent localities. Police watchers reported how, all of a sudden, 
shop-owners started pulling down shutters, Muslim men quickly got off trams and 
started running in all directions. Things calmed down after a few hours once the ru-
mours appeared to be false.104 
 
     When 9 September 1946 did not witness any concerted Muslim attack upon Hin-
dus, new posters and handbills announced a new date. These declared that the Mus-
lims were preparing to attack on 12 September instead, when the Opposition in the 
Bengal Legislature had decided to table a ‘no confidence motion’ against 
Suhrawardy’s ministry. 105  When even this proved incorrect, yet another leaflet 
emerged, this time issued by one Randhir Singh who styled himself as ‘Commander-
in-Chief of the Hindu Nation’.106 It declared that just before the Great Calcutta Kill-
ing, the Bengal Government had issued three hundred licences of fire-arms to the 
Muslims of Calcutta. They were in possession of more than three thousand rifles, re-
volvers, guns as well as a few machine guns and hand bombs. In case the Bengal Min-
istry fell on account of the motion, Muslims would immediately launch an attack on 
Hindus. However, in the event the Ministry continued in office, they would wait until 
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the situation became normal. This would enable them to strike at a time when their 
opponents were complacent. Like a military commander, the author of the leaflet laid 
out the exact routes the Muslims would take to ensure the annihilation of their foes. It 
argued that the Muslims had chalked out a fool-proof plan of dividing Hindu localities 
into small segments so that they could be easily isolated and surrounded by small 
armed mobs. The leaders of the Muslim League, it further claimed, had approved of 
the plan in their meeting on 27 August 1946.107 
 
     This constant flow of rumour, sometimes embedded in mysterious pamphlets, 
maintained communal tension in the city at fever pitch. Hindu fears of Muslim attacks 
were reinforced by stray cases of assaults, stabbings and setting fire to houses evacu-
ated by Hindus in Muslim localities during the days of the Killing.108 Some Hindu 
families who had temporarily moved out of Muslim-majority areas to weather the 
storm now tended to lose hope of ever returning home.109 These were, of course, am-
ply reciprocated in Hindu dominated areas where Muslim families found it impossible 
to live any longer and decided to move to areas with greater concentration of Mus-
lims. These small local migrations surely started the process of communal ghettoiza-
tion that crystallized in the years after partition,110 reflected in the division of the city 
space into more communally homogeneous areas. 
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     By the autumn of 1946, stray cases of assault and stabbing had become a part of 
everyday life in Calcutta. This was also the time when Hindu religious festivities 
reached their peak in the city. The blurring of religious group performance and com-
munal rivalry made tensions more intense around religious festivals.111 A leaflet do-
ing the rounds in Hindu neighbourhoods of south Calcutta towards the end of October 
1946 accused Muslim ‘beasts’ licking the boots of British officials and abusing the 
powers of government to murder the ‘non-violent minority Hindus… in a cowardly 
fashion’.112 ‘The outraged mothers and sisters must be avenged. The souls of the dead 
Hindu brethren remain unsatiated’, it stridently insisted.113 The leaflet urged Hindu 
young men to sacrifice Muslims at the altar of the deity during Kali Puja instead of 
buffaloes: ‘The dark Diwali should be coloured with the blood of the Pakistani  
Muslims.’114 
 
     Just as propaganda and rumour fuelled fears among Hindus of an impending attack 
by Muslims, similar sentiments kept stoking Muslim animosity against Hindus. Po-
licemen spoke of a deep sense among Muslims of being wronged by Hindus. They 
offered an account of Direct Action Day in which the Muslims were victims rather 
than aggressors. Contrary to Hindu propaganda, they claimed that Hindus and their 
leaders were responsible for the Great Calcutta Killing. All that Muslims had wanted 
was to stage an ‘unprecedented demonstration’ on Direct Action Day. 115 Muslim 
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leaders had called upon everyone in Calcutta to observe a strike. Muslims had joined 
Hindus on numerous protests and demonstrations in the past and expected the latter to 
reciprocate. However, Hindus were keen to sabotage the demonstration. On finding 
Hindu shops open, Muslims attempted to persuade the shopkeepers to refrain from 
opposing the strike. But Hindus, they alleged, were bent on making trouble and took 
every opportunity to assault them. In many parts of Calcutta, they banded together in 
large crowds to attack Muslims. Stones, soda bottles and hot water were thrown on 
peaceful Muslim processions; unarmed Muslims were mercilessly butchered; several 
mosques were desecrated. Even ‘Nationalist Muslims’, with their ‘backbones’ practi-
cally broken by the recent floor-crossing of Fazlul Huq, deeply resented such atroci-
ties. 116  Except for a microscopic minority (that included Syed Nausher Ali and 
Humayun Kabir), Muslim leaders of all persuasions, police reports claimed, had 
joined hands with the Muslim League to help victims of their community ‘in every 
possible way’.117 According to the report, Muslims claimed that the Bengal Govern-
ment had called a strike on 16 August 1946 to ensure that there were no communal 
clashes. Had the Suhrawardy Ministry wanted to create trouble, it would not have 
asked ordinary Muslims to attend the meeting at the Ochterlony Monument ‘leaving 
their women and children at the mercy of the Hindus’.118 In fact, some had gone to the 
meeting with small children, which they would not have done had they planned to 
start the killings.119 All this was evidence, in the opinion of Muslims, that falsified the 
accusation that it was the Muslims who planned the riot. Yet after the Killing, Mus-
lims faced constant vilification. Hindu leaders prepared to table no-confidence mo-
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tions against the League ministry in the Assembly as well as against the Mayor in the 
Calcutta Corporation.120 Despite being aware that such actions were not likely to be 
successful, opposition leaders persisted with these strategies merely to defame Mus-
lims. Such propaganda was designed to present Muslims as aggressors and Hindus as 
victims. The League ministry, instead of coming to their rescue, was trying to appease 
Hindus. Muslims found themselves at the receiving end of police highhandedness and 
abuse. While they were harassed with constant house searches and arbitrary arrests, 
the police were reluctant to take action against ‘Hindu hooligans and looters’.121 One 
incident was said to have particularly incensed the ‘Muslim community of Calcutta’; 
sometime towards the end of September 1946, armed police or the army (the Special 
Branch was unsure which) had fired tear gas at the Nakhoda Mosque while about 
eight hundred devotees congregated for prayer. Not only did this infuriate the assem-
bled worshippers, the screen of the mosque had caught fire, although it was extin-
guished soon thereafter.122 The Muslims therefore felt betrayed not only by the Hin-
dus but also by their own leaders who controlled the provincial administration. 
 
     Muslims were also embittered by the constant flow of leaflets, pamphlets, hand-
bills and posters issued by Hindu provocateurs blaming Muslims of planning fresh 
attacks on Hindus.123 The Calcutta District Muslim League complained to the police 
on several occasions, warning that circulation of such propaganda could lead to sud-
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den escalations of tension,124 precipitating small-scale violence on numerous occa-
sions. Not a day passed without reports of stabbings and attacks on helpless vic-
tims.125 Just as Hindu festivals generated apprehensions among Hindus about Muslim 
attacks, Muslim festivals also produced anxieties about Hindu attacks. That these 
fears were not wholly unfounded were proved by several attacks on Muharram pro-
cessions in December 1946.126 There were also rumours of stabbings and attacks cir-
culating in Muslim-dominated localities. Rumours of atrocities on Muslims prompted 
feelings of revenge against Hindus, even when these were proved to be false. One In-
spector toured Muslim neighbourhoods in north Calcutta and concluded that violence 
could break out anytime because of rumours of Hindus planning to attack them.127 
Another police informer spoke of ‘gossip’ freely shared in restaurants and tea shops at 
Wellesley and Park Circus areas about what the next moves of the Hindus were going 
to be.128 Despite efforts of League leaders and various peace committees, anti-Hindu 
rumours remained pervasive in Muslim localities.129 Sudden escalations of tension 
resulted from wild rumours of Jinnah being arrested130 or shot,131 just as there were 
rumours among Hindus of a Muslim conspiracy to kill Nehru. 132  Such rumours 
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among Hindus and Muslims, each mirroring the other, kept communal tempers on 
both sides red hot. 
 
     After the outbreak of communal violence in Noakhali, where Muslim peasants 
were reported to have massacred Hindu landlords,133 even newspapers published re-
ports that the Muslims claimed were nothing but rumours.134 Reports of forced con-
versions of Hindus to Islam led to serious clashes in Calcutta. A Special Branch of-
ficer reported that various Hindu organizations had set up their camps at the Sealdah 
railway station in order to provide relief to Hindu refugees fleeing communal violence 
in Noakhali and Tipperah. The situation, in his view, was ‘fraught with considerable 
danger’, as volunteers of such organizations pounced on anyone getting off from 
trains from eastern Bengal.135 Scuffles routinely broke out between passengers and 
these volunteers, especially when they found women in burkhas accompanying Mus-
lim men. In such cases, these volunteers harassed the passengers and interrogated 
them for hours to determine whether they, especially the women, were victims of 
forced conversion to Islam. As expected, Muslim volunteers also set up rival camps to 
rescue Muslim passengers from harassment, and this often resulted in an uproar. On 
one such occasion, a riot seemed imminent when an armed policeman, fearing that the 
situation was going out of control, fired two rounds killing one and injuring another 
two people.136 
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The State and Communal Consolidation 
 
     The rumours – whose origins remain mysterious – were accompanied by relentless 
propaganda against the partiality and communal bias of the police. A Bengali news-
paper, Bharat, emerged as the flag-bearer of this crusade.137 Naming (and shaming) 
specific police officers, Bharat described how they encouraged the burning of Hindu 
houses and illegal arrests of Bengali bhadraloks. In one article, it claimed that Muslim 
goondas were systematically burning down Hindu houses in Muslim-dominated areas 
of central and north Calcutta, such as Park Circus, Beniapukur and Manicktala, so that 
the Hindu families who had run away from their homes could not return.138 Not only 
were the police turning a blind eye to such criminal acts, the paper claimed, they were 
actively encouraging arson by influencing the personnel of local fire stations. The 
government, it alleged, had transferred efficient firemen posted at these stations over-
night and replaced them with ‘Pakistani soldiers’.139 What exactly is implied by this 
cryptic expression is difficult to ascertain, but it is likely that Bharat was complaining 
about the replacement of existing and retiring personnel of these stations with Muslim 
firemen. Furthermore, it accused the Commissioner of Police, ‘the red-faced Pakistani 
General Hardwick Saheb’ of orchestrating these changes.140 In another article Bharat 
accused the Officer-in-Charge of Tollygunje Police Station of protecting Muslim 
badmashes with the help of his obese Sergeant and his Inspector Usuf.141 This evil 
duo, Bharat claimed, had arrested more than a hundred innocent Hindu bhadralok 
without a shred of evidence against them so as to prove their allegiance to the Muslim 
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League. However, it assured its readers that such lawlessness had finally been stopped 
with the intervention of the Hindu Assistant Commissioner Robin Gupta.142 In anoth-
er article, Bharat charged the Officer-in-Charge of the Beniapukur Police Station, 
Allauddin, with encouraging miscreants to burn down Hindu houses and shops. The 
situation had deteriorated so much, it claimed, that the American news agency, Asso-
ciated Press, had been forced to send out reports to international media informing the 
world of police atrocities in Calcutta.143 
 
     Other popular Bengali newspapers kept up the refrain. They too accused Muslim 
police officers of partiality, although in more measured tones. In sensational cases, 
many such papers desisted from publishing the exact police station or the names of 
police officers involved. Dainik Basumati, for example, reported a case of goondas 
breaking into a thana and releasing the arrested members of their gang.144 The Mus-
lim Officer-in-Charge allegedly entered into negotiation with the miscreants and per-
suaded them to turn the offender back into police custody. Appalled by this incident, 
the paper demanded the immediate transfer of the Officer-in-Charge. It accused the 
latter of communal bias, as he had reportedly prevented the Hindu constables and oth-
er officers of his thana from firing on goondas. These daily reports, and the relentless 
propaganda around stabbing, assault and arson under the active connivance of an al-
legedly ‘communalized’ police force, heightened the paranoia of Calcutta Hindus 
against the Muslim League-dominated provincial administration, and Muslims in  
general. Such attitudes, images and assumptions have found expression in Bengali 
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literature, the detective novel Adim Ripu by Saradindu Bandyopadhaya being only the 
most famous.145  
 
     This atmosphere – dense with communal propaganda – precipitated a communal 
consolidation that sometimes cut across party-political affiliations. To an extent, this 
consolidation was prompted by the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry to inves-
tigate the August Riots in Calcutta towards the end of September 1946.146 Setting 
aside party affiliations and ideological differences, political leaders joined hands to 
present the case of their respective communities. On the one hand, it contributed to a 
further blurring of the differences between the Bengal Congress and the Bengal Hindu 
Mahasabha. On the other, Muslim leaders who had hitherto maintained distance from 
the Bengal Muslim League, gravitated towards it in a bid to present themselves as 
representatives of the embattled community, cruelly wronged by its Other. 
 
     Towards the end of September 1946, the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha lead-
ers had come together to form the Calcutta Citizen’s Defence Committee. Chaired by 
Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, it counted amongst its members the ‘who’s who’ of Bengal pol-
itics – Surendra Mohan Ghosh, Kiran Sankar Roy, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Bidhan 
Chandra Roy, Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee – and included within its ranks capitalists of 
the stature of the Birlas.147 What unified capitalists, Congressmen and Mahasabhaites, 
undoubtedly, was that they were all Hindus. Spearheaded by the Bengal Hindu 
Mahasabha, the Committee condemned the Suhrawardy government for the ‘ghastly 
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carnage’ and proclaimed the innocence of the Hindus.148 The Mahasabha insisted that 
it had appealed to the Hindus to remain calm, peaceful and non-provocative, even 
though it had directed its Ward Presidents and Secretaries to be vigilant and resist co-
ercion of ‘miscreants’.149 It was only after disturbances broke out on the Direct Action 
Day that Mahasabha leaders organized defence parties ‘to save the lives and property 
of the Hindus’.150 But it held that ‘without the active help of the British Governor, 
British Chief Secretary, British Police and the British troops’, the Suhrawardy gov-
ernment could not possibly have orchestrated the ‘Nadirshahi mass butchery in the 
heart of Calcutta’.151 The Calcutta Citizen’s Defence Committee called for an imme-
diate transfer of the administrative machinery to the Congress so that British officials 
could not join hands with ‘League goondas’ and repeat the ‘bloodbath’ in the city.152 
It also voiced concerns that the Inquiry Commission would not act impartially be-
cause of the ‘deep-rooted conspiracy’ of the British Government to keep the League 
in power in Bengal. It nevertheless called upon all individuals and organizations to 
give evidence before the Committee to ‘strengthen the suspicion that a conspiracy be-
tween the British bureaucrats and the Leaguers did exist’. The Mahasabha also decid-
ed to publish the speeches of League leaders and editorial comments of League or-
gans with a foreword by Syama Prasad Mookerjee to mobilize public opinion. Apart 
from deposing before the Commission, the Citizen’s Defence Committee also took up 
the cases of ‘respectable Hindus’ who had been victims of ‘indiscriminate arrests’ up-
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on false allegations by ‘Muslim complainants instigated to give false evidence by 
Muslim Leaguers’.153 
 
      Bengal Muslim politics saw similar developments in the days after the Calcutta 
Killing. It witnessed the further consolidation of the Muslim League, uniting various 
factions within it – if only briefly and tenuously – on an anti-Hindu programme. The 
elections to the Bengal legislatures earlier in the year had, as mentioned above, given 
the League an overwhelming mandate in favour of the Muslim League. Non-League 
Muslim leaders had been severely marginalized. Even the Krishak Praja Party had 
suffered shocking reverses. Leading Praja leaders including Syed Naushar Ali, the 
Speaker of the previous Bengal Legislative Assembly, were crushingly defeated at the 
hands of Muslim League candidates.154 Only the indomitable Fazlul Huq, who con-
tested from two constituencies, won both seats.155 
 
     Yet, after the Calcutta Riots, even Huq decided to cross over to the League. This 
rendered the few remaining non-League Muslim legislators virtually impotent. This 
was not the first time that Fazlul Huq changed his political affiliation, of course. 
However, according to the Bengal Governor, this time his decision was influenced by 
the fate of non-League political leaders during the Killing. In those ominous times, 
Syed Nausher Ali, for example, had to take shelter in a police station for days to 
‘avoid massacre by the League hooligans’.156 His floor-crossing, along with that of 
three other non-League Muslim legislators, further buttressed the Ministry’s position 
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in the Assembly. If Suhrawardy could hold onto the support of five Independent 
Scheduled Caste members who had supported his Ministry until this point, the Mus-
lim League could now command an absolute majority in the Assembly with 127 sup-
porters (including the Speaker) in a House of 250 members.157 
 
     Outside the legislature, the Muslim League was also gaining ground among the 
Khaksars, despite the fact that the all-India Khaksar leadership was at loggerheads 
with Jinnah.158 Hindu vigilantes had not spared Khaksars during the August Killing. 
Khaksar leaders in Calcutta begged Allama Mashraqi, their all-India leader, to join the 
League after Jinnah’s call for all Muslims to unite under the League banner. 159 
Mashraqi extended a conditional offer to Jinnah, declaring that the Khakrars would be 
willing to join the League only if he worked with Gandhi ‘to achieve the independ-
ence of India and Pakistan’. However, their Bengal leadership insisted that this was an 
unreasonable demand, and decided to work with the League in the province without 
formally joining the party.160 Thus, both within and outside the Assembly, the Muslim 
League successfully built up a uniquely wide base of support, drawing close to it 
those who had previously remained aloof. 
 
     The factional divides within the Bengal League remained as sharp as ever, yet 
when it came to the defence of ‘Muslim interests’, all sections of the party stood unit-
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ed. Ongoing rivalries were now articulated through attacks on the ministry for not do-
ing enough to safeguard and promote the interests of the Muslim community. The as-
sumption, of course, was that all Muslims had the same interests, which were distinct 
from those of non-Muslims. 
 
     Thus, a paradoxical posturing characterized League politics in the months after the 
Killings. On the one hand, all Muslim leaders (Leaguers as well as those outside it) 
joined the chorus claiming a Hindu conspiracy against Muslims, and the Muslim 
League ministry. On the other hand, the Suhrawardy ministry was subjected to severe 
criticism by many Muslim leaders, who attacked it for betraying the ‘Muslim cause’. 
 
     The most remarkable expression of this paradox was the formation of a Central 
Relief and Defence Committee in early September 1946 by League leaders opposed to 
the ministry.161 In fact, the Calcutta Citizen’s Defence Committee – constituted later 
by a Congress-Mahasabha alliance, as discussed above – replicated the model pio-
neered by Suhrawardy’s rivals within his own party. They included almost all promi-
nent Leaguers outside the ruling faction, including Fazlul Huq, Nazimuddin, Azizul 
Huq and Ispahani. The Committee accused the Suhrawardy administration of harass-
ing Muslims ‘even for bonafide and honest possession of articles’, making illegal ar-
rests and conducting indiscriminate house searches.162 It resolved to arrange the legal 
defence of Muslims arrested in connection with communal riots, and to record the 
statements of all Muslim men and women who had been targets of Hindu and Sikh 
violence. With the financial support of most prominent Muslim merchants of Calcut-
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ta, the Committee raised about one hundred and fifty thousand rupees within days of 
its formation, and placed the funds in Ispahani’s custody.163 Besides legal defence, it 
provided relief for Muslim riot victims, especially those who had been orphaned or 
widowed. Just as Congress and Mahasabha had come together to defend ‘Hindu inter-
ests’ against the alleged onslaught of the Muslim ministry, the Committee under 
Suhrawardy’s party rivals sharpened their criticism, threatening to take legal action 
against the provincial government for continuing to harass Muslims of the city.164 Yet 
when it came to the no-confidence motion tabled in the Assembly by the Opposition 
in mid-September 1946, all Muslim legislators, irrespective of factional divides, stood 
united behind the ministry. Internal rivalries were articulated through intrigues within 
the party to force Suhrawardy to reshuffle his Cabinet, so that his ambitious rivals 
could share the resources and powers of office.165  
 
     Newspapers emerged as another vehicle of public criticism of Suhrawardy’s gov-
ernment. Paradoxically, these newspapers often had declared Muslim League lean-
ings. Yet they carried propaganda alleging discrimination against Muslims by the 
provincial government. Azad, for example, accused Suhrawardy of deliberately refus-
ing to depute Muslim police officers to assist in preparing the Police Commissioner’s 
report on the August riots.166 It implied that Suhrawardy was deliberately trying to 
tone down the culpability of the Hindus in the police version of the Killing. It further 
alleged that a Muslim police officer in north Calcutta was transferred merely because 
                                                 
163 ‘Muslim Affairs – Muslim League – Calcutta Riots’, 10 September 1946, ibid. 
164 ‘Review of Azad India’, 31 October 1946, K.P.M. No. 01818/05, S.B. File No. 938 Part II, 
P.M. (1946). 
165 ‘Muslim Affairs – Muslim League’, 14 September 1946, K.P.M. No. 01817; S.B. File No. 
938 Part I, P.M. (1946), SBR, CP. 
166 Azad, 23 September 1946. 
184 
he had conducted searches in Hindu localities.167 Rozana Hind also accused the minis-
try of conducting ‘unnecessary searches’, provoking deep and understandable resent-
ment among ‘Muslims of Calcutta’.168 It recounted a story of how a Hindu Inspector 
of a thana forcibly entered Muslim households with ‘Bhojpuri Constables’ on the plea 
of making searches. Following an incident in which someone had thrown an acid bulb 
on a bus, Rozana Hind accused the Hindu Inspector of rescuing only the Hindu victim 
and using this excuse to arrest many Muslim men and abuse ‘Muslim pardanashin 
women in filthy language’.169 Those arrested were finally released on the insistence of 
the Hindu victim that he did not know whether the culprit was a Hindu or a Mus-
lim.170 These newspapers propagated the idea that despite the League being at the 
helm of affairs in Bengal, ministers acted in ways detrimental to their own constituen-
cy and the Muslim community. 
 
     Newspapers were themselves not immune from public wrath. Anonymous letters, 
for example, threatened The Statesman and its staff with dire consequences for its an-
ti-Muslim League stance. One such letter, signed by one ‘Jehadi’, warned its Editor: 
‘You will do well to keep your mouth shut… if you do not stop writing against us we 
have decided to burn your office completely and butcher you and the white wom-
en.’171 The writer bragged that there would be no one to save them ‘as Police is ours’. 
It demanded that The Statesman should ask its ‘friends in the Assembly’ (presumably 
indicating the European members) to vote for the Ministry, or else they would be 
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doomed.172 Another letter, which The Statesman received about a week later, threat-
ened: ‘I am very sorry to say that if you ever, from today onwards, interfere with 
Muslim matters, or write anything against them, you will be in trouble and The 
Statesman House will be blown up, so you better be careful.’173 This writer described 
himself as ‘Your friendly advisor’ and signed off with ‘Muslim Zindabad’.174 
 
     That both these letters were written in English shows that these were not the work 
of illiterate ‘hooligans’. Educated middle-class consumers of ‘English’ news were in-
volved in the controversies about newspapers and their biased reportage. 
 
     An Intelligence Officer emphasized this point with some surprise. While passing 
through the Park Circus tram depot, he reported, he was alarmed by a Muslim crowd 
involved in a heated altercation with a hawker of newspapers. On investigation, he 
found out that the crowd was insisting that the hawker, also a Muslim, had refrained 
from selling Navayug and The Statesman, because both these papers had adopted an 
‘anti-Muslim’ stance. The officer noted, with surprise, that the people in the crowd 
‘seemed to be decent looking and literate’.175 This vignette says as much about police 
stereotypes as it does about communalism in this area. 
 
     But there were also instances of physical intimidation of newspaper staff that, the 
police believed, were being carried out by ‘hooligans’, probably under the instigation 
of the educated middle-class readers of newspapers. On 1 November 1946, a peon 
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working with The  Statesman was stabbed on Grant Street. The reporting policeman 
remarked, with some concern, that this was the third time since the August Killing 
that peons employed by The Statesman had been attacked.176 Self-appointed guardians 
of community interests, it seems, were keen to enforce censorship, either by threaten-
ing newspaper offices, their lower staff or even their vendors. 
 
 
Communal Animosity and Everyday Economic Dislocation 
 
     One of the biggest consequences of the Great Calcutta Killing on the life of the 
city was the straining of everyday economic relations between Hindus and Muslims. 
Calcutta’s growing importance as a centre for trade and commerce had attracted Mus-
lim migrants from all parts of India since the eighteenth century. It had attracted mer-
chants from northern and western India, most of whom were Urdu speakers. The 
Cutchi Memons were among the wealthiest mercantile groups, who had migrated 
from Kathiawar in the eighteenth century, and they dominated the trade in hide as 
well as exports and imports of indigo and rice. Others included Pathan merchants who 
mostly dealt in the leather trade and dominated informal credit networks, Iranian mer-
chants engaged in exports and imports and other traders from Western India partici-
pated in a variety of trades.177 Apart from merchants, there were the aristocratic Mus-
lim families from Awadh and Mysore, as well as the displaced native Muslim aristoc-
racies who had worked in the army and administration of royal courts of Bengal.178 
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These aristocrats had brought with them their retinues and servants, who swelled the 
ranks of the urban proletariat. However, from the late nineteenth century, Calcutta had 
also begun to attract a large number of poorer Muslim migrants from north India as 
labourers in the jute mills in its industrial suburbs. But apart from the mills, a large 
number poured into the city to provide various services and participated in a variety of 
occupations.179 
 
     There were substantial Muslim settlements in the heart of town, with large en-
claves around the Hogg market – the largest municipal market of the city – as well as 
clusters around the Nakhoda Mosque and the indigenous commercial area of 
Burrabazar. The latter area was dominated by Marwari merchants and traders.180 Mus-
lim labourers, living cheek and jowl with the Marwaris, had developed intimate con-
nections with the latter. Many of them, migrants from Bihar and the Punjab, worked 
as carters in Burrabazar and provided a variety of services. 181  Clashes and petty 
squabbles with Hindu rivals in these areas were not uncommon, but Hindus and Mus-
lims did develop close ties of mutual interdependence.182 These connections, which 
had woven Hindu and Muslim groups into the economic fabric of Calcutta for at least 
about a century and a half, began to show signs of strain from the 1920s.183 But de-
spite growing Hindu-Muslim hostility, these ties remained functional until the 1940s. 
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     These bonds tended to break down in the aftermath of the August massacre. By 
early September 1946, reports of Hindu businesses and shops dismissing their Muslim 
employees grew more frequent, as did stories of the economic boycott of Muslims.184 
In some bazaars of north Calcutta, Hindu shopkeepers drove away Muslim vegetable 
sellers and butchers.185 Hindu workers of Muslim firms also feared losing their jobs. 
The decision by a Muslim firm, Wachel Molla and Sons, to dismiss fifteen Hindu em-
ployees, caused consternation. According to a secret police report, the firm planned to 
sack the remaining Hindu employees after the Durga Puja festival.186 
 
     Tension was particularly acute in the commercial areas of north and central Calcut-
ta. In Burrabazar, Amratola and Mullickbazar, Muslim carters had a virtual monopoly 
in the business of transporting goods. Carts were used to navigate the intricate net-
work of narrow lanes and bylanes, moving goods, stocking warehouses, loading and 
offloading larger vehicles which could not enter these crowded gullies. After the riots, 
the relation between Muslim carters and Hindu merchants, often Marwaris, became 
acutely strained. The latter began bringing in Hindu carters from ‘outside’. Leading 
Hindu merchants of the area actively canvassed for the ending of all commercial rela-
tions with Muslims.187 This had an immediate and adverse impact on the livelihoods 
of Muslim carters and cart-owners. They petitioned the Commissioner of Police and 
the Deputy Commissioner of Northern Division to intervene on their behalf.188      
 
                                                 
184 Confidential diary entry of Inspector A.G. Khan of S.B., Calcutta, 5 September 1946, 
K.P.M. No. 01818/05, S.B. File No. 938 Part II, P.M. (1946), SBR, CP.. 
185 Extract from daily report on the political situation in Bengal, 5 September 1946, ibid.  
186 Untitled report, 26 September 1946, ibid. 
187 ‘Unrest among the Muslim carters and Cart Chaudhuries in Amratala’, undated (but likely 
to be in late September or early October 1946), ibid.  
188 Ibid. 
189 
     Alarmist rumours also disrupted economic interdependence between Hindus and 
Muslims. Calcutta Police found a leaflet in Hindi pasted on a pillar at the junction of 
Harrison Road and Clive Street. It declared that ‘Muslim Goondas’ were forcing Hin-
du workshop owners in Muslim-dominated areas to employ local Muslims. These 
goondas allegedly warned that if Hindu owners dared to disobey them, their work-
shops would be looted and burnt down.189 The author of the leaflet, Randhir Singh, 
‘Commander-in-Chief of the Hindu National Guard’, advised his ‘Hindu brethren’ not 
to be afraid of such threats. They must prepare to defend every Hindu workshop. If 
Hindu owners thought that they would save their workshops by giving in to Muslim 
demands, they were mistaken, he argued. This was a Muslim conspiracy to enter the 
workshops as employees, kill the Hindu owners, and then take over the business, for 
‘there is little that this deceitful community does not do’.190 The leaflet concluded 
thus: 
 
Die or be destroyed, but never accept defeat. If the property is destroyed, let it go; if 
lives are lost, let it be so, but do not put a stigma on the prestige of the Hindu nation 
over and above your losing everything by submitting to the demands of deceitful 
men.191    
 
The Bengal National Chamber of Labour wrote to the Commissioner of Police com-
plaining about these posters urging Hindus to boycott Muslims economically, in every 
possible way, including handbills which pressed Hindus not to buy biris from Muslim 
biri makers and other commodities manufactured by Muslims; not to hire rickshaws, 
hackneys and taxis driven by Muslims; not to recruit Muslim workers, and to dismiss 
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those already in their employment.192 Although the investigating officer found no evi-
dence of such posters or handbills, he observed that a de facto economic boycott did 
exist ‘on account of the day to day incidents in the city causing fear of life.193 
 
     Even in those factories where relations between Hindu and Muslim workers re-
mained cordial during the Killing, rumours circulating in its aftermath threatened to 
bring production to a standstill. On 15 September 1946, the Manager and the Works 
Superintendent of the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works reported disrup-
tive rumours at the factory.194 The whisperers had it that Muslims in neighbouring 
areas of Phulbagan, Kalabagan and Kankurgachi were planning to attack the factory 
and kill Hindu workers. Accordingly, ‘some outsider Muslims’ had asked the Muslim 
employees of the factory to leave once they received their pay. 195  Makleswar 
Rahman, a laboratory assistant, overheard this conversation among his colleagues and 
reported it to his Sectional Head.196 The Manager told the police that even on Direct 
Action Day, Makleswar had turned up for work. The family quarters of the factory 
bordered the eastern banks of a canal. Upon investigation, the police found that Mus-
lim boatmen had easy access to these quarters, and inmates complained about 
‘strangers’ entering their private areas and spreading fear and panic, especially among 
women.197 
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     The factory management realized that police involvement in this case was only 
likely to heighten suspicion.198 So they arranged their own mechanisms to counter the 
‘wild rumours’. They selected twelve trusted workers of the factory – Hindus and 
Muslims – to cycle around in the adjoining areas and report to the factory. The facto-
ry, in its turn, published news bulletins –at 12 noon, 2 pm and 4 pm every day – to 
supply information to the workers. This, the Manager reported, helped alleviate fears 
and improved production considerably.199 This is yet another instance of the precipi-
tous decline in the legitimacy of the state. Factory workers considered intervention of 
the institutions of the state more troubling than a source of reassurance. 
 
     The straining of economic relations between Hindus and Muslims among the Cal-
cutta working classes, made political work among the labouring poor extremely diffi-
cult. The Communist Party of India (CPI) had also suffered attacks during the August 
riots. Muslim mobs had ransacked two of its CPI Communes at Harrison Road and 
Chittaranjan Avenue. Muslim Communist inmates had tried to prevent the angry 
crowd, but to no avail. Although the Commune members were eventually rescued, 
their belongings were looted, and the buildings were vandalized.200 
 
     In the days after the riots, Muslim CPI members were subjects of slanderous gos-
sip, discrediting them for ‘betraying the Muslim cause’.201 Party work suffered since, 
due to the communally-charged atmosphere, Hindu party activists could not visit 
Muslim areas, while Muslim comrades found it impossible to work in Hindu domi-
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nated areas. The financial position of the Bengal and Calcutta Committees were ren-
dered precarious, as collection of subscriptions from workers became difficult, and 
these subscriptions accounted for a substantial proportion of party funds. All District 
Committees devoted their few resources to preventing yet another riot and promoting 
goodwill among the communities.202 But for smaller parties such as the Revolutionary 
Socialist Party (RSP), organizational activities among labour came to a standstill after 
the riots.203 Party leaders made an attempt to resume work from mid-September 1946. 
The North Calcutta District Committee of the RSP, for example, called on members 
of its Labour Front to devote at least four hours each week for party work.204 The 
leadership directed them to make both Hindu and Muslim workers realise that com-
munal riots were harmful for everyone and that these were instigated by the leaders of 
both communities and ‘British Imperialists in furtherance of their own interests’.205 
Despite such directives, RSP workers reported after just a week that work among la-
bourers was impossible because of communal tension; they found workers, especially 
Muslims, in parts of north Calcutta to be ‘unresponsive’.206 They told the leaders that 
work could not be resumed ‘until the situation became normal’.207 Similarly, leaders 
of the Forward Bloc concluded at a meeting in Calcutta in early September 1946 that 
‘the working class movement has received a serious set-back and the revolutionary 
fervour… had faded away’.208 In September 1946, the Bengal Provincial Congress 
Committee also discussed how ‘labour organizational work had been altogether sus-
pended… in view of the high communal tension resulting from the recent riots in Cal-
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cutta’. 209  Leaders of even smaller organizations, such as the Hindusthan Mazdur 
Sevak Sangha, went so far as to advise its organizers ‘not to risk their lives by visiting 
the bustee areas’, especially slums of Muslim workers, ‘but only to maintain their 
links and contacts as far as possible’.210 
 
     This dislocation in economic relations continued throughout the period of decolo-
nization. Independence brought in its wake, as the next chapter will show, a thorough 
rearrangement of the power dynamics between communities, organizations and peo-
ple in Calcutta. This had profound consequences for commerce as well. ‘Normalcy’ 
returned only after Muslims had been totally cowed, after partition, as the next chap-
ters will show. 
 
Conclusion 
      
     This chapter provides insights into how Calcutta’s inter-communal relations grad-
ually collapsed. This process began before the August riots of 1946, reflected in eve-
ryday conflicts around use of sacred spaces and access to public resources. The mas-
sacre that the city witnessed during the Great Calcutta Killing was not altogether sur-
prising, though its scale perhaps was. After the Killing, instances of stabbings and ar-
son against rival communities became a part of everyday life. These were accompa-
nied by a steady stream of rumours and vicious propaganda that kept both Hindus and 
Muslims in a state of constant fear for their lives. This had disastrous consequences 
for economic ties between different communities. 
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     What emerges, therefore, is a picture of a grave crisis of state authority. The pro-
vincial government, now under control of Muslim League ministers, came to be seen 
as corrupt and partial – a perception promoted by its political rivals, both Hindus and 
Muslims. Moreover, pervasive violence, both quotidian and spectacular, eroded pub-
lic faith in the state’s coercive apparatus. While Hindu propagandists exhorted their 
co-religionists not to rely on the police for protection, Muslim political rivals attempt-
ed to delegitimize the Suhrawardy Ministry in the eyes of Muslims by accusing it of 
Hindu appeasement. These had important ramifications, as the followings chapters 
will show. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Towards Independence with Partition of Bengal 
 
     As the future of British India and the ‘Pakistan question’ came to dominate all-
India politics by early 1947, Hindu-Muslim conflict in Calcutta took a distinct turn. 
The Cabinet declaration of 20 February 1947, which fixed a time-frame for British 
withdrawal from the subcontinent, changed the complexion of the debate on India’s 
future.1 It hinted at the possibility that the British government could well agree to di-
vide British India into two successor states, conceding the Muslim League demand for 
a sovereign Pakistan. A large section of Bengali leaders championing the Hindu cause 
now turned the two-nation theory to their advantage. They argued that if, according to 
the Muslim League, Hindus and Muslims were two irreconcilable nations, and if it 
were impossible for the Muslim minority to live together in harmony with the Hindu 
majority in a united India, then, by the same logic, the Hindu minority of Bengal 
could not be expected to live under a polity dominated by the province’s Muslim ma-
jority. Thus, they demanded that if British India were divided into India and Pakistan, 
Bengal must also be divided into two parts – a western Bengal with Hindu-majority 
areas and an eastern Bengal with Muslim-majority areas. While Pakistan could claim 
eastern Bengal, western Bengal had to be made a part of independent India. While a 
small section of the Bengal Muslim League leadership found the demand acceptable, 
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there were other leaders, both Hindu and Muslim, who opposed the division of the 
province on communal lines. The latter group demanded a sovereign united Bengal, 
separate from both India and Pakistan. Calcutta, the nerve centre of Bengal’s political 
life, became the theatre for this contest – between those who demanded Bengal’s par-
tition and those who wanted a sovereign nation-state of united Bengal. This chapter 
will study this conflict and argue that this period generated new symbols through 
which communal antagonisms were articulated in Calcutta. 
 
     This phase represented a grave crisis for the state. The figure of the Punjabi Mus-
lim armed police emerged as the symbol around which communal tensions and the 
demand for Bengal’s partition, coalesced and intertwined. In order to satisfy critics 
within his own party, Suhrawardy, the Premier, recruited a troop of Muslim police-
men from the Punjab for the armed constabulary of the Calcutta Police. Congress and 
Mahasabha leaders launched a campaign to protest against this move and argued that 
if the whole of Bengal was allowed to pass into the hands of Pakistan, it would un-
leash a regime of unmitigated misery for Hindus. A crime allegedly involving newly 
recruited Punjabi Muslim policemen facilitated this campaign, which helped Hindu 
leaders mobilize support for Bengal’s partition on the ground that Hindus could no 
longer expect any justice from the present regime, or any future government dominat-
ed by the Muslim League. Their argument was that not only had the day-to-day ad-
ministration, in the hands of Muslim policemen and the ‘corrupt’ ministers, crumbled, 
but that no institution of the state remained functional to which ordinary Hindus could 
appeal for redressal of the wrongs they suffered everyday in the hands of the provin-
cial government. Therefore, the only redemption available for the Hindus, they 
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claimed, lay in a radical restructuring of state power, including the vivisection of the 
province on communal lines. 
 
     The campaign for the partition of Bengal unfolded alongside the ‘United Bengal’ 
movement. It was the joint campaign of a few prominent provincial leaders of both 
the Muslim League and the Congress. The first section of the chapter delineates the 
contours of high politics in Bengal that laid the ground for the United Bengal cam-
paign. It will show that the campaign cannot be explained exclusively by the altruistic 
motives of its leaders, as has been presupposed by existing historiography. 
 
     Historians have usually portrayed the demand for a united sovereign Bengal in 
idealist terms – as a last-ditch attempt of secular-minded leaders to preserve the unity 
of a region deeply tied together with a common culture and a shared way of life.2 Of-
ten their analyses have tended to become teleological, with historians like Harun-or-
Rashid and Bidyut Chakrabarty attempting to draw a direct link connecting the United 
Bengal campaign with the national self-determination movement in East Pakistan in 
1971. Despite Joya Chatterji’s critique of the campaign as nothing more than a mere 
‘pipe dream’,3 even she seems to agree that whatever the chances of its feasibility 
might have been, the objectives that drove the campaign were laudable. The second 
section re-examines this historiographical consensus and suggests a different reading. 
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     The next section reveals how those leaders campaigning against the United Bengal 
movement mobilized new symbols of Hindu-Muslim antagonism to their cause. It will 
show how the figure of the Punjabi Muslim armed police emerged as the focal point 
of the Bengal partition campaign in Calcutta. 
 
     The chapter then moves to an examination of the 100 Harrison Road Case – a sen-
sational incident of crime in which a Punjabi Muslim policeman allegedly raped a 
Hindu woman. It analyzes the street mobilizations for a strike on the issue and how it 
was harnessed to the cause of the campaign for Bengal’s partition. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by exploring the aftermath of the protests around the 100 Harrison Road 
Case and how the tempo of the partition campaign was maintained until the 3 June 
announcement, which conceded the demand for the partition of Bengal and rejected 
the United Bengal proposal.   
 
 
Provincial Politics after the Great Calcutta Killing 
      
     After the Great Calcutta Killing in August 1946, Huseyn Suhrawardy, the Bengal 
Premier, tried to come to an understanding with the Congress and form a coalition 
government in the province. Shila Sen has suggested that Suhrawardy was brought to 
his senses by the calamity, which gave him ‘second thoughts’. 4 She believes that 
Suhrawardy had ‘changed his mind and sincerely wanted to restore confidence among 
Hindus’. 5  However, her optimism is neither substantiated nor persuasive. 
                                                 
4 Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, p. 209. 
5 Ibid. 
199 
Suhrawardy’s move can be explained better as a continuation of his old strategy of 
safeguarding and protecting his own position in the Bengal Ministry. 
 
     The previous chapter has described how the provincial elections of 1946 resulted 
in an overwhelming victory for the Muslim League in Bengal. Defeating rivals within 
his own party, Suhrawardy had emerged as the new Premier. Rather than appeasing 
his opponents, he had decided to reward his supporters with most of the important po-
sitions in the ministry. This strategy prompted him to seek an alliance with the Con-
gress opposition. With Congress help, he hoped to maintain his sway over his enemies 
within his party. The alliance did not materialize, primarily due to the intransigence of 
the Bengal Congress. This rendered Suhrawardy’s position vulnerable, encouraging 
intra-party intrigues within the Bengal League. 
 
     After the Great Calcutta Killing in August 1946, Suhrawardy’s position became 
even more fragile. As Premier and the minister responsible for law and order, large 
sections of the public saw the Killing as proof of his incompetence.6 Of course, the 
Muslim League maintained that the Hindus were equally, if not principally, responsi-
ble for the violence. But this did not prevent the rival Nazimuddin-Akram Khan fac-
tion from demanding a reshuffle of the ministry.7 If those in the opposition within the 
Bengal legislatures accused him of anti-Hindu bias, opponents within his own party 
accused him of not doing enough for his co-religionists. The danger from his party 
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rivals to his dominance was greater than the danger from the opposition benches in 
the legislatures. Thus, Sen’s contention that opposition demands in the Bengal legisla-
tures for the removal of the ministry forced Suhrawardy to make another attempt at 
enlisting Congress support is untenable.8 The opposition was not strong enough to 
overthrow the ministry so long as it maintained its existing support in the legislatures. 
This support, Suhrawardy knew, would still be forthcoming, as Leaguers did not want 
to topple the ministry altogether. Opponents within his party only wanted a rear-
rangement of power within the ministry – to get a bigger share of ministerial posts or, 
better still, to remove Suhrawardy and replace him with a leader of their own faction, 
preferably Nazimuddin. The latter could count on the support of Muslim big business, 
the Bengal Governor, the Viceroy, as well as Jinnah.9 Intra-party intrigue was thus a 
much bigger threat to Suhrawardy’s position than the opposition in the legislatures. 
 
     Suhrawardy’s chances of success in negotiations with the Congress were not 
strong. The popularity of League-Congress unity slogans had faded away long ago. In 
April 1946, when Suhrawardy had attempted his first rapprochement with the Con-
gress, the scenario had been very different. Yet it was not hopeless: the Bengal Con-
gress leadership had for long resented its exclusion from all-India Congress politics.10 
The High Command had, time and again, refused to allow its Bengal leaders to come 
to any agreement with either the Krishak Praja Party or the Muslim League,11 which 
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did not increase the popularity of the central leadership in the eyes of many provincial 
leaders. Neither did the latter gain from the increasing prominence of the Congress on 
the all-India stage. When Congress formed the Interim Government towards the end 
of August 1946, Sarat Bose was the only leader from Bengal who was admitted into 
it.12 This had done little to improve the standing of the Bengal Congress leaders in all-
India politics. Thus, if somehow Suhrawardy could persuade the High Commands of 
both the League and the Congress to allow a provincial alliance between the two par-
ties in Bengal, the leaders of the Bengal Congress might have been persuaded to see 
merit in his proposal. 
 
     Suhrawardy’s efforts at securing the consent of the High Commands of the League 
and the Congress failed;13 Jinnah refused to allow Suhrawardy to forge a provincial-
level alliance with Congress until a ‘satisfactory coalition at the Centre’ had been 
achieved.14 However, Suhrawardy’s efforts did facilitate a compromise at the all-India 
stage. After meeting the Viceroy, he issued a statement from Delhi urging the Con-
gress, which had already formed an Interim Government, to take a ‘bold leap’ and 
come to a compromise with Jinnah before the ‘chasm yawned too wide to be 
bridged’.15 It is doubtful if Suhrawardy would have made such a forceful appeal to the 
Congress without securing prior consent from Jinnah and Wavell. 16 By some ac-
counts, Wavell was determined to bring the League into the Interim Government 
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since his Calcutta visit in the aftermath of the Great Calcutta Killing.17 When Wavell 
had arrived in the city on 26 August 1946, he was apparently shaken by black-flag 
demonstrations by the supporters of the League and the Muslim National Guard, who 
held him responsible for the carnage and for sabotaging Muslim interests by pander-
ing to Congress demands.18 Whatever Wavell’s motivation may have been, following 
Suhrawardy’s Delhi tour, he met Jinnah on 16 September 1946. Parleys between the 
two lasted from 12 to 15 October, which culminated in the League joining the Interim 
Government on 26 October 1946. 
 
     Jinnah, however, decided not to nominate any Bengal League leader to the Interim 
Government, choosing Jogendranath Mondal, leader of the Scheduled Caste Federa-
tion, instead. Jinnah’s decision was aimed at making a point vis-à-vis the Congress. If 
the Congress had refused the League monopoly over Muslim nominees in the Interim 
Government, Jinnah wanted to show that the Congress could not claim to represent all 
Hindus either. At best, Congress represented the upper-caste Hindus. But it is argua-
ble that Jinnah could well have accommodated a Scheduled Caste representative in 
one of the four seats allocated to North Indian Muslims.19 In any case, the decision 
not to include any Bengal Leaguer, not even from his preferred Nazimuddin-Akram 
Khan-Ispahani faction, was deeply unsettling for the provincial leadership.20 If Jinnah 
cared so little even for his loyal followers in Bengal, the Suhrawardy-Abul Hashim 
faction could hope for very little. The Bengal leaders had felt unrecognized by Jinnah 
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for a long time.21 But this development made them feel insulted.22 This was the con-
text in which the United Bengal campaign emerged towards the beginning of 1947. 
 
 
‘Sovereign United Bengal’ and Its Leaders 
 
     On 20 February 1947, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced the ‘defi-
nite intention’ of Britain of withdrawing from India by June 1948, transferring power, 
if required, to provincial governments.23 Sensing a hint of partition of the subconti-
nent in Attlee’s declaration, the Hindu Mahasabha changed its demand from Akhand 
(United) Hindustan to a call for the partition of Punjab and Bengal. If the League be-
lieved that Hindus and Muslims were, indeed, two different nations with irreconcila-
ble interests, Mahasabha leaders argued, then the large Hindu and Sikh minorities of 
the Punjab and Bengal could not be expected to live under perpetual Muslim domina-
tion in Pakistan.24 In a similar vein, on 8 March 1947, the Working Committee of the 
All India Congress passed a resolution calling for the division of the Punjab in the 
event that India was to be partitioned.25 Acharya Kripalani, the Congress President, 
confirmed in a press interview that the same principle would apply to Bengal as 
well.26 Less than a month later, on 4 April 1947, the Bengal Provincial Congress 
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Committee also declared its support for the partition of Bengal.27 This was followed 
by the Hindu Mahasabha adopting a ‘line of action’ at its Annual Session at 
Tarakeswar in Hooghly district of Bengal as a blue-print for dividing Bengal.28 It 
asked the Constituent Assembly to appoint a Boundary Commission to determine the 
borders of a Hindu-majority province of West Bengal, to constitute a separate legisla-
tive body for Hindu legislators of Bengal and to set up two Regional Ministries – one 
for Muslim-majority eastern Bengal and the other for Hindu-majority western Bengal. 
As is well known, the demand for a separate province of West Bengal carved out of 
Hindu-majority areas of the province gained support from Calcutta’s Hindu big busi-
ness houses, including the Birlas and the Goenkas.29 Influential newspapers such as 
Amrita Bazar Patrika, Ananda Bazar Patrika and Hindusthan Standard initiated a 
vigorous press campaign for the partition of Bengal.30 Yet, in April 1947, a section of 
prominent Muslim Leaguers and Congressmen of Bengal launched a movement not 
just to keep the province united, but to create a sovereign United Bengal independent 
of both India and Pakistan. They argued that Bengal’s distinct cultural and linguistic 
identity had to take precedence over religious considerations in determining the future 
of the Bengali people. 
 
     Historians have presented the demand for an independent United Bengal in either 
sentimental or teleological terms. Shila Sen, for example, sees this demand as a genu-
ine expression of a sentimental desire to keep Bengal united, at least on the part of 
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some Hindu and Muslim leaders. 31 According to her, ‘both Suhrawardy and Abul 
Hashim made a sincere and earnest effort to make Bengal independent and sover-
eign’.32 Apart from the intransigence of many Congress and League leaders, Sen ar-
gues that the effort failed mainly due to time constraints. Under the charged circum-
stances, it was impossible to arrive at a consensus of Bengal leaders on the issue by 2 
June 1947, when the British government decided to finalize the modus operandi of 
British withdrawal from the subcontinent.33 Leonard A. Gordon, biographer of the 
Bose brothers, agrees with Sen about limitations of time that eventually led to the 
failure of the United Bengal scheme. Among other factors, he emphasizes how Sarat 
Bose restricted his discussions on the United Bengal proposal only to top League and 
Congress leaders, and did not reach out to the public, partly due to his bad health. But 
he celebrates the scheme nonetheless as a real alternative to the partition demand. He 
also holds the Congress High Command responsible, especially Nehru and Patel, for 
pushing Mountbatten to partition India instead of ‘balkanizing’ it.34 Sarat Bose was 
subsequently blacked out of the Congress press, says Gordon.35 Faced with Nehru and 
Patel’s ‘veto’ against the scheme, and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee’s ‘pro-partition coa-
lition’, he opines, the United Bengal movement eventually collapsed. 36 Harun-or-
Rashid, on the other hand, places this episode in a longer and linear teleology of Ben-
gal’s demand for autonomy, which finally culminated in the creation of Bangladesh in 
1971.37 Bidyut Chakrabarty also draws a direct connection between the United Bengal 
movement and the 1952 ‘Language Movement’ in East Pakistan and, eventually, the 
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self-determination movement for Bangladesh in 1971.38 Only Joya Chatterji has ex-
pressed some scepticism about the campaign.39 Even so, almost all historians hail the 
over-all principle behind the campaign as a counterpoint to the rampant communalism 
that characterized the demand for the partition of India and Bengal. Even if one grant-
ed the anti-communal inspiration of the United Bengal campaign, the self-interest of 
its leadership remains too obvious to miss. Yet, these concerns have hitherto been 
overlooked. This is not to reduce the movement to the self-seeking impulses of lead-
ers; however, a discussion of these dimensions can help in preventing its uncritical 
celebration and explain its failures better. 
 
     Sarat Bose and Abul Hashim conceived of the idea of a sovereign United Bengal 
for the first time in a series of meetings in January 1947. This predated the 20 Febru-
ary Cabinet declaration, lending some credence to the claim that it was not a mere 
knee-jerk reaction to the possibility of a partition of both India and Bengal. 
 
     Even at the risk of some reductive analysis, it is possible to explain Hashim’s en-
thusiasm for a sovereign United Bengal by his position within the Muslim League and 
his roots in western Bengal. If Jinnah’s nomination to the interim government was any 
indicator, Suhrawardy-Hashim faction of the Bengal League had little hope of gaining 
any rewards from the League High Command. If Bengal was divided, there was little 
doubt that League Central leadership in a future Pakistan would prefer the rival 
Nazimuddin-Akram Khan faction. The latter had a stronger base of support in eastern 
Bengal and backing from Muslim big business. But, perhaps even more important for 
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Hashim was his personal attachment to western Bengal. Despite being trained in Ara-
bic and Islamic theology since childhood, Hashim’s background reveals a somewhat 
Hindu bhadralok-like characteristics. Hailing from Kashiari in the district of Burdwan 
in western Bengal, Hashim was born into a family of government servants who were, 
at the same time, ‘landlords in their own village’.40 His family had taken to western 
education at least since his grandfather’s times; he seems proud, indeed, that his 
grandfather was a ‘class fellow’ of Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, and that his father 
was a loyal follower of Sir Surendranath Banerjea. 41 Again, not unlike Nirad C. 
Chaudhuri,42 Hashim talks about the importance that his family attached to their an-
cestral home in the village. Members of his family thought that cities were ‘good for 
working and earning’, but ‘not for living’, he says; for everyone in his extended 
household, holidays had to be spent in the village, no matter where they worked. 
Hashim also had deep professional base in Burdwan. He was called to the Distract 
Bar at Burdwan and had practiced for five years as a successful lawyer, before joining 
politics.43 He had been elected to the provincial assembly also from the Burdwan 
Mohammadan Constituency.44 His deep personal attachment to his roots in western 
Bengal, therefore, was apparent. He shared very little in common with the landed aris-
tocracy that was sure to dominate the politics of eastern Bengal in case the province 
was partitioned. Given these factors, Hashim’s enthusiasm for a United Bengal be-
comes quite understandable. Right to the very end, he insisted that the demand for a 
sovereign United Bengal was in conformity with the Lahore Resolution, which had 
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formed the basis for the League’s Pakistan demand. There was nothing in the Resolu-
tion, he claimed, that called for an Akhand Pakistan.45 
 
    On the Congress benches, meanwhile, by the time negotiation for United Bengal 
began, Sarat Bose was profoundly disgruntled. After his release from jail in Septem-
ber 1945, he had a brief period of rapprochement within the Congress High Com-
mand.46 He rapidly rose to positions of eminence within the All-India Congress. In 
December 1945, he was elected to the Central Assembly. He became the leader of the 
opposition when the Congress Parliamentary Party elected him as their leader in the 
Assembly on 19 January 1946. In September 1946, he joined the Interim Government. 
However, once the Muslim League decided to enter the Interim Government on 26 
October 1946, he was made to step down. This also marked his estrangement from the 
Congress High Command. Soon, he publicly fell out with important all-India leaders 
of the Congress. On 6 January 1947 he resigned from the Congress Working Commit-
tee.47 Thus, when he entered into discussions with Abul Hashim about the possibility 
of keeping Bengal united and separate from both India and Pakistan, he had already 
lost his battle for a place on the all-India stage. For him, alliance with the Muslim 
League in a sovereign Bengal could have been a promising prospect. 
 
     The other prominent Congress leader who supported Bose’s endeavours was Kiran 
Sankar Roy. On the surface of it, Roy’s attitude may seem somewhat puzzling, given 
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that he had almost always remained loyal to the Congress High Command.48 But his 
willingness to join the United Bengal campaign can, at least partly, be explained by 
his extensive landed interests in the eastern Bengal countryside. Of course, he was an 
established Calcutta politician. But his identity as the zamindar of Teota was no less 
important. In this respect, he was typical of the bhadralok elites of Calcutta to whom 
their landed connection was as important to their identity and prosperity as their ur-
bane lifestyles.49 There is some evidence in the police records that point to troubles in 
his zamindari after the Great Calcutta Killing. A panicky letter from one of his estate 
managers warned Roy of the growing hostility among Muslim peasants towards Hin-
du landowners in eastern Bengal.50 From the Naib to the humble peon, many of Roy’s 
zamindary cutcheries were run almost entirely by Muslim personnel, besides being 
surrounded by Muslim villages on all sides. The manager warned him that any flicker 
of communal violence would make his estate the first target of Muslim attack.51 Roy’s 
reactions are not known, but the importance he attached to his landed possessions is 
proved by his eventual migration to East Bengal after Partition and his decision to join 
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its legislatures as the leader of the opposition.52 He was willing to take the risk, de-
spite the fact that his stature as one of the leading Congress personalities of Bengal 
could have easily secured for him a senior ministerial post in the government of West 
Bengal, or even in Delhi. This is exactly what happened when he finally lost all hope 
of carving out a political future within Pakistan, and moved back to West Bengal as 
its Home Minister. Given this evidence and his personal trajectory, it is not surprising 
that in early 1947 Roy threw his weight behind the United Bengal movement.  
 
     The official inauguration of the United Bengal movement began, however, with 
Suhrawardy’s statement at a press conference in Delhi on 27 April 1947. 53 
Suhrawardy, the Premier of Bengal, was a thorough-bred Calcutta man. Despite the 
fact that the poor Muslim peasantry of eastern Bengal formed much of the social base 
of support for the Muslim League in the province, Suhrawardy’s political base was 
urbane, rooted in the drawing rooms and working class neighbourhoods of the city. 
He had cut his teeth in Calcutta’s trade union politics.54 For him, Calcutta was his po-
litical life-line. If Bengal was divided, it was clear that Calcutta, as a Hindu-majority 
city, would become a part of West Bengal and remain with India. It was also clear that 
in such circumstances League politics would have no future in India or in the new 
province of West Bengal. Exiled from Calcutta, Suhrawardy would become a ‘politi-
cal refugee in East Bengal’.55 
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     Ultimately, the fate of Calcutta became the focal point around which the demands 
and counter-demands about the future of Bengal coalesced. Suhrawardy, of course, 
declared in his press statement in Delhi that ‘in the end the tussle will rage around 
Calcutta’.56 During negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, Jinnah had declared, ‘Paki-
stan without Calcutta would be like asking a man to live without his heart’.57 In fact, 
the United Bengal movement initially had Jinnah’s approval as he preferred a viable 
sovereign state of United Bengal with Calcutta as an ally of Pakistan. He preferred 
this to an impoverished eastern Bengal within Pakistan, which would be more of a 
liability for the new Muslim nation rather than an asset. He seemed to have changed 
his mind later when he feared that the proposed state of United Bengal may not ally 
itself with Pakistan.58 The British Indian administration was also concerned about the 
fate of Calcutta. Frederick Burrows, the Governor of Bengal, also held that East Ben-
gal without Calcutta would become a ‘rural slum’.59 If the thriving port of Calcutta 
had to survive, he felt that Calcutta had to be made a ‘free city’.60 The Viceroy, Lord 
Mountbatten, saw Burrows’ point,61 but was convinced that the Congress would never 
accept such a proposal.62 The Congress was also adamant to retain Calcutta within 
India because, as Nehru explained, ‘Calcutta was the port for the whole of Northern 
India’.63 
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     Conversely, despite a brief initial flirtation with the United Bengal scheme, the 
Nazimuddin-Akram Khan faction decided to settle for partition if the whole of Bengal 
could not be retained as an integral part of Pakistan. In fact, getting rid of Calcutta, for 
them, was a politically tempting idea, despite its possible adverse economic conse-
quences. Without Calcutta, Dacca would emerge as the new centre of power in a di-
vided eastern Bengal. With their political base firmly planted in Ahsan Manzil, the 
palace of the Nawab of Dacca, the Nazimuddin-Akram Khan faction of the Bengal 
League would easily prevail over their rivals. According to some observers, this 
‘Dacca group’, therefore was ‘so anxious to desert Calcutta’ that they ‘outdid’ Syama 
Prasad Mookerjee in agitating for Bengal’s partition.64 
 
     This ‘Dacca group’ unleashed relentless propaganda against the Bengal Ministry 
for not doing enough to promote Muslim interests. They took advantage of popular 
resentment and everyday economic grievances of Muslims under Suhrawardy’s gov-
ernment. Hindu merchants usually controlled food grains, coal and other fuels in the 
Calcutta market; and as economic relations between communities fell apart following 
communal riots, Muslim families found procuring such necessities increasingly diffi-
cult.65 Many Muslim shopkeepers found themselves ousted from markets in Hindu-
majority areas. A great number of those driven out of Koley Market, Lansdowne 
Market, as well as markets in Stand Road, Clive Street and Manicktolla had to earn 
their living selling commodities on footpaths of Muslim-majority areas of the city.66 
Muslim students also found it difficult to access educational institutions. Schools, col-
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leges and universities tended to be in Hindu-dominated areas, or required Muslim stu-
dents to pass through Hindu-majority localities. 67  Suhrawardy’s rivals within the 
Bengal League attempted to capitalize on such popular anxieties by insisting on re-
shuffling the ministry. They blamed Suhrawardy’s ministry for not doing enough to 
open more shops and educational institutions in Muslim areas and for failing to pro-
tect lives and livelihood of ordinary Muslims of the city. Rival factions within the 
Bengal branch and the Calcutta District branch of the Muslim League, as well as sev-
eral ‘relief committees’ it had set up in the aftermath of the riots, put pressure on the 
Ministry to ensure that at least fifty per cent of appointments in all departments of the 
government were reserved for Muslim candidates.68 
 
     Pressed upon from all sides by the rival faction, and unable to garner support from 
the Congress opposition, Suhrawardy needed to do something that would make a bold 
statement, proving his sincerity in promoting ‘Muslim interests’. This was the context 
in which the Suhrawardy Ministry recruited about five hundred personnel to the 
Armed Police of Calcutta from the Punjab. Classified as a ‘martial race’, the presence 
of such policemen in the city’s streets, Suhrawardy seemed to believe, would visibly 
demonstrate his commitment towards protecting Calcutta’s Muslims.69 The figure of 
the Punjabi Armed Police emerged, thereafter, as the symbol around which communal 
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animosity found articulation in Calcutta; it structured public debates on the demand 
for partition of Bengal in the event that a Muslim state was to be carved out of British 
India.  
 
 
The Deterioration of ‘Law and Order’ and Rebellion in the Calcutta Police 
 
     Police administration in Calcutta deteriorated steadily after the August Killing. 
This attracted virulent criticism. In a letter to the editor of Amrita Bazar Patrika, a 
retired police officer held changes in the policing system of Calcutta responsible for 
the breakdown of order.70 According to him, in the aftermath of the communal riots of 
1926,71 a ‘Harrison Road Safety Scheme’ had been set up by Sir Charles Tegart, then 
Commissioner of the Calcutta Police. This entailed posting police pickets at strategic 
points across the city and dedicating forces to accompany even the smallest of proces-
sions. Police headquarters informed local thanas whenever a procession passed 
through their jurisdiction. Accordingly, concerned thanas posted pickets all along the 
procession to keep participants under constant observation. A booklet containing de-
tails of the scheme, along with a map of Calcutta, was distributed to all officers. The 
scheme was so successful, the writer claimed, that even during the difficult days of 
the Civil Disobedience agitation in the 1930s, Calcutta remained peaceful. However, 
since November 1945, Tegart’s scheme had been abandoned and replaced by the 
‘Control Room System’. According to this new policing structure, every occurrence 
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of trouble had to be reported directly to the Control Room of the Calcutta police 
headquarters at Lal Bazar, which sent out mobile police squads to the area in which 
violence had broken out. The problem with this method was that, in most cases, police 
squads reached the spot too late, when ‘mobs’ had already committed the ‘mischief’ 
and disappeared at the sight of police lorries.72 Such mobile squads were ‘like so 
many birds of passages which harmlessly flew over troubled areas, riotous mobs melt-
ing away at their sight to form again after they have passed’.73 Even if it produced 
‘some spectacular effect’, as a riot control scheme ‘it proved very innocuous’.74 ‘Or-
der’ was only restored, the ex-officer opined, when the army took over and employed 
a version of the old scheme. The author, claiming some experience ‘of the inner work-
ings of the city police force’, believed that the breakdown of police administration 
during the August Killing was not due to ‘inefficiency’ but a ‘deliberate conspiracy at 
the top’.75 
 
     Whatever legitimacy remained of the police force as an impartial state agency was 
severely compromised in the aftermath of the August carnage. Losing trust in the po-
lice to protect lives and property, wealthy residents of the city had come to rely in-
creasingly on private security arrangements. As these were dictated by communal 
considerations, the private security labour market of Calcutta became more and more 
stratified along communal lines. A police report in mid-September 1946 expressed 
concern at the possibility of clashes between the private guards of different communi-
ties. Hindu merchants of Burrabazar were reportedly employing only Sikh and Nepali 
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security guards to protect their houses and business establishments. Similarly, Muslim 
merchants of Amratolla Street were employing only ‘Pathans’ and ‘other able bodied 
Muslims from the UP and the Punjab’.76 
 
     Allegations that the police force was partial were not without foundation. On 15 
October 1946, for example, an informant reported to the Criminal Investigation De-
partment that Muslim police officers made no secret of their pro-Muslim League sen-
timents. Hindu organizations, on the other hand, were attempting to ‘enlist the sympa-
thy of Hindu officers and men’,77 in which they seemed to be successful. By early 
1947, high-ranking European police officers would refer to the communal biases of 
low-ranking policemen almost as an administrative ‘common sense’. An outbreak of 
localized violence in some pockets of South Calcutta on 16 March 1947 led the local 
police stations to evacuate Muslim shopkeepers of Lansdowne Market, Jagu Babu 
Bazaar and Oriya Para to ‘safe zones’, virtually conceding the incapacity of the local 
police to protect minorities.78 During religious processions and festivities, only those 
policemen belonging to the concerned religion were deployed as watchers, with the 
assumption that policemen of the ‘other’ religion, if posted on such occasions, would 
invariably result in clashes.79 Senior European police officers found it so exceptional 
that low-ranking personnel should report against communal propaganda carried out by 
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their own community that they found it necessary to felicitate such heroes with mone-
tary rewards.80 
 
     Yet the elitist condescension of superior officers towards their rank and file appear 
hollow given how the integrity of higher officials of the police force was compro-
mised. Following the Great Calcutta Killing, government had appointed a Calcutta 
Disturbances Commission of Inquiry to investigate the phenomenon. In this connec-
tion, the Chairman of the Commission, Sir Patrick Spens interviewed officers of the 
Calcutta Police. By March 1947, reported Amrita Bazar Patrika, complaints were be-
ing lodged that ‘higher authorities’ were forcing junior police officers to withhold in-
formation from the Commission.81 Superiors within Calcutta Police were allegedly 
taking their juniors to task for divulging details of the working of the police force dur-
ing the ‘disturbances’ in course of their depositions. Despite protests from Spens, it is 
doubtful if any action was taken to even investigate these allegations. Thus, by early 
1947, whatever credibility such ‘independent’ agencies of the state had retained until 
this point were thoroughly compromised. 
  
     With the legitimacy of the police force thus compromised, the army began to be 
called in support of civil administration with increasing frequency. The Suhrawardy 
government had delayed its request for military assistance during the August Killing, 
for which it had faced public approbation. Once the army was brought in, however, it 
could not be withdrawn fully even months after the worst was over. Sir Francis Tuker, 
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the Officer Commanding of the Eastern Command, remembered soldiers patrolling 
Calcutta on ‘pure police work’ in early 1947, with the difference that, unlike the po-
lice, they did not have the powers of search and arrest.82 Army technical staff was al-
ways kept on standby to take over Calcutta’s essential services – electricity and water 
supply, sanitary services and suchlike – in case of strikes or rioting that repeatedly 
brought the city to a standstill.83 
 
     Tuker’s unabashedly imperialist account of the last days of the Raj positions the 
army as a martyr in a story of native civilian incompetence. He contends that it was 
always a tight rope walk for the army during civilian duties, as its personnel received 
no thanks for their services but ran the risk of ‘false accusations of cruelty, house-
breaking and rape’.84 However, his descriptions of everyday violence in the city are 
revealing. Official figures for casualties resulting from communal violence for the 
week ending 1 April 1947 numbered over seven hundred in Calcutta alone; yet, Tuker 
confesses, it was impossible to point towards specific incidents. ‘Little crowds, little 
affairs in little streets; leaving behind them on the ground two or three dead with a 
few injured… In the end casualties climb into the thousands.’85 Police and the army 
strove to restore and maintain a new kind of ‘peace’: ‘a chronic situation in which in-
dividual goondas took their toll on isolated and unprotected members of the other 
community but in which mobs found little opportunity to battle with each other’.86 
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     Spectacular displays of state power had some effect in controlling the violence. 
The All India Pakistan Day, celebrated by the Muslim League in Calcutta on 23 
March 1947, according to the police, had every possibility of precipitating a fresh 
wave of violence. The police prevented this by issuing orders of blanket arrests, ban-
ning processions or assemblies by invoking Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. Curfew in the evenings became routine.87 The police seized all loudspeakers 
installed for public speeches intended to raise enthusiasm for Pakistan.88 Official cir-
culars emphasized the need for ‘nipping trouble in the bud’.89 Even such drastic ac-
tion did not prevent low-key violence. Tuker remembers that firing by police and 
troops had become a regular and ordinary affair, ‘as did stabbing, assaults and bomb 
and acid throwing’.90 
 
     Matters came to a head in early April 1947 when Calcutta witnessed a major police 
rebellion. On the night of 1 April 1947, a Gurkha armed constable killed a Muslim 
taxi driver near the Museum in Central Calcutta.91 What exactly led to the clash re-
mains obscure, but it created a sensation as the incident came to be projected in terms 
of Hindu attack upon a Muslim. The offending policeman was arrested and charged 
with murder. This led to a rebellion of Gurkha armed constables within Calcutta Po-
lice. They refused to carry out orders, prevented their superior officer from leaving his 
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barracks and demanded that the Police Commissioner should come to them and hear 
their grievances.92 When the Commissioner did so, it became clear that the objectives 
of the protesters were not confined to the arrest and murder charge against their col-
league. Their main complaint was about discriminatory treatment by the Bengal Gov-
ernment, which, in their view, favoured the newly recruited Muslim armed police bat-
talion from the Punjab. Recruited in a hurry, no immediate accommodation was avail-
able to house them. As a result, Ispahani, the Muslim businessman and Muslim 
League stalwart, had offered them his Calcutta mansion as barracks. Thus, it was ru-
moured, they rolled in luxury. The Gurkha armed police, on the other hand, lived in 
‘wretched barracks, little more than huts’, and suffered mistreatment by the govern-
ment.93 The Commissioner immediately released the arrested Gurkha constable and 
promised an enquiry into their living conditions and charges of discrimination. How-
ever, soon after this agreement, another enquiry was held into the 1 April firings and 
the police rearrested the accused constable once again, only to release him and with-
draw all charges a few days later. This official mishandling of the case, Tuker re-
members, had grave consequences. ‘[T]he next time the Gurkha went out on patrol 
they used their rifles without provocation.’94 Numerous fights broke out on the fol-
lowing days between Gurkha armed policemen and the Muslim population of the 
city.95 
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     The term ‘Gurkha’, says Lionel Caplan, has to be understood as a ‘fiction’, not in 
the sense that it was a mere ‘fabrication’ but as an identity that came to be ‘fash-
ioned’.96 It was used in a variety of ways in British colonial writings. In military my-
thology, colonial writers portrayed them as descendants of the ruling dynasty of Nepal 
who had conquered the land in the eighteenth century. But the term was used in a va-
riety of senses. It sometimes referred to the whole population of Nepal; but, more fre-
quently, it was a catch-all term that collapsed several ethnic and tribal communities 
speaking a variety of Tibeto-Burman languages whom the British military authorities 
classified as the ‘martial races’ of Nepal.97 
 
     The Gurkha personnel in the armed battalions of Calcutta Police, according to 
Tuker, were ‘‘domiciled’ Gurkhas’.98 They were at least the second generation among 
migrants from Nepal, many of them being ‘half-caste’ (in Tuker’s racist terminology), 
as they frequently had ‘Indian mother[s]’.99 Given their martial race stereotypes, the 
military authorities did not believe that they were ‘of the same steady material straight 
from Nepal’. Therefore, they usually found lesser employment as clerks and bands-
men in Gurkha regiments of the Indian Army.100 In police work, however, the Gurkha 
armed constabulary was ‘the one reliable police force that Calcutta possessed’, which 
had ‘taken the government safely through all disturbances of the past two years’.101 
They were hated by Hindus and Muslims alike, yet they constituted, in Tuker’s opin-
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ion, the only section of Calcutta’s police force ‘that could be depended upon to stand 
on the burning streets when all but they of the police had fled’.102 During the Calcutta 
protests surrounding the trials of the Indian National Army personnel, the protesters, 
Hindu and Muslim alike, saw Gurkha police as traitors. By 1947, however, Gurkha 
policemen saw themselves as Hindus, discriminated against by a Muslim ministry, 
which favoured Muslim policemen. Eventually, in the communally charged atmos-
phere of the city, the Hindus of Calcutta saw Gurkhas as their protectors against Pun-
jabi Muslim policemen, ‘The Pakistan Occupation Army of Bengal’ as they also came 
to be called.103 
 
     In the last months of British rule, the Punjabi Muslim police contingent became the 
focal point of attacks against the Suhrawardy ministry. The Hindu Mahasabha, with 
the support of the Bengal Congress, emerged as the champion of Hindu grievances 
against Punjabi Muslim police oppression. Such protests crystallized around the sen-
sational 100 Harrison Road Case, an incident which remained at the centre of Hindu 
propaganda for the partition of Bengal during the last days of colonial rule. 
 
 
The 100 Harrison Road Case 
 
     On the night of 14 April 1947, a bomb exploded on Harrison Road.104 Explosions 
of this sort had, by this time, become commonplace in Calcutta. Yet what happened as 
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a consequence of this incident had a profound impact on the politics of partition in 
Bengal.  
 
After the explosion, two newly-recruited Punjabi Muslim Armed Policemen 
posted at a nearby police picket went into the house at 100 Harrison Road, apparently 
to investigate the matter. It was a four-storied building. The two policemen climbed 
the stairs all the way to the top floor, broke into an apartment and, allegedly, raped a 
Hindu woman. As news of the incident spread, the Deputy Commissioner of North 
Division, Mr. Hafizuddin Ahmad, went to the house next morning, only to find that 
the family had fled. On returning to the Jorasanko Police Station, he found that the 
woman and her husband had come to the thana to register a complaint. An identifica-
tion parade was conducted. The victim identified one Muhammad Ali as the police-
man who had raped her, while her husband identified the accomplice, Golam 
Hossain.105 The police arrested the accused policemen and brought them to the court 
of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate on 22 April 1947.106 
 
     By this time, however, the incident had already assumed centre-stage in the Hindu 
campaign for the partition of Bengal. On 17 April 1947, the Bengal Provincial Hindu 
Mahasabha held a meeting at their Calcutta office presided over by Mahasabha veter-
an Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee. Condemning the 100 Harrison Road incident, the 
Mahasabha decided to observe a hartal on 23 April ‘to mark the inauguration of an 
all-out campaign for the removal of the Punjabi policemen’.107 This meeting also de-
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clared that this strike should be regarded ‘as one of the first steps towards the partition 
movement’.108 Warning that the Muslim League government could take ‘drastic ac-
tion to suppress this agitation’, the Mahasabha advised Hindus to prepare for ‘self-
defence to meet any contingency’.109 In the communally charged atmosphere, this 
amounted to nothing less than inciting violence. 
 
     On 20 April, Hindu Mahasabha organized a public meeting at the Calcutta Univer-
sity Institute Hall, once more presided over by N.C. Chatterjee. The audience num-
bered over two thousand.110 Chatterjee condemned the ‘uniformed men’ who had re-
cently been ‘imported from the Punjab and let loose on the citizens of Calcutta’.111 ‘In 
any civilized country’, he asserted, ‘the Minister in charge of law and order would 
have been thrown out of office within twenty-four hours’.112 However, the Govern-
ment and other legislators, he lamented, had become ‘pathetic spectators of the dis-
honour of our women and the persecution of our men’.113 
 
     In a discursive twist, Chatterjee insisted that the issue was not communal at all. 
The Bengali Hindus were even ready to accept the League government’s decision, 
despite being ‘against all canons of justice’, to have an overwhelmingly non-Hindu 
police force in a predominantly Hindu city.114 But, ‘for Heaven’s sake’, he urged the 
government, ‘do not import Punjabis or Pathans’. ‘Their presence pollutes the atmos-
phere’, and it was unfair that Bengali tax-payers, ‘whether Hindu or Muslim’, should 
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be forced to pay for ‘non-Bengali upcountrymen… recruited from the scum of socie-
ty’.115 There were ‘no dearth of capable Bengalis’, many of whom were ‘unemployed’ 
and ‘starving’. Recruiting Bengali policemen would put a stop to this ‘licensed barba-
rism’ as, unlike the polluting Punjabi Muslim, every Bengali ‘whatever be his politi-
cal creed and religious faith, will hang down his head in shame when he finds that his 
sister is molested and outraged’.116 
 
     As far as the charge of rape was concerned in the 100 Harrison Road case, 
Chatterjee insisted that no official enquiries were necessary at all; in fact the public 
had lost all confidence in such measures ‘which cost the poor tax-payers a lot of mon-
ey and ultimately add to their misery’.117 This was a direct challenge to the ‘sublime’ 
dimensions of the state.118 Not only was Mahasabha propaganda attacking the police, 
the state’s ‘profane’ dimension; it was delegitimizing the very instruments through 
which the modern state maintains its public legitimacy by resurrecting its ‘sublime’ 
imaginary - as a repository of justice. The truth of the victim’s statements, Chatterjee 
argued, was self-evident. She was examined by ‘the foremost gynaecologist available 
in this country’, ‘a gentleman of unimpeachable integrity’ and a ‘competent judge of 
human character’.119 He had testified that the woman was, indeed, molested. But even 
if this was not proof enough, anyone who would care to interrogate the victim, ‘unso-
phisticated and simple girl that she is’, would be convinced of her story. In any case, 
it was unbelievable that ‘a Hindu married girl would concoct a story of her own dis-
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honour’. Any suggestion that the victim may be lying, in Chatterjee’s opinion, was 
evidence of a ‘diseased mind’.120 
 
     Dr. Bamandas Mukherjee, the doctor who had examined the victim five days after 
the incident, was also present in the meeting. He urged the Hindus to participate in the 
23 April strike for a separate Hindu province as the ‘rulers’ of Bengal, he declared, 
had ‘turned into oppressors’.121 The meeting passed a resolution demanding that the 
Punjabi Muslim police force be disbanded. ‘Otherwise’, warned Chatterjee, ‘Hindus 
will be compelled to take this menace as a declaration of hostility against them’.122 In 
these circumstances, Hindus would have ‘no alternative but to come to the conclusion 
that this is a force which has been manufactured for the purpose of oppression, intim-
idation and torture’.123 If this demand was not met, the resolution demanded that Hin-
du members of the Bengal Legislatures should resign and refuse to cooperate. For co-
operation in any form could only mean ‘alliance with the powers of evil’.124 The 
meeting also urged the Viceroy and the Interim Government to intervene and dismiss 
the ministry. It asserted that ‘Partition or Zonal Ministries’ could alone end the torture 
of Bengali Hindus.125 Finally, the resolution called upon ‘all peace-loving citizens of 
Calcutta who have any respect for the honour of women and for civil rights’ to ob-
serve complete hartal on 23 April 1947.126   
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     There were elements of misrepresentation in Chatterjee’s speech, especially the 
claim that no investigating officer had met either the lady in question or her husband. 
Mr. Hafizzuddin Ahmad, Deputy Commissioner of Police, North Division, testified in 
Court that he had, in fact, met the couple and arranged for an identification parade at 
the Jorasanko Police Station.127 But newspapers openly questioned Ahmad’s creden-
tials. Hindusthan Standard began by asserting that initial police investigations in 
criminal cases were usually conducted by the Officer-in-Charge (OC) of the police 
station which had jurisdiction over the crime scene. 100 Harrison Road fell within 
Jorasanko police station. Hence, the OC of this thana should have initiated the inves-
tigations. The fact that it was entrusted to some other officer was in itself a procedural 
lapse. Because the OC of Jorasanko was a Hindu, the newspaper report alleged that 
communal considerations were behind the deliberate violation of due process; the 
government simply wanted to ensure that a Muslim police officer investigated the 
crime, so that out of communal prejudice he would side with the Punjabi Muslim po-
licemen. It also charged the investigating police officer with corruption, bribery and 
malpractice, including that he was once caught ‘in a place of infamy dancing in com-
pany with women of ill-fame’.128 Whatever may have been the truth in these allega-
tions, such propaganda went uncontested. The Mahasabha leaders tried to convince 
the Hindu public that the government wanted to sabotage the investigation and protect 
the culprits. 
 
     The strike campaign for 23 April 1947 was supported and generously funded by a 
large number of Marwari businessmen of Calcutta. On 19 April, they organized a 
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meeting at the Maheswari Bhawan in Burrabazar, the business area of the city domi-
nated by Marwaris, to discuss how to defend Hindus from the ‘new menace’.129 It 
proposed that a Hindu volunteer corps should be raised to fight the Punjabi Muslim 
police force. They promised a sum of rupees twenty-five lakhs to fund this campaign. 
Sitaram Saksaria, who had previously demonstrated Gandhian leanings, according to 
police sources, declared that ‘Gandhian philosophy must be shelved for the mo-
ment’.130 The meeting also decided to sponsor a social campaign for removing the 
practice of purdah among Hindu women, especially in Marwari families. In fact, they 
agreed that every Hindu woman had to be ‘trained in the use of dagger’ for protecting 
herself.131 Finally, it sought the help of all parties, especially left-wing parties, to take 
the initiative in organizing Hindus for self-defence. 
 
     The left parties were not slow in responding to the call of these Marwari business-
men. The Forward Bloc took the initiative in organizing a secret meeting of left-wing 
organizations to consider proposals for setting up a Hindu volunteer body. Represent-
atives of the North Calcutta Forward Bloc, the Socialist Party of India (SPI) and the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party of India (RSPI) met on 20 April 1947.132 Referring to 
the 100 Harrison Road incident, Sohan Lal Misra of the Forward Bloc declared that 
Calcutta Hindus were helpless and their lives and property were insecure because of 
the depredations of Punjabi Muslim policemen. The meeting tentatively resolved to 
raise a secret and underground ‘militant organization’; only the name of the ‘General 
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Officer Commanding’ would be announced ‘for the purpose of issuing the necessary 
directives to the members of the Corps’.133 
 
     This was primarily a Forward Bloc proposal; SPI and RSPI did not commit to the 
programme. This was not because they were against Hindu communal volunteer or-
ganizations in principle; they had to seek permission from their respective party lead-
erships before planning joint action with other (rival) left parties. What happened of 
the proposals is difficult to tell, but police reports confirmed left-wing initiatives in 
setting up volunteer organizations in Calcutta for protection of Hindus.134 The For-
ward Bloc was the most enthusiastic in this regard. A police note dated 17 April 1947 
spoke of Forward Bloc activists visiting riot-prone areas of Calcutta on the pretext of 
peace missions to organize Hindus to fight Muslims. In Tangra, for example, Forward 
Bloc party workers allegedly began to collect subscriptions from Hindu residents to 
raise a Hindu volunteer militia.135 The Special Branch reported that they had also ap-
proached the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha for funds. They were allegedly 
working in cooperation with Madaripur Jugantar Party activists to procure bombs and 
explosives for Hindu defence against Muslims.136 
 
     Other police reports also spoke of a nexus between Hindu communal organizations 
and the Forward Bloc. The Hindu Seva Sangha, for example, had allegedly employed 
Sohan Lal Misra of the Forward Bloc on a monthly salary of five hundred rupees, 
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provided him with a car, and instructed him to visit communally sensitive areas of 
Calcutta to collect evidence on Punjabi Muslim police atrocities.137 Another Hindu 
organization, the Kashi Visvanath Seva Samiti, was reportedly assisting him in his 
work.138 The Burrabazar Branch of SPI had also set up a Volunteer Corps, a police 
report claimed. A similar ambiguity marked the ‘fiery speech’ of Ram Manohar 
Lohia, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) stalwart, at yet another meeting hosted by 
Marwari businessmen in Calcutta on 22 April at the same venue in Burrabazar. Com-
menting on the outrages committed on women in Calcutta (thereby alluding to Punja-
bi Muslim policemen and the 100 Harrison Road Case), Lohia suggested that ‘we 
should jump upon the goondas with a vow either to die or to kill them’ rather than 
‘send wire to the Governor or Viceroy asking for remedy’.139 Making appeals to gov-
ernment, calling for intervention by the Interim Government, passing resolutions in 
meetings – all these were ‘meaningless’ and sign of a ‘weak mentality’.140 ‘Either kill 
or be killed’, for there was ‘no worse cowardice’ than ‘witnessing ravages on wom-
en’; there was ‘no better opportunity’ for embracing ‘glorious death’.141 Of course, he 
insisted, it was not ‘a strife between Hindus and Muslims’. However, he warned that 
under no circumstances was anyone to flee any part of Calcutta, for ‘[t]o evacuate is 
to cooperate with Jinnah’.142 He instructed Hindus to refrain from killing Muslims, as 
this would also help Jinnah. He further added, ‘if the Indian Hindus work in the polit-
ical field as residents of Hindustan, the problems of Hindustan will be solved, even 
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without the cooperation of the Muslims’.143 Thus, despite being cloaked in a non-
communal rhetoric, Lohia’s speech was ultimately directed against Muslims. The 
‘goondas’ he referred to, who were allegedly outraging women of Calcutta, read con-
textually, invariably referred to Muslim goondas. Delivered one day before the 23 
April strike, from a platform sponsored by Marwari financiers of the agitation led by 
the Mahasabha, one is hardly left with any doubt about the anti-Muslim insinuations 
in his call for ‘goonda killings’. 
 
     Considerable trade union support was forthcoming for the 23 April strike as well. 
This was, at least in part, because the husband of the victim in the Harrison Road in-
cident was an employee of the telephone department. As a result, the All India Tele-
graph Union, which represented both telephone and telegraph workers, came out in 
support of the proposed Hindu Mahasabha hartal.  On 17 April 1947, the general sec-
retary of the All India Telegraph Union issued a press statement condemning the ‘das-
tardly crime’ at 100 Harrison Road and threatened a general suspension of work ‘till 
conditions were such that they [workers] could feel secure and go about their lawful 
avocations freely’.144 Members of the union met on 19 April 1947 with Mrinal Kanti 
Bose of the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) as president.145 The meeting 
passed a resolution condemning ‘the act of lawlessness committed on womanhood at 
100 Harrison Road by the guardians of law and order’.146 Other unions soon joined 
the agitation. At a meeting on 21 April 1947, the Calcutta Corporation Employees’ 
Association resolved that Corporation workers, other than those in departments deal-
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ing with ambulance, maternity homes, dispensaries, water works, pumping stations, 
burning ghats and burial grounds, would observe a one-day strike on 23 April 
1947. 147  The same day, the Executive Committee of the Calcutta Chemists’ and 
Druggists’ Association came out in support of the strike and resolved to close down 
medicine markets. With the exception of prescription drugs, members of the Associa-
tion resolved not to sell medicines on that day.148 The General Council of the Bengal 
Provincial Trade Union Congress also adopted a resolution on 19 April 1947 con-
demning ‘excesses’ of Pathan and Punjabi police. They decided to postpone a jute 
workers’ strike as it was ‘unsafe to launch a general strike in the middle of communal 
disturbances’.149 The Central Intelligence Officer of Calcutta also confirmed that bus 
and taxi drivers had decided to suspend work for the day.150 Thus, the 23 April strike, 
sponsored by the Hindu Mahasabha, garnered wide support from labour organizations 
and trade unions. 
 
     The agitation also gained support from Sikh organizations in Calcutta. The Hindu-
Sikh Minority Protection Committee, one of the many anti-Muslim volunteer organi-
zations that sprang up in the aftermath of the Calcutta Killing, promised support of the 
Sikhs for the 23 April strike.151 A meeting of Sikh leaders held at the Jagat Sudhar 
Gurdwara on 20 April 1947 adopted a similar resolution.152 The general secretary of 
the Sri Guru Singh Sabha released a press statement the same day appealing to the 
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Sikhs of Calcutta ‘to join all sane elements in condemning goondaism’.153 He urged 
them to organize a ‘non-violent protest’ until Muslim goondas had left Bengal.154 Of 
course, many Sikhs had allied with Hindus even during the Calcutta Killing. But in 
this agitation against Punjabi Muslim policemen, the stakes of the Sikhs of Calcutta 
were higher. They were at pains to leave no doubt in the minds of the Hindus that de-
spite being Punjabis themselves, they had no sympathy for Punjabi Muslims. In view 
of Hindu Mahasabha propaganda easily slipping from an anti-Muslim rhetoric to an 
anti-non-Bengali rhetoric (as evident from N.C. Chatterjee’s speech discussed above), 
it is unsurprising that the Sikhs were keen to prevent an anti-Punjabi Muslim agitation 
turning hostile towards Punjabis in general. 
 
     The response of the Congress to the call for a strike on 23 April remains the most 
remarkable. The Hindu Mahasabha had made it clear from the very outset that the fi-
nal decision about the proposed hartal was subject to ratification by the Executive 
Council of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC).155 It took the Con-
gress days to finally come out with a statement. When it did, it turned out to be dubi-
ous, aimed only at sitting on the fence. The BPCC passed a resolution on 21 April as-
suring the public that the Executive Committee was aware of ‘the intensity of feeling’ 
generated in Calcutta as a result of the ‘collapse of law and order’.156 It said that the 
Congress had also ‘noted’ the proposal for the strike. However, the BPCC had previ-
ously disapproved of such methods (referring perhaps to Suhrawardy’s strike call on 
the Direct Action Day) and believed that this could ‘complicate the already critical 
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communal situation’.157 The resolution declared that it appreciated the degree of pub-
lic resentment against the ‘general lawlessness’ in view of which ‘such moves are 
natural to be initiated’. Thus ‘whatever is done in any quarter’, the Executive Com-
mittee called upon Congress activists and the public at large to preserve peace ‘even 
in the face of grave provocation’.158 The BPCC was aware, the resolution explained, 
that ‘anti-revolutionary and reactionary forces’ were keen to ‘put obstacles at the time 
of peaceful and undivided transference of power’. Thus the Congress felt its obliga-
tion to ‘organize mass support… to meet every contingency in this critical time’ and 
authorised BPCC President Surendra Mohan Ghosh to ‘set up the requisite machinery 
such as a Council of Action’.159 This convoluted resolution ensured that the Congress 
could claim credit for the campaign, project itself as the champion of the ‘sufferings 
of the law abiding and the toiling masses’,160 yet keep its options open for distancing 
itself from any violence this could precipitate. 
 
     Joya Chatterji has argued that during the last months of the Raj, it was the Con-
gress that championed the Hindu cause in Bengal, while the Mahasabha provided the 
backing. 161  But evidence suggests that the overall complexion of Congress-
Mahasabha relation was more symbiotic. While the Congress took the lead in defend-
ing Hindu communal interests in the legislative sphere, it largely left the dirty work of 
actually instigating communal feelings through street campaigns to the Mahasabha. 
Even if it is true that the Congress, on its own, held the majority of public meetings to 
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gain public support for Bengal’s partition,162 Mahasabha’s anti-Muslim hate cam-
paign on the streets took the issue to a different level altogether. On the one hand, it 
seems, Congress’s agenda was to pose as the cool-headed negotiator; its leaders main-
ly wanted to generate public support for the legislative part of the partition campaign. 
The Mahasabha, on the other hand, was allowed to play the role of the rabble-rouser. 
Both could take credit for whatever this lethal cocktail of communal combination 
managed to achieve. 
 
     The strike on 23 April 1947 was a considerable success, especially in Hindu domi-
nated areas.163 Shops, markets, cinemas and educational institutions remained shut. 
Employees of banks and mercantile offices stayed away from their workplaces, while 
attendance in government offices remained thin. Some factories in Khidderpore area 
remained closed and workers in Ordnance Depots and the Corporation in North Cal-
cutta refused to work. Taxis, rickshaws and carts did not come out onto the streets, 
while buses operated on very few routes. Although trams ran on some routes in the 
morning, these were soon withdrawn due to ‘public interference’.164 At some places, 
large crowds took to the streets. Instances of brickbat-throwing took place on a large 
scale. A bomb exploded on Vivekananda Road. The police made a few arrests and 
fired tear gas shells, injuring some protesters. It was business as usual, however, in 
Muslim-majority areas of the city, hampered only by the scarcity of transport.165 
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     In this campaign, justice for the woman whom the policemen had allegedly raped 
took a back seat. This issue became a mere pawn in the larger Hindu campaign for 
Bengal’s partition. The fallout was a widening of the communal fissure in Calcutta 
even further. It hammered the last nail in the coffin of whatever public enthusiasm the 
United Bengal scheme had managed to generate. Whatever little balm it may have 
been able to administer to the communal wound in Bengal, the anti-Muslim propa-
ganda that accompanied the partition campaign successfully washed it away. The 
Punjabi Muslim police – now the symbol of Muslim oppression – became the locus 
around which this communal discourse in Bengal came to be framed. In this dis-
course, partition of the province on communal lines came to be projected as the only 
escape the Hindus had from physical annihilation under Muslim rule. It remained so 
until 3 June 1947, when the British government announced its decision to partition 
Bengal. 
 
 
Punjabi Muslim Policemen and the Partition of Bengal 
      
     Propaganda against Punjabi Muslim policemen never died out after the 23 April 
strike. The issue was kept alive by recurrent reports of Punjabi policemen allegedly 
raping Hindu women. On 7 May 1947, for example, the Hindusthan Standard report-
ed that two armed Punjabi Muslim policemen had ‘criminally trespassed’ into a house 
on Canal Circular Road, confined the residents into a balcony at gunpoint and raped a 
thirty-year-old widow.166 Even when the culprits were caught, newspaper reports al-
leged that the guilty policemen were simply confined to their barracks without ar-
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rest.167 The Hindu Mahasabha claimed that Punjabi Muslim policemen were hand in 
glove with League activists who had orders from its High Command to kill Hindus. 
Besides conducting house-raids, Mahasabha leaders asserted, Punjabi Muslim po-
licemen were kidnapping Hindus from the streets and handing over to Muslim Na-
tional Guard volunteers and Muslim League relief workers. They were then taken to a 
secret location and slaughtered. 168  Furthermore, Mahasabha propagandists alleged 
that Muslim League relief workers roamed around in communally mixed neighbour-
hoods, threw bombs and crackers themselves and implicated Hindu residents by giv-
ing false evidence to the police.169 In a similar vein, a leaflet claiming to solve the 
‘Mystery of Disappearance of Arrested Persons in Calcutta’170 declared that the Pun-
jabi policemen randomly arrested Hindus on the plea of violating curfew orders, 
handed them over to ‘murder gangs’ in slaughter houses, where the unfortunate vic-
tims were butchered, chopped into small pieces, packed in wooden crates and sent 
outside the city ‘for an unknown destination’.171 The author of the leaflet advised 
Hindus that the best way to deal with Punjabi Muslim policemen when they came to 
make an arrest was to kill them at once. If that was not possible, they should run 
away. If they felt trapped, they should immediately raise an alarm and seek assistance 
from other Hindus.172 
 
                                                 
167 Confidential diary entry by Sub-Inspector Pramatha Chakraborty, 9 May 1947, K.P.M. No. 
01821/05; File No. 938/47 II (C), P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. 
168 ‘Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha’, 20 April 1947, K.P.M. No. 01820/05; S.B. File No. 
938 II, P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Anonymous leaflet, title illegible, undated, K.P.M. No. 01823/05; S.B. File No. 938 IV, 
P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
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     By the middle of May 1947, Syama Prasad Mookerjee was directly addressing the 
press warning Hindus of the Bengal ministry’s attempts at recruiting more Muslims 
from the Punjab into Calcutta’s armed police. Despite posing as a ‘believer in the sol-
idarity of the Hindu race and in the need for a sovereign and united Bengal’, 
Mookerjee warned, Suhrawardy had dispatched recruiting parties to the Punjab coun-
tryside, and had already enlisted two hundred more of such Punjabi Muslims for Cal-
cutta Police.173 He hoped that this would finally open the eyes of those Hindus who 
were still ‘fraternizing with the Muslim League and Mr. Suhrawardy’ and attempting 
to ‘purchase peace for Bengali Hindus’ by indulging in ‘unholy pacts and negotia-
tions’ – referring, of course, to the supporters of the United Bengal movement.174 On 
20 May 1947, Mookerjee issued another press statement. He asserted that the Hindu 
Mahasabha had now received confirmation not only that the Bengal ministry was re-
cruiting more Punjabi Muslims for the armed police of both Bengal and Calcutta, but 
that the ministry had instructed recruiters to ensure that the new men were brought to 
the province by 2 June 1947, the expected date for the British government’s an-
nouncement on India’s future.175 Thus, in case the British Government agreed to par-
tition Bengal, a massive riot would follow. Mookerjee asked the Viceroy, the Home 
Member and the Governor to ‘intervene immediately’ and ‘prevent further complica-
tions’.176 
 
     The Muslim League and the various organizations under its umbrella, as well as 
the League-leaning press, remained defensive all through the campaign. Until the 100 
                                                 
173 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 17 May 1947. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 20 May 1947. 
176 Ibid. 
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Harrison Road Case came to light, some League newspapers expressed open support 
for Suhrawardy’s police recruitment policy. An article published in early April 1947 
in Azad, for example, asserted that the newly-recruited Punjabi Muslim policemen 
were, in fact, completely non-partisan and non-communal; the Hindus hated them as 
they feared that their neutrality would frustrate the Hindu conspiracy to exterminate 
the Muslims of Calcutta – the city where the Muslims were a minority. It declared that 
the handful of Punjabi Muslims already serving in Calcutta Police was thoroughly in-
adequate and demanded that at least a few thousand more of such policemen be 
brought in to tackle the increasing difficulty of administering ‘the Great City of the 
East’.177 With time, as the Hindu campaign against the Punjabi Muslim police became 
louder, open defence of such policemen became difficult. League propaganda increas-
ingly adopted a defensive posture. 178  Instead of contradicting the Mahasabha-led 
campaign, it attempted to bring out counter-examples of Muslims being harassed by 
Hindu policemen, especially the Gurkha armed police. In a localized outbreak of vio-
lence in Beliaghata in early April 1947, for example, local Muslims blamed the ‘al-
leged partiality of the Gurkha Armed police picket’ for the murder of an Imam, dese-
cration of a mosque and destruction of the tomb of a pir. 179 They demanded that 
Gurkha policemen be replaced by Punjabi Muslims or Pathans.180 An organization by 
the name of Anjuman-e-Mufidul Islam sprang up, again in early April, to register 
Muslim complaints against ‘police excesses’. 181  While a section of the Muslim 
League blamed Suhrawardy for ‘Hindu appeasement’ and failing to protect Mus-
                                                 
177 Azad, 8 April 1947. 
178  See ‘Miscellaneous: Communal Situation in Calcutta’, 5 April 1947, K.P.M. No. 
01820/05; S.B. File No. 938 II, P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. 
179 Communal Situation in Calcutta, 9 April 1947, ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Azad, 9 April 1947; Report of Inspector A.G. Khan, 25 April 1947, K.P.M. No. 01820/05; 
S.B. File No. 938 II, P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. Confidential diary entry from Inspector A.G. 
Khan, 25 April 1947; K.P.M. No. 01821/05; File No. 938/47 II (C), P.M. (1947), SBR, CP.  
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lims,182 others blamed Hindus and their organizations for keeping the tension high  
in order to discredit the ministry and strengthen their campaign for the partition of 
Bengal.183 
 
     By the end of May 1947, Calcutta was rife with rumours of communal trouble on 2 
June 1947. On the eve of Mountbatten’s declaration of 3 June 1947, stipulating the 
future shape of India and Bengal after British withdrawal, both Hindus and Muslims 
anticipated a violent communal conflagration in Calcutta.184 Rumours circulated in 
Muslim-majority areas of the city that Hindu Mahasabha was collecting arms and 
planning a concerted attack on Muslims if the demand for Bengal’s partition was not 
conceded. However, if Bengal was partitioned, officers of the Calcutta Police predict-
ed a bout of anti-Hindu violence. They were convinced that Muslims would not ‘con-
cede Calcutta to the Hindus without a fight’.185 Police informers reported that Muslim 
families in Calcutta were stocking up food for at least a fortnight, and that secret 
meetings were being held in all Muslim dominated areas ‘almost everyday for defence 
and offence’.186  
 
Yet, the campaign for Bengal Partition championed by the Mahasabha and the 
Bengal Congress was so systematic and vigorous, both in the realms of formal politics 
as well as in the domain of street agitations, that for many weeks before the 3 June 
                                                 
182 Special Branch Notes, undated, K.P.M. No. 01820/05; S.B. File No. 938 II, P.M. (1947), 
SBR, CP; ‘Communal Situation in Calcutta’, 15 April 1947, ibid. 
183 Statement of a Special Branch Secret Agent: ‘Communal Situation in the City’, 21 May 
1947, K.P.M. No. 01823/05; S.B. File No. 938 IV, P.M. (1947), SBR, CP.  
184 Ibid. Also see ‘D.C. North’s information regarding a Muslim outburst before 2 June 1947, 
ibid; Syamaprasad Mookerjee’s press statement in Amrita Bazar Patrika, 20 May 1947. 
185 Ibid. 
186 ‘Muslim Affairs: Apprehension of Trouble on 2 June 1947’, K.M.P. No. 01824/05, S.B. 
File No. 938V, P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. 
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announcement the partition of the province seemed like a foregone conclusion. De-
spite all the rumours of preparation for protesting the loss of Calcutta with violence, 
Muslims of the city seemed to have lost heart and were reconciled to the success of 
the Hindu campaign. Of course, there were Muslim League leaders who, despite ini-
tial protests about losing dominance over Calcutta, were not particularly unhappy 
about letting it go, such as those who wanted Dacca to be the centre of Bengal politics 
in Pakistan. But for many Muslim families of Calcutta, the partition of Bengal and 
allocation of Calcutta to a partitioned India, meant a prolonged period of uncertainty. 
They had to renegotiate their position within a new political environment that would 
certainly be hostile to those Muslims who would choose to remain in the city. They 
knew that in the new scheme of things, they would certainly have to negotiate their 
place in the city from a position of weakness rather than of strength. As the events of 
the following years confirmed, their apprehensions did not prove to be unfounded. 
 
Conclusion 
 
     This chapter intended to illuminate the nature of popular mobilization for Bengal’s 
partition in Calcutta. Control over Calcutta had shaped the Pakistan demand even at 
the all-India level. The Muslim League claimed it as an intrinsic part of Pakistan. On 
the other hand, many Hindus saw Calcutta as the centre of their culture and politics 
only recently contaminated by Muslims as a result of the exigencies of electoral poli-
tics. Therefore, they claimed a historical right over the city and argued for its sever-
ance from the Muslim-majority areas of Bengal. Agitation in the city’s streets, there-
fore, constituted a major part of the partition campaign in Bengal. The figure of the 
newly recruited Punjabi Muslim policemen provided a symbol around which the 
242 
campaign consolidated itself. The 100 Harrison Road Case gave the pro-Partition 
propagandists, championed by leaders of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha, an 
opportunity to delegitimize the authority of the provincial government. They repre-
sented the regime under Suhrawardy as a foretaste of ‘Muslim tyranny’187 to which 
Hindus would be subjected if the whole of Bengal was allowed to pass into the hands 
of Pakistan. 
 
     The United Bengal movement, which many historians have celebrated as a non-
communal alternative to India’s Partition, failed to carry the day when faced with this 
vigorous campaign for Bengal’s partition. Yet, a part of the blame must lie with the 
intrinsic lack of legitimacy of leaders of the campaign. It became too easy for the Par-
tition campaign to project the United Bengal movement as the last attempt of failed 
leaders to hold on to the reins of power. As one contemporary observer remarked: 
‘Thus [United Bengal] plan has two authors – one has no past, Shaheed Suhrawardy, 
the other has no future, Sarat Chandra Bose. Their commodity has, therefore, no mar-
ket.’188 
 
     But more than anything else, the street campaigns during this period, represented 
an acute crisis of state power. In the perception of large numbers of Bengali Hindus, 
not only had the everyday state degenerated into a machine of ‘Hindu oppression’, but 
those institutions which could intervene to protect them and deliver justice had also 
collapsed. It now seemed useless to appeal to other ‘higher authorities’ to intervene on 
                                                 
187 Chatterji, Bengal Divided. 
188 P S Mathur, ‘Sovereign Bengal’, Hindusthan Standard, 2 and 3 August 1945. Quoted in 
Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, p. 578. The statement was made by Altaf Hussain, whom 
Mathur quoted in his article. 
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their behalf. Even Calcutta’s Muslims seemed to have given up the battle for protect-
ing their socio-economic and political position in the city even before the British gov-
ernment finally announced the decision to partition Bengal. This exemplified the pe-
culiar nature of decolonization as a moment of transition of state power. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Nation-State and its Muslim Minority in Calcutta 
 
     Attlee’s announcement of 3 June 1947 transformed inter-community relations 
dramatically.1 The Partition of the subcontinent became a settled fact; on 15 August 
1947, British India was destined to be partitioned into two sovereign nation-states – 
India and Pakistan. The announcement also settled the fate of Calcutta. It was to  
become the provincial capital of a Hindu-majority West Bengal and join the Indian 
Union. 
 
     The police in Calcutta expected an immediate outbreak of communal violence.2 
But rather than resist, the Muslims seemed to have reconciled themselves to their des-
tiny. They either left for Pakistan or accepted a life of a religious minority. While 
most rich and influential Muslims left for Pakistan, a large number of poorer Muslims 
stayed behind. Deprived of patronage and protection from their powerful co-
religionists, the latter were reduced to a position of acute vulnerability. This chapter 
aims to delineate the processes of marginalization that rendered Calcutta’s Muslims 
vulnerable, not just to the tyranny of their Hindu rivals, but also to the state machinery 
that the latter came, very quickly, to dominate. 
                                                 
1 For the announcement on 3 June 1947 see ‘Statement by His Majesty’s Government, dated 
the 3rd June 1947’, Partition Proceedings (6 vols.), New Delhi: Government of India Press, 
1949, vol. I, p. 2. See Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 20. 
2 Statement of a Special Branch Secret Agent: ‘Communal Situation in the City’, 21 May 
1947, K.P.M. No. 01823/05; S.B. File No. 938 IV, P.M. (1947), Special Branch Records, 
Calcutta Police (henceforth, SBR, CP). 
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     Earlier chapters have argued that decolonization in the subcontinent needs to be 
understood as a crisis in the way the late colonial state came to be imagined in quotid-
ian life. These have tried to show that despite attempts by the government to sustain a 
sublime image of the colonial state, popular politics and everyday encounters with 
agencies of the local state repeatedly reduced it only to its profane dimensions.3 After 
3 June, the new leaders preparing to take over the reins of administration realised that 
if the institutions of the post-colonial state had to command authority, they needed to 
resurrect the state’s sublime imaginary – those dimensions of state power they had 
themselves delegitimized in the past by mobilizing their followers against the gov-
ernment. But this was no easy task. They had to be careful not to compromise their 
dominance in their effort at reinstating the idea of an impartial, benevolent and just 
state. This required an immediate readjustment of social relations, which, in turn, re-
quired the subordination of ‘internal enemies’. Muslims who stayed back became the 
internal enemy par excellence.4 
      
     The predicament of Indian Muslims after partition became a subject of scholarship 
rather late in the day. Beginning in the 1990s, against the backdrop of a resurgence of 
                                                 
3 For a discussion on the distinction between ‘sublime’ and ‘profane’ dimensions of the state, 
see Thomas Blom Hansen, ‘Governance and Myths of State in Mumbai’ in C.J. Fuller and 
Véronique Bénéï (eds.), The Everyday State and Society in Modern India, London: Hurst, 
2001, pp. 31-67; also see Thomas Blom Hansen, Violence in Urban India: Identity Politics, 
Mumbai and the Post-Colonial City, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
4 For a discussion of how Indian Muslims emerged as ‘internal enemies’ par excellence after 
partition, see Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can a Muslim be an Indian?’, Comparative Studies in Soci-
ety and History, vol. 41, no. 4, October 1999, pp. 608-29. For a discussion on the contradic-
tion posed between ‘Bengali’ and ‘Muslim’ identities in Bengal, see Joya Chatterji, ‘The 
Bengali Muslim: A Contradiction in Terms? An Overview of the Debate on Bengali Muslim 
Identity’, Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 16, no. 2, 1996, 
pp. 16-24. 
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communal violence, this scholarship was dominated, with a few notable exceptions,5 
by political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists. What emerged was a sophisti-
cated literature on communal violence,6 Hindu right-wing politics7 and secularism.8 
But these works paid little attention to the period of transition between the last days of 
the Raj and the immediate aftermath of partition. This period, this chapter will argue, 
was crucial to the making of the post-colonial Indian state as well as to the position of 
Muslim minorities within the polity. 
 
                                                 
5 One of the most influential historical studies of the 1990s on the fate of Muslim minorities 
after Partition was by Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims since 
Independence, London: Hurst & Company, 1997. 
6 Some of the most influential works on communal violence in independent India since the 
1990s include Thomas Blom Hansen, Wages of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcoloni-
al Bombay, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors of Vio-
lence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992; Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collec-
tive Violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997; Paul R. Brass, The Production of 
Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, London: University of Washington Press, 
2003; Paul R. Brass, Forms of Collective Violence: Riots, Pogroms and Genocide in Modern 
India, New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006; Asghar Ali Engineer, Communal Riots af-
ter Independence: A Comprehensive Account, Delhi: Shipra, 2004; Ashutosh Varshney, Eth-
nic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002; Ornit Shani, Communalism, Caste and Hindu Nationalism: The Violence in Gujarat, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
7 Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), The BJP and the Compulsions of 
Politics in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998; Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Na-
tionalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of State Building, Im-
plantation and Mobilization (With Specific Reference to Central India), London: Hurst & 
Company, 1993; Peter Van der Veer, Religious Nationalisms: Hindus and Muslims in India, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994; Ornit Shani, ‘The Rise of Hindu Nationalism 
in India: The Case Study of Ahmedabad in the 1980s’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, 
2005, pp. 681-96. 
8 Perhaps the most influential collection of essays on secularism in the 1990s was Rajeev 
Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998; Other 
influential studies on Indian secularism include William Gould, ‘Contesting “Secularism” in 
Colonial and Postcolonial North India between the 1930s and 1950s’, Contemporary South 
Asia, vol. 14, no. 4, 2005, pp. 481-94; Achin Vanaik, The Furies of Indian Communalism: 
Religion, Modernity and Secularization, London: Verso, 1997; Rochana Bajpai, Debating 
Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India, New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2011; Taylor C. Sherman, Muslim Belonging in Secular India: Negotiating Citizenship 
in Postcolonial Hyderabad, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Also see the re-
cent collection of essays: Humeira Iqtidar and Tanika Sarkar (eds.), ‘Revisiting Secularisa-
tion’ Economic and Political Weekly, Special Issue, vol. 48, no. 50, 14 December 2013.  
247 
     Since the early 2000s, historians have begun studying the transition from the colo-
nial to the post-colonial period in South Asia systematically.9 A group of scholars 
have described this process as a transition from subjecthood to citizenship.10 This 
chapter hopes to engage in a dialogue with this body of scholarship, with a shared 
concern about how the everyday state shaped the quotidian experience of citizenship 
for marginalized groups. However, it focuses more narrowly on the period of inter-
regnum when ideas of both subjecthood and citizenship were in a state of flux. After 
the 3 June announcement, the status of Indians as colonial subjects began to give way 
to an anticipation of national citizenship. Yet these would-be citizens only had a faint 
idea about what precisely Indian citizenship would look like. Their position can best 
be described as a state of being ‘neither subject nor citizen’. This chapter will argue 
that this was a decisive moment when the relationship between the state and its future 
citizens was redefined. 
      
                                                 
9 Chatterji, Spoils of Partition; Gyanesh Kudaisya, Region, Nation, “Heartland”: Uttar Pra-
desh in India’s Body Politic, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006; Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, 
Decolonization in South Asia: Meanings of Freedom in Post-Independence West Bengal, 
1947-52, London; New York: Routledge, 2009; Taylor C. Sherman, ‘The Integration of the 
Princely State of Hyderabad and the Making of Postcolonial India, 1948-56’, Indian Econom-
ic and Social History Review, vol. 44, no. 4, 2007, pp. 1358-88; Taylor C. Sherman, State 
Violence and Punishment in India, London: Routledge, 2010; Sarah Ansari, Life After Parti-
tion: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh, 1947-1962, Karachi; Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005; William Gould, Bureaucracy, Community and Influence: Society and the 
State in India, 1930-1960s, London: Routledge, 2011; William Gould, Religion and Conflict 
in Modern South Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
10 Taylor C. Sherman, William Gould, and Sarah Ansari (eds.), From Subjects to Citizens: 
Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947-1970, Delhi; Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2014; William Gould, Taylor C. Sherman, and Sarah Ansari, ‘The 
Flux of the Matter: Loyalty, Corruption and the “Everyday State” in Post-Partition Govern-
ment Services of India and Pakistan’, Past and Present, vol. 291, no. 1, May 2013, pp. 247-
53. There is also a growing literature on citizenship in India. See Joya Chatterji, ‘South Asian 
Histories of Citizenship, 1947-1970’, The Historical Journal, vol. 55, no. 4, 2012, pp. 1049-
71; Ornit Shani, ‘Conceptions of Citizenship in India and the “Muslim Question”’, Modern 
Asian Studies, vol. 44, no. 1, January 2010, pp. 145-173. 
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     The fate of Muslims who stayed back in Calcutta is potentially a richly productive 
site for this investigation. But unfortunately the subject has not received adequate at-
tention from scholars. Among the small corpus of literature that exists, Joya 
Chatterji’s work stands out as the most important and detailed exposition on the sub-
ject.11 Chatterji’s discussion of Muslim minority formation is structured by her paral-
lel concern with refugees. Thus, Muslims who ‘stayed on’ in West Bengal stand in 
contrast to the Hindu refugees who ‘moved’. The underlying conceptual framing of 
the theme, therefore, reflects her ongoing concerns with migration (or ‘staying on’) 
and mobility (or immobility). This framing also structures the way in which the pro-
cess of Muslim marginalization is analysed. In Chatterji’s work, the contest is over 
space, with Hindus (especially Hindu refugees) grabbing the space (both physical and 
cultural) that Muslims had occupied in the days before partition. The state makes an 
appearance, but mainly serves as a backdrop.  
 
     This chapter, on the other hand, puts the local state apparatus at the centre stage in 
the analysis. It argues that the marginalization of Calcutta’s Muslim minorities  
cannot be understood without taking the priorities and intervention of state agencies 
seriously. 
 
     This chapter will begin with an account of the way Hindu ‘goonda’ gangs were 
dealt with by the new state-in-the-making. The next section will discuss the tropes 
through which Hindu groups and their media articulated their anti-Muslim prejudice 
                                                 
11 Chatterji, Spoils of Partition, pp. 159-208. Joya Chatterji, ‘Of Graveyards and Ghettos: 
Muslims in Partitioned West Bengal, 1947-1967’ in Mushirul Hasan and Asim Roy (eds.), 
Living Together Separately: Cultural India in History and Politics, New Delhi; Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2005, pp. 222-49. 
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in the days after partition, justifying, indeed pushing for, the subordination of the 
Muslim minority under the new regime. The last section will describe how the new 
state machinery dealt with Muslim minorities and the changes this brought about in 
the latter’s self-representation. 
 
 
Hindu ‘Goondas’ and the Miracle of the Mahatma 
 
     Communal fractures within Bengal’s high politics had deepened since the Com-
munal Award and the Government of India Act of the 1930s. By the time tensions be-
came acute after the Cabinet Mission Plan in July 1946, hostilities had opened up be-
tween the Hindu and Muslim masses in their respective neighbourhoods in Calcutta. 
Communally-aligned criminal gangs – ‘goondas’ in official parlance, but also de-
scribed in colonial sources quite interchangeably as ‘bad characters’, ‘badmashes’, 
‘hooligans’ and a range of similar categories12 – emerged as defenders of community 
interests. Gang leaders frequently had close ties with important public figures in the 
world of formal politics. After 1947, if the restructured machinery of the new nation-
state was to take root in the city, both Hindu and Muslim gangs of the Calcutta un-
derworld had to be controlled. But this had different implications for Hindu and Mus-
lim gangs respectively. 
 
                                                 
12 India and Burma Committee – Indian Political Situation: Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State for India, 15 August 1945, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds.), The Transfer 
of Power, 1942-47: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, vol. VI, London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976, no. 28, pp. 70-71. Also see Suranjan Das and J.K. Ray, 
The Goondas: Towards a Reconstruction of the Calcutta Underworld, Calcutta: Firma 
K.L.M., 1996; Suranjan Das, ‘The “Goondas”: Towards a Reconstruction of the Calcutta Un-
derworld through Police Records’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 29, no. 44, 29 Octo-
ber 1994, pp. 2877-2883. 
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     Independence and partition involved a radical restructuring of power relations in 
Bengal. Muslim politicians now had to pack up, bag and baggage; or they had to try to 
reinvent themselves. Most leaders chose to leave Calcutta. Those who stayed behind 
had to function in very difficult circumstances and refashion their politics as per the 
needs of the hour. They had to prioritise reconciliation with the new, largely ‘Hindu’, 
leadership above championing ‘Muslim’ interests. The Muslim leadership of Calcutta 
was, in a sense, a defeated leadership which had to vacate and hand over effective 
power to the leaders of the Hindus. At a stroke, Calcutta’s Muslims lost the position 
of dominance they had previously enjoyed in this Muslim-minority city. Muslim 
goonda gangs not only lost their patrons but also their strength as the muscle-power of 
the politically dominant community. Excluded from patronage and protection, the 
Muslim underclass was left vulnerable to the depredations of the law-enforcing ma-
chinery of the new, overwhelmingly Hindu, government of West Bengal. 
 
     Even more ominously, these gangs were now exposed to the wrath of various Hin-
du gangs who saw opportunities in the changed circumstances to settle old scores. 
This involved teaching ‘lessons’ to those goonda gangs who had acted as protectors 
of Muslims in 1946. In these ‘pedagogic’ acts of violence, Hindu gangs expected the 
support of the new administration, now run by their old patrons. 
 
     For the government, however, this meant trouble. As leaders of the opposition, 
they had used the Calcutta underworld to their advantage when it suited them. Now 
that their objective of securing a territory over which they could rule had been 
achieved, outlaws previously under their protection had to be made to mutate into 
law-abiding citizens. The point is not that they were particularly concerned with the 
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fate of Muslims who decided to embrace Indian citizenship. But outbreaks of com-
munal violence could now delegitimize their claim to govern the new province. They 
had to act as impartial guardians of a secular nation-state, or at least create the impres-
sion of so doing. 
 
     The task of demobilizing this subterranean world of crime was difficult and dan-
gerous. There was the obvious danger of the Hindu goondas turning against them. 
The law and order machinery was not ready to cope with challenges of this sort, par-
ticularly since it, too, was in the process of being divided. Peace could best be accom-
plished through gentle persuasion rather than heavy-handed action. 
 
     Remarkably, it was Mahatma Gandhi, the champion of the politics of moral per-
suasion, who stepped in to fulfil this mission. Hindu politicians from Bengal who had 
previously used Hindu goondas for their vested interests in the past did not have the 
moral authority to perform this delicate task. The few Muslim leaders who remained 
hailed the Mahatma’s intervention.13 It was their last hope of securing some protec-
tion for the lives and properties of Muslims in the city. If it went well, Muslim leaders 
could even hope to improve their public standing in the new order by huddling under 
the Mahatma’s umbrella. 
 
     Gandhi’s relationship with Bengal was a troubled one. Since the days of the 
Swadeshi movement, Bengal had been the nerve-centre of extremist politics, a herit-
                                                 
13  Manubehn Gandhi, The Miracle of Calcutta (tr. Gopalrao Kulkarni), Ahmedabad: 
Navajivan Publishing House, 1959, pp. 19-20. 
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age widely cherished by its people.14 Gandhian ideals of non-violence had far less 
popular appeal here than in many other parts of India. In the domain of Congress poli-
tics, moreover, Gandhi had always faced stiff resistance from Bengal.15 In the 1920s, 
Chittaranjan Das had led the Swarajist opposition to his leadership of the Congress, 
together with Motilal Nehru.16 In the 1930s, as the prevailing mood within the Bengal 
Congress became more inward-looking, Gandhi, as the central figure of the Congress 
High Command, became the object of opposition for a range of powerful leaders 
committed to Bengal’s provincial interests. 17  His reputation was further damaged 
when in 1939, at the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Tripuri, he 
forced Subhas Bose to resign from the position of Congress President.18 Gandhi’s op-
position to Bose was seen as proof of the High Command’s disregard for Bengal’s 
interests. In the following years, the central Congress leadership attempted to weed 
out opposition from within the Bengal Provincial Congress,19 but it did not help im-
prove their public standing in the province. Gandhi, however, decided to make Ben-
gal, which had never really embraced him, the theatre of his experiments in commu-
nal harmony. In October 1946, when Noakhali in eastern Bengal went up in flames, 
                                                 
14 Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908, New Delhi: People’s Pub-
lishing House, 1973.  
15 Chatterji, Bengal Divided.  
16 Rajat Kanta Ray, Urban Roots of Indian Nationalism: Pressure Groups and Conflict of In-
terest in Calcutta City Politics, 1875-1939, New Delhi: Vikas, 1979; Rajat Kanta Ray, Social 
Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, 1875-1927, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984; 
Tanika Sarkar, Bengal, 1928-1934: The Politics of Protest, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987; Gitasree Bandyopadhyay, Constraints in Bengal Politics, 1921-41: Gandhian 
Leadership, Calcutta: Sarat Book House, 1984. 
17  Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Leonard Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Move-
ment, 1876-1940, New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1974.  
18 Leonard Gordon, Brothers against the Raj: A Biography of Indian Nationalists Sarat and 
Subhas Chandra Bose, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990; Sugata Bose, His Maj-
esty’s Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India’s Struggle against Empire, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
19 Chatterji, Bengal Divided. 
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Gandhi decided to dedicate himself personally to restoring peace by making Noakhali 
his home for several weeks.20 
 
     In August 1947, Gandhi was merely passing through Calcutta on his way to 
Noakhali. But on 9 August, when he arrived in the city, it was already in the grip of 
communal violence.21 Ever since the Calcutta riots of 1946, the city had scarcely 
known respite from communal killings. Rumours, stabbings and localized outbreaks 
of violence had kept the fires burning. Mobilizations around the Hindu demand for 
Bengal’s partition on the streets of the city had only aggravated this tense atmosphere. 
The 3 June announcement seemed to have brought about a ceasefire, but this was the 
lull before a storm. Hope of a return to ‘normalcy’ soon vanished. Official statistics of 
communal casualties in the city, invariably conservative, soared. By July, they had 
returned to the levels of violence witnessed in May, before the 3 June announcement. 
(See Table 4.1) 
  
                                                 
20 Rakesh Batabyal, Communalism in Bengal: From Famine to Noakhali, 1943-47, New Del-
hi; London: Sage, 2005; Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947, New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1991; Anwesha Roy, ‘Making Riots, Making Peace: Communalism, 
Communal Riots and Anti-Communal Resistance in Bengal, 1941-47’, PhD Thesis, Jawahar-
lal Nehru University, 2015.  
21 Gandhi, The Miracle of Calcutta, p. 17; Apart from Manubehn’s account, there are two oth-
er important sources on Gandhi’s stay in Calcutta in August–September 1947: Nirmal Kumar 
Bose, My Days with Gandhi, Calcutta: Nishana, 1953; Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last 
Phase, Part II, Volume X, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1958.  
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Period  
(1947) 
Communal Inci-
dents 
Killed Injured 
Second Half of May  278 37 304 
First Half of June 58 15 44 
Second Half of June 193 41 170 
First Half of July 230 50 246 
Second Half of July 166 33 180 
 
Table 4.1: Data for Communal Incidents in Calcutta, Government of Bengal. Compiled from 
Secret Reports on the Political Situation in Bengal (Fortnightly Reports) for the respective 
periods, India Office Records, L/PJ/5/154, Year 1947, British Library. 
 
 
     While in Calcutta, Gandhi stayed at his ashram in Sodepur. It was here that 
Suhrawardy and Muhammad Usman, two Muslim League stalwarts widely held by 
the Hindus to have orchestrated the Great Calcutta Killing, met the Mahatma and 
pleaded for help. They begged Gandhi not to leave for Noakhali immediately, but to 
stay back in Calcutta to restore peace between Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi agreed 
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on the condition that Suhrawardy would personally ensure that Noakhali remained 
peaceful.22 
 
     On 13 August 1947, Gandhi arrived at Haidari Mansion in Beliaghata, an area in 
north Calcutta in which all Muslims had either been killed or driven away.23 Tempers 
ran high; but, all of a sudden, peace returned to the city on the eve of independence. 
Hindus and Muslims visited areas they had not been able to enter since the days of the 
Killing; they embraced and congratulated each other in excitement.24 This, Manubehn 
tells us, was Gandhi’s ‘first miracle’.25 
 
     Things went well for the next couple of weeks, with Gandhi and Suhrawardy ad-
dressing evening prayer meetings all over Calcutta and its suburbs. Satisfied with the 
prevailing mood of communal harmony, on 31 August, Gandhi announced his deci-
sion to proceed to Noakhali. Later that night, communal violence broke out all over 
Calcutta. Allegedly started by Sikhs to avenge violence in the Punjab, Calcutta woke 
on 1 September 1947 to widespread killing, looting and arson. 
 
     In response, Gandhi decided to begin a fast which, he declared, would end either 
with the return of peace or with his death. The violence raged for the next two days, 
but by 4 September, a tentative calm began to return. The Mahatma had managed to 
cast his spell, his chroniclers tell us, on both Hindus and Muslims: rioters from both 
                                                 
22 Gandhi, The Miracle of Calcutta, p. 19. See the entry for 11-12 August 1947. 
23 Ibid., p. 21. See entry for 13 August 1947.  
24  For a description of the rejoicing in Calcutta on 15 August 1947, see Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay, Decolonization in South Asia, pp. 9-17; also see Jim Masselos, ‘“The Magic 
Touch of Being Free”: The Rituals of Independence on 15 August’ in Jim Masselos (ed.), In-
dia: Creating a Modern Nation, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990, pp. 37-53.  
25 Gandhi, The Miracle of Calcutta. 
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communities fell at his feet and asked for forgiveness. Hindu goondas lined up to sur-
render their arms to Gandhi. Leaders across party lines signed a pledge assuring Gan-
dhi that they would personally ensure peace in Calcutta and that, should another riot 
break out, they would fight it with their own lives. Satisfied at the ‘change of hearts’, 
Gandhi broke his fast the same day, after addressing his evening prayers. Having ac-
complished the ‘miracle of Calcutta’, Gandhi left for Delhi on 7 September 1947. 
 
     Chroniclers of these events, who are mostly hagiographers of Gandhi, end the sto-
ry here. With the successful disarming of Calcutta’s underworld, a year-long saga of 
relentless violence apparently gave way, under the Mahatma’s spell, to an era of 
peace in this riot-torn city. This remains the dominant narrative even today, which has 
now been institutionalized in the official memory of the city.26 Every year on 15 Au-
gust, the anniversary of India’s freedom from British rule is celebrated in Calcutta 
with a dramatic performance re-enacting the arms surrender at Haidari Mansion.27 
The Police Museum in Calcutta has also ceremoniously put up the surrendered arms 
for public display. 
 
     Two features in this dramatic episode require attention. The first was the fact that 
Gandhi’s ‘miracle’ was predicated on a public and performative acceptance of defeat 
on the part of Muslims. Suhrawardy, the ex-Premier of Bengal, declared himself per-
sonally guilty of orchestrating the Great Calcutta Killing in August 1946 at a mob tri-
al, an admission extracted from him on the threat of being publicly lynched. While 
                                                 
26 For a discussion of institutional memory, see Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: 
Les Lieux de Mémoire’, Representations, no. 26, Spring 1989, pp. 7-24.  
27 Archivists at the Police Museum in Calcutta informed me of this annual performance. Un-
fortunately, I have been unable to witness this in person. 
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Manubehn’s account, aimed at demonstrating the ‘miracles’ that Mahatma was capa-
ble of, sanitizes the event to the point that Suhrawardy’s ‘confession’ comes across as 
a voluntary ‘change of heart’,28 Pyarelal’s account is more revealing. We learn that 
Gandhi had not dared to bring Suhrawardy to his evening prayer on 14 August 1947 
as he was reluctant to give the crowd ‘the slightest cause for irritation’.29 Upon learn-
ing that Suhrawardy had locked himself up inside the Haidari Mansion, an angry mob 
attacked the building, pelting stones at the window. Suhrawardy remained ‘impassive, 
muttering sardonic remarks about the young men outside’.30 It was Gandhi who paci-
fied the crowd, telling them that Suhrawardy was ‘engaged in breaking the Ramzan 
fast’, and that he would soon appear before them.31 When the crowd temporarily 
calmed down, Gandhi ‘beckoned’ Suhrawardy to his side. One man in the crowd 
asked Suhrawardy whether he was responsible for the Great Calcutta Killing. 
Suhrawardy remarked, ‘Yes, we all are’. But the mob did not relent, pushing threaten-
ingly until Suhrawardy admitted, ‘Yes, it was my responsibility’.32 Thus, far from a 
spontaneous confession of his sins, brought about by his apparent ‘change of heart’, 
Suhrawardy was forced into an admission of guilt in the face of mob violence. 
 
     But Pyarelal, too, was invested in projecting the Mahatma’s greatness. He con-
cluded that this ‘unequivocal, straight and candid confession … by one who had made 
arrogance and haughtiness his badge and never known humility’, apparently had ‘a 
profound effect on the crowd’.33 Gandhi had later said, Pyarelal tells us, that he could 
                                                 
28 Gandhi, The Miracle of Calcutta, pp. 25-26.  
29 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, p. 368. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 369. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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sense that this had a ‘cleansing effect’.34 But that was not all; after that, Suhrawardy 
went on a public campaign to urge Calcutta’s Muslims to surrender to Hindu coercion 
‘willingly’. At Gandhi’s evening prayer on 15 August 1947, when communal tension 
in the city had supposedly melted away, Suhrawardy observed that Hindus were forc-
ing Muslims to shout ‘Jai Hind’. But, he declared, there was no need for force any 
more: ‘We shall shout that slogan of our free will, for we too are residents of India.’35 
Thereafter, in every public meeting, Suhrawardy’s messages to Muslims were to 
shout ‘Jai Hind’ and to ‘unite’ under India’s flag. At another prayer meeting at 
Tollygunge on 29 September 1947, Suhrawardy told Muslims: ‘If you want to live as 
inhabitants of Hindustan you must accept the Tri-colour as your national flag and sa-
lute it.’36 His signal, therefore, was clear; the only way Muslims could manage to sur-
vive was by submitting themselves ‘willingly’ to the demands of the Indian state and 
its Hindu public. Suhrawardy’s advice for Muslims was to crawl when, or even be-
fore, they were asked to bend. 
 
     The second aspect that needs attention is this: Gandhi’s effort was not just to re-
store communal peace, but also to legitimize state institutions, including the police, 
now that the nation-state was attempting to stabilize itself. While his advice to po-
licemen was to ‘serve’ the people and not ‘rule’ over them, and to be impartial, Gan-
dhi urged the public to submit to the police. He told the congregation at one of his 
prayer meetings that the police ‘received orders from the Government, not from pri-
vate individuals’ and that it was their duty ‘to arrest all those who commit crimes’.37 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Gandhi, The Miracle of Calcutta, p. 28. 
36 Ibid., p. 51. 
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Even historians who are otherwise critical of nationalist historiography have lauded 
Gandhi’s efforts in the last days of his life and his complete disdain for power. Sumit 
Sarkar, for example, writes that it was at this time that Gandhi’s true greatness was 
revealed by his courage to ‘stand against the tide’ and his ‘total disdain for all conven-
tional forms of power which could have been his for the asking now that India was 
becoming free’.38 But one must not miss the point that, even though Gandhi remained 
aloof from struggles over power and position in Delhi, his mission nonetheless legiti-
mized institutions of the nation-state, despite his earlier scepticism towards the coer-
cive apparatus of government. Along with attempts at ‘changing people’s hearts’, it 
was equally his mission to preach obedience towards the institutional power-
structures of the nation-state. 
 
     In any case, a sanitized narrative of Gandhi’s ‘miracle’ remains hegemonic today, 
and counter-narratives are hard to come by. Fifty years after India’s independence, 
Andrew Whitehead, a journalist at the British Broadcasting Corporation, conducted a 
series of interviews across India, Pakistan and Bangladesh about experiences of parti-
tion in South Asia.39 As luck would have it, one of them was of Gopal Mukherjee, the 
notorious Gopal ‘Patha’ who led the most extensive underground network of goondas 
in 1940s Calcutta. In his account of the episode of the surrender of arms in September 
1947, the 83-year-old Gopal Mukherjee provided a narrative radically different from 
the hegemonic accounts of Gandhi’s hagiographers.40 
 
                                                 
38 Sumit Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership, 1945-47’, Economic and Po-
litical Weekly, vol. 17, no. 14/16, Annual Number, April 1982, p. 683. 
39 Audio tapes of Andrew Whitehead’s interviews have been deposited at the library of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
40  Audio recording of his interview with Gopal Mukherjee is available online: 
http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/partition-voices.html [accessed 15 March 2017]. 
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     Gopal Patha confessed that he had enjoyed a close relationship with the bosses of 
the Bengal Congress, especially Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy, who became the Chief 
Minister of West Bengal soon after independence. But he was no Gandhian. A life-
size sculpture of Subhas Bose in full military uniform still adorned his ‘office’ near 
Wellington Street when Whitehead met him.41 An admirer of Bose all his life, he had 
little regard for the Mahatma. Yet as a pre-eminent leader of Calcutta’s underworld, 
Gopal claimed that Gandhi had approached him twice and he had refused to see him 
on both occasions. He finally went the third time, when he saw people coming to 
Gandhi and surrendering weapons that were of no use to anyone: ‘out-of-order pistols, 
that sort of thing’.42 When Gandhi’s secretary (presumably Pyarelal) asked him to sur-
render his arms, Gopal claimed to have replied: ‘with these arms I saved the women 
of my area, I saved the people. I will not surrender them.’43 He also claimed to have 
challenged the Mahatma further: ‘Where was Gandhi, I said, during the Great Calcut-
ta Killing? Where was he then? Even if I have used a nail to kill someone, I won’t 
surrender even that nail.’44 
 
     There is no reason why Gopal Mukherjee’s version should be taken as any more 
accurate than those of Gandhi’s hagiographers. The boldness that the 83-year-old 
Mukherjee attaches to his dealings with Gandhi in his memory of an event half a cen-
tury ago is more likely to be coloured by the happy imaginings of his youthful brava-
do in old age. But this research has recovered a corpus of contemporary police 
sources that provide a third angle to this polarized vision of the events of September 
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1947. The evidence suggests that Gopal met Gandhi not once but twice. Furthermore, 
the interactions between Gopal and Gandhi were rather conciliatory. On the first oc-
casion, he went to Gandhi in the morning of 4 September 1947 with other goonda 
leaders. They assured Gandhi that there would not be any further ‘recrudescence’ of 
riots in Calcutta and ‘entreated’ him to end his fast.45 Gandhi, however, refused to be 
satisfied with ‘mere verbal assurance’ and demanded that their promises be ‘translated 
into action’.46 He wanted them to surrender all arms and ammunition in their posses-
sion. Later that same evening, Gopal met Gandhi alone. Gandhi handed him an ad-
dress where, according to his information, six Sten guns were kept hidden and asked 
Gopal to bring them to him. 
 
     Gopal, according to the police report, promised to do so, but only when Gandhi 
assured him that he would also put pressure on Muslim goondas to surrender their 
arms to him.47 It is unknown whether Gopal surrendered any arms at all. Police rec-
ords indicate that despite making promises to start with, he later changed his mind and 
decided not to surrender any lethal weapons. There are no records of the total number 
of arms that were surrendered. But going by fragmentary evidence and the exhibits at 
the Kolkata Police Museum, it does not seem to be a spectacular number and certainly 
constituted only a small fraction of those that must have been in circulation. But these 
were not merely useless pistols, as claimed by Gopal in his 1997 interview. At least 
one Sten gun was surrendered, police records confirm, together with several cartridg-
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es, hand grenades, country-made pipe guns, choppers and other arms.48 In any case, 
the number and potency of the surrendered arms is not at issue here. This was sup-
posed to be a symbolic and performative gesture, a spectacle of submission of the 
goonda at the feet of the Mahatma – the moral victory of right over wrong, and of the 
establishment of the ‘order’ of the new free India.  
 
     The comprehensive disarming of criminal gangs in the city was almost impossible, 
of course, given the intricate networks of patronage and protection within which the 
‘institutional riot system’ of Calcutta was embedded.49 The sphere of operation of the 
gang leaders was often localized and neighbourhood-based, but many were connected 
with men in high places through a range of affiliations that were numerous, entangled 
and fluid. 
 
     Gang members, as is well-known, often coalesced around local clubs and gymna-
siums.50 Some of these attained particular notoriety. The appropriately named Narak 
Gulzar Club at Suri Lane,51 for example, became the nodal point for the operation of 
the Muchipara group of goondas, which extended its influence by coordinating its ac-
tivities with other gangs at Rainbow Club boarding house.52 These groups then se-
cured their protection by tapping into the connections their leaders maintained. The 
Muchipara Group was led by the infamous gangster Jagabandhu Bose and his brother 
Bimal Bose (nick-named ‘Bhanu’),53 both of whom were members of the Congress 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
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Socialist Party. Binay Chakravartti, another member of the same gang, belonged to 
the Hindustan National Guard, a volunteer body with strong connections with the 
Hindu Mahasabha. Hara, Ramen and Mokhim, junior members of the same group, 
belonged to the ‘Violence Group’, an organization led by Bepin Ganguli, a Congress 
worker of some local repute.54 Interestingly, it was Ganguli who had arranged for the 
meeting of the goonda delegation with Gandhi on 4 September 1947.55 This fact puts 
an entirely different complexion on the Mahatma’s miracle. 
 
     On closer examination, it emerges that the Muchipara Group also had patrons be-
yond political circles. One of its principal funders was Makhan Lal Sen, the proprietor 
of the Bharat newspaper.56 Thus, a single group of young men, operating largely 
within the jurisdiction of the Muchipara Police Station through local clubs, gymnasi-
ums and boarding houses, proves to have connections both with the Congress and the 
Hindu Mahasabha, as well as the press. Many gangs frequently enjoyed protection 
from the police as well, especially from its lower rungs.57 
 
     Not only did this goonda-politician-media-police nexus make the gangs formida-
ble, many were of some vintage. They almost always had a history of involvement in 
old terrorist organizations, such as Anushilan and Jugantar, or their later incarnations, 
for instance the Revolutionary Socialist Party.58 Often, they also had a history of par-
ticipation in ‘nationalist’ struggles. Jagabandhu and Bimal of the Muchipara Group, 
as members of the Congress Socialist Party, had been active in the Quit India Move-
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ment of 1942. They had also played significant roles in the agitations around the Indi-
an National Army trials in November 1945 and February 1946.59 The so-called ‘na-
tionalist pedigree’ of many of these characters co-existed peacefully with their cre-
dentials as leaders of murderous Hindu communal gangs. The varied contacts, gener-
ous funding and ‘nationalist’ credentials all made it challenging for the early post-
colonial state to uproot these criminal gangs completely, had it ever had the firm in-
tention of so doing. 
 
     But the drive to disarm communal groups in the city, however lukewarm, together 
with the impetus provided by the Mahatma’s efforts, created considerable turmoil in 
Calcutta’s underworld. Many of the patrons, protectors, and financiers of goonda 
gangs now attempted a volte-face to win favours with the new regime. As stated earli-
er, Bepin Ganguli, the local Congress leader, who had earlier been the patron of the 
‘Violence Group’, was instrumental in arranging the meeting of goondas with Gandhi 
on 4 September 1947.60 Other leaders, many of whom were Congress workers, played 
a similar role. Jagannath Koley, Indu Beed and Deben De, all political leaders with 
some local clout, had financed a range of neighbourhood-based gangs since commu-
nal tensions in the city had reached a high pitch in 1946. Some gang commanders 
complained that all of these political leaders who had financed and ‘instigated’ them 
to carry out the killings were now pleading innocence and ‘trying to lay all blames on 
the group leaders’.61 Some leading goondas also tried to change their posture to suit 
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the direction of the prevailing wind. A few joined their patrons and financiers in try-
ing to court favour with government, which now tried to control goonda gangs to re-
assert its legitimacy. Ashu Chatterji, a pleader by profession and leader of the 
Charakdanga group of goondas, was allegedly taking ‘much interest’ in the rehabilita-
tion of Muslim families in Mia Bagan Bustee, to which the other gangs took a strong 
exception.62 
 
     In fact, a sharp divide emerged between those groups which were willing to 
change their stance and those who held on to a hard anti-Muslim disposition. 
Jagabandhu Bose of the Muchipara Group inaugurated the surrender of arms to Gan-
dhi. This was strongly denounced by Gopal Mukherjee of Malanga Lane; Gopal even 
threatened Jagabandhu with death. More significant was the fracture this caused with-
in the Muchipara group that Jagabandhu had previously dominated. His own brother, 
Bhanu Bose now led a rival faction against him and joined Gopal.63 The fact that con-
stant gang wars of this kind could spill over and lead to chaos kept the city admin-
istration on high alert. But the connections that these gang leaders had with men in 
positions of power, and the sympathy they commanded among the lower echelons of 
the police, ensured their protection. 
 
     Admittedly, the police carefully monitored the dynamics of the goonda world, 
conducting raids, seizing arms and ammunition and making arrests from time to 
time.64 However, state action was mostly directed at those recalcitrant gangs who 
were indifferent to Gandhi’s call to change their ways. Indrajit Das, the leader of 
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Kalitara Bose Lane group, was one such leader of Calcutta’s underworld. He openly 
fell out with Naresh Chandra Ghose, a Special Constable in Calcutta Police. Naresh, 
who had masterminded the attacks on the Muslims of Mia Bagan Bustee while Gan-
dhi was living in its vicinity, was ‘now assuming an air of innocence and trying to 
placate the Muslims’, much to Indrajit’s annoyance.65 Indrajit threatened him and oth-
er financiers, many of whom were local Congress leaders, that if they dared to betray 
the goonda leaders and got them arrested, ‘he would divulge all secrets to the police.66 
The nature of these ‘secrets’ are not difficult to imagine. Leaders in high places had 
used goondas to their advantage, including using them to commit murder and arson. 
The goondas knew enough to put their patrons in deep trouble if they decided to open 
their mouths, and men like Indrajit now threatened to speak out to damage his former 
bosses. This time, however, Indrajit had gone too far; somewhat to his surprise, the 
police arrested him on 25 September 1947. He was released on bail two days later but 
remained under constant police scrutiny.67 But some of his close aides remained in 
detention. In utter bafflement, Indrajit complained that the police, under ‘Congress 
direction’, was pursuing a ‘suicidal policy’.68 His gang, he complained, was demoral-
ized by the constant threat of arrests and house-searches. He insisted that there was 
‘every likelihood of a recrudescence of communal disturbances’, when the services of 
groups such as his would be urgently required.69 He believed that goonda groups were 
essential for the protection of Hindu citizens of the new nation-state against Muslim 
onslaughts and thought of his activities as ‘service to the community’.70 
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     Needless to say, there were better connected goonda leaders than Indrajit. They 
were never arrested. The police were unable to tackle them with anything like an iron 
fist. A case in point is Gopal Mukherjee, who counted the Premier himself as a per-
sonal friend.71 Soon after making conciliatory gestures towards Gandhi, all accounts 
suggest that he had remained steadfast about not surrendering his weapons or giving 
up his anti-Muslim activities. As a result, Gopal, and others of his ilk, caused the po-
lice considerable grief. Every time the authorities apprehended a recurrence of com-
munal violence, Gopal’s activities worried them. That their concerns were justified 
was proved by Gopal’s prominent part during the communal riot of 1950.72 
 
     It must be remembered, however, that the wavering attitude of the administration 
and the political establishment towards organized networks who instigate riots is not 
an aberration. As Paul Brass suggests in his description of ‘institutional riot systems’, 
riot-prone cities in India have always kept alive networks of professionals who could 
reliably be called upon to organize riots whenever the occasion demanded. With the 
connivance of state actors, operators in the riot system act as ‘fire-tenders’, maintain-
ing the ‘fuel at a combustible level, sometimes stoking it, sometimes letting it smoul-
der’.73 This is the story of how Calcutta Muslims came to be marginalized and disem-
powered after independence, despite the regime paying lip-service to secularism and 
the need for communal harmony. 
 
     But the presence and activities of goondas, or their patronage at high levels, cannot 
wholly explain the predicament of Muslim minorities in the city. One must look be-
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yond such networks of criminality to investigate the legitimacy that these riot net-
works derived from dominant sections of society. The activities of the underworld, if 
it was to sustain itself after independence, had to resonate at some level with domi-
nant public attitudes and discourses that structured minority formation. This will re-
quire a close study of the tropes through which anti-Muslim propaganda circulated in 
the larger public domain. 
 
 
Muslims as the Threatening ‘Other’ 
 
     The main trope through which Hindu hostility towards Muslims was articulated 
was the alleged threat to life and livelihood Hindus faced from Muslims despite parti-
tion. Calcutta had a substantial Muslim minority, often concentrated in small pockets. 
Partition notwithstanding, in its immediate aftermath Muslims sometimes continued 
to dominate institutions of local government in such areas. Matiaburz, in the suburbs 
of Calcutta, was one such locality with a substantial concentration of Muslims. The 
Chairman of the Matiaburz Municipality was a Muslim, so were most of its Council-
lors. This became a major source of resentment on the part of Hindus who saw Mus-
lim dominance, even at such local levels, as fundamentally illegitimate after partition. 
 
     These prejudices were coloured by all-India developments, such as the controver-
sies surrounding the ‘accession’ of Hyderabad to the Indian Union.74 An anonymous 
letter to the Home Minister of West Bengal alleged that the Muslims of Matiaburz 
                                                 
74 For the accession of Hyderabad to the Indian Union, see A.G. Noorani, The Destruction of 
Hyderabad, London: Hurst, 2014; Taylor C. Sherman, Muslim Belonging in Secular India. 
269 
wanted this area to be treated in the same way as Hyderabad and wanted to merge 
with Pakistan.75 Hindus, the letter claimed, were particularly unhappy about the Mu-
nicipality’s connivance at illegalities practiced by Muslim butchers in the area. Butch-
ers’ shops, which encroached upon footpaths, were ‘really a menace to the Hindus’. 
Even the police were no match for the ‘aggressive and ferocious Muslim butchers’.76 
The letter asserted that the same butchers had massacred Hindus during the Great 
Calcutta Killing and they feared that happenings in Hyderabad would soon be met by 
a demand to include Matiaburz in Pakistan. 
 
     Sometimes, Hindu resentment against Muslims was expressed through the idiom 
of Muslim ‘appeasement’ or ‘favouritism’, allegedly practiced by unpatriotic Hindus 
and foreigners. After the announcement of partition, government employees were giv-
en six months to decide whether they wanted to serve in India or Pakistan.77 Unsur-
prisingly, most Muslim government servants chose to join the Government of Paki-
stan, while their Hindu counterparts chose India. However, government institutions 
found it difficult to immediately dispense with the services of many of their employ-
ees who chose to migrate to the other dominion and replace them with newcomers. 
Thus many Muslim employees continued to serve for short periods on temporary con-
tracts in government offices across India. This became a source of grievance for Hin-
du employees who wanted the government to remove the ‘betrayers’ with immediate 
effect. The retention of Muslim employees in government offices, even on short con-
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tracts, was seen as a sign of Muslim ‘favouritism’. Hindu employees at the Mint in 
Calcutta typified the prevailing sentiment. One Lalji, who claimed to represent Hindu 
workers of the Alipore Mint, complained to the President of the Bengal Provincial 
Hindu Mahasabha about how the Mint management was going out of its way to retain 
the services of Muslim employees who had already decided to leave for Pakistan.78 A 
government notification had directed the management to sanction two months’ leave 
to such employees so that they could prepare for their transfer. Accordingly, Muslim 
workers who had opted for Pakistan had resigned, but had immediately been re-
absorbed on daily-wage contracts. The most skilled among them, such as the masons, 
continued to receive a ‘very high salary’, often adding up to eight or nine rupees per 
day. Hindu workers, Lalji claimed, were agitated about how the Mint management 
were ‘appeasing’ those who had been ‘betraying from the beginning for which India 
is now divided’.79 Unpatriotic Hindu officers (who spoke only English and allegedly 
felt ashamed to talk in Hindi or Bengali), together with the British Officer-in-Charge, 
Lalji concluded, were behind this move. He urged the President of the Mahasabha to 
intervene immediately. 
 
     Private enterprises operating in, or headquartered in, Calcutta were also looked up-
on with suspicion, especially where Muslim workers comprised a considerable part of 
the workforce. Bata Shoe & Co., the Czech company headquartered in India at 
Batanagar in the vicinity of Calcutta, had a large proportion of Muslim labourers. Af-
ter partition, the continued dominance of Muslims in its factories irked Hindu work-
ers. They complained that Muslim jobbers, who continued to enjoy patronage from 
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the management, were recruiting Muslims from Pakistan but registering them in pay-
rolls under false Hindu names.80 Investigation revealed that the story was false; the 
new recruit named Atma Ram, who had caused much consternation among Hindu 
workers, did eventually turn out to be a Hindu.81 But allegations of this kind gained 
credence as the company came under official scrutiny for a range of suspicious activi-
ties, including the illegal export of machinery to Pakistan.82 Moreover, Hindu workers 
had a long-standing grievance about ‘Muslim favouritism’ in the organization, having 
complained that their managerial staff had long used Muslim workers as blacklegs to 
break labour strikes.83 
 
     Allegations of continued Muslim dominance of workplaces in the city became 
louder as a sensational story came to light in the factory of Metal Box, a private Brit-
ish enterprise which had its Indian headquarters in Calcutta. As in the factories of Ba-
ta, Muslim labourers at Metal Box formed a strong and exclusive coterie.84 A labour 
supervisor called Razi Ahmad was a leader of the Muslim National Guard in the 
Matiaburz area. As a leader of this notorious Muslim League-sponsored volunteer 
body, he had allegedly masterminded the killing of Hindus during communal riots. 
Hindu workers complained that the company, especially its allegedly pro-Muslim la-
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bour welfare officer Mr. Kapani, continued to protect him and retain his services even 
after partition. 
 
     Matters came to a head when Razi Ahmad secured the employment of a new la-
bourer in the factory. The behaviour of this new hand appeared suspicious, allegedly 
because Razi Ahmad and his gang prevented him from interacting with Hindu work-
ers of the factory. One day, Razi had him mercilessly beaten up for refusing to attend 
prayers at the neighbouring mosque. But this new recruit soon escaped and lodged a 
complaint with the Watgunj Police Station. He informed the police that he was a Hin-
du, that though he was registered at the factory as Mujibul Huq, his real name was 
Manindra Nath Sarkar.85 He had been stabbed and kidnapped by a gang of Muslims in 
the days before partition and once he recovered from his injuries, he had been con-
verted by force to Islam. At first his kidnappers tortured him in captivity; thereafter, 
they took him to Razi Ahmed and got him work at the Metal Box factory. But he was 
used as a slave, and his entire salary was confiscated by Razi and his followers. 
 
     As this story spread, it infuriated not just the Hindu workers of the factory, but also 
the Hindus of the locality. Tempers rose even further when it came to light that two of 
Manindra’s tormentors, who were arrested by the police following the complaint, 
were released on bail. The police reported that Hindus in the factory were so excited 
that they ‘would not hesitate to take the law in their hands to retaliate against the mis-
chief caused by the Muslims’.86 We do not know what happened thereafter; the ten-
                                                 
85 Untitled report by B. Bhattacharya, 4 June 1948, ibid. 
86 Untitled report by B. Bhattacharya, 1 June 1948, ibid. 
273 
sion at Metal Box faded away with time. However, it fed a larger Hindu anxiety over 
forced conversion. 
 
     The threat of forced conversion of Hindus to Islam was part of a larger repertoire 
of discourses though which anti-Muslim sentiments had long been articulated.87 Yet it 
gained a special significance after partition. It became a narrative of how, even after 
partition, Muslims were continuing with their criminal designs to decimate Hindu so-
ciety. It was to show how thankless Muslims were by nature, to argue why it was use-
less to ‘appease’ them. It became a justification for the demand to put those Muslims 
who chose to remain in Calcutta in their ‘proper place’. Absurd stories of forceful 
conversion in the districts would sometimes make their way to the newspapers, creat-
ing a furore in the city. The Bengali daily Hindusthan reported, for example, how 
Muslims in Burdwan had kidnapped a Hindu man and converted him by force to their 
faith. Thereafter, the Muslims had filed a complaint with the police alleging that the 
victim’s family had murdered him for willingly embracing Islam. The victim, howev-
er, managed to escape. He sought the protection of the Burdwan District Hindu 
Mahasabha. Finally, with Mahasabha’s intervention, he obtained justice and saved his 
family who had been languishing in jail on false charges.88 
 
     There was also a constant stream of stories of how Muslims had an organized 
racket for kidnapping young Hindu boys. These kidnapped boys were apparently con-
verted to Islam and raised as Muslims. Many argued that Muslims were adopting this 
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strategy to swell their numbers. With the influx of Hindu refugees from East Bengal, 
the proportion of Hindus in Calcutta were increasing, thereby reducing the percentage 
of Muslims in the city’s demography even further. Some Hindu propagandists 
claimed that this was the reason why Calcutta Muslims specifically targeted Hindu 
refugee children. The latter were also easy targets as they were more vulnerable. Hin-
du voluntary organizations therefore sprang up to ensure their protection. These or-
ganizations put up camps at strategic spots, such as the Sealdah Railway Station, 
where Hindu refugees poured in from East Bengal. 
 
     A police report on an alleged attempt to kidnap a refugee boy in mid-1948 re-
vealed the typical denouement. It claimed that a Muslim man had approached a Hindu 
refugee family who had arrived at Sealdah Station on their way to a refugee camp at 
Howrah, and had offered to take charge of their son.89 On being refused, the man at-
tempted to kidnap the boy while his parents were busy making arrangements. A 
member of the Servants of Bengal Society, a Hindu voluntary organization, somehow 
managed to catch the Muslim and raise alarm. A crowd of three hundred Hindus gath-
ered and attempted to assault the man, while shouting ‘in a frenzy that Noakhali 
should be avenged’.90 The police managed to intervene and arrest him. Such stories 
obviously increased the paranoia around Muslim ‘depredations’ and contributed to the 
making of Calcutta’s Muslims a suspect population. 
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     Stories of the forceful conversion of Hindu men to Islam went hand in hand with 
allegations of the continued abduction and oppression of Hindu women by Muslims – 
another hoary trope, as Datta has shown.91 On the eve of Indian independence, pam-
phlets and posters proliferated in Calcutta that spoke of the need to avenge Muslim 
depredations on Hindu women and the forceful conversion of Hindu men. A Hindi 
leaflet published in Calcutta, which found its way to various North Indian provinces, 
asked Hindus why they wanted to celebrate India’s freedom from colonial rule on 15 
August 1947.92 It asserted that the day must be observed as the first anniversary of the 
Great Calcutta Killing; instead of celebrating it, Hindus should spend the day weeping 
in shame. It prepared an inventory of reasons why the day must be mourned. The rape 
of Hindu women and their forceful marriage to Muslim men topped the list, together 
with lamentations over forceful conversion of Hindu men. It carried a picture of a 
supposedly Hindu women being forced to walk naked amidst a Muslim crowd carry-
ing Pakistani flags.93 Such propaganda gripped the city in the days after partition. A 
widely circulated Bengali leaflet threatened the West Bengal ministry with dire con-
sequences if it failed to prevent oppression of Hindu women in East Bengal. It 
claimed that Muslim League ministers were ‘still casting their lustful eyes upon Hin-
du women’; Muslim police officers transferred from Calcutta to East Bengal were 
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‘still committing adultery on Hindu women’; and it insisted that the only way of 
teaching Muslims a lesson was ‘shooting them like dogs’.94 
 
     A stream of reports on the ‘recovery’ of Hindu women found their way into Eng-
lish and Bengali dailies. These invariably prompted angry letters to editors from 
members of the public complaining of administrative complacency. For example, on 
27 June 1948, Amrita Bazar Patrika reported that police had recovered four Hindu 
girls, aged between sixteen and twenty-five years, and two minor Hindu boys, while 
searching the house of a Muslim goonda.95 This prompted one Rabindra Nath Biswas 
to write to the Editor of the paper accusing the police of not paying heed to popular 
demands for a thorough search of all Muslim houses in Calcutta. It was a matter of 
shame, he insisted, that the kidnapping of Hindu women and children had continued 
unabated even after partition. Every day, he complained, radio and newspaper stories 
were replete with reports of missing Hindu women and children. A search of ‘sus-
pected Muslim areas’, he claimed, would lead to many more recoveries.96 In another, 
Arabinda Ghosh wrote to the editor of Hindusthan expressing exasperation at daily 
reports of Hindu women recovered from the clutches of Muslim goondas. 97  He 
claimed that even the respectable-looking Muslims were not above suspicion. He 
called upon the police to conduct a ‘systematic search’ of all Muslim houses in Cal-
cutta, for nothing could be more insulting for Hindus than having to endure Muslim 
oppression of Hindu women within the territory of Hindustan.98 
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     The demand for the rescue of Hindu women from Muslim oppression, of course a 
long-standing theme in Hindu communal discourse, had a few novel dimensions 
which are worth highlighting. Some of these were peculiar to the circumstances that 
prevailed around the time of partition and its aftermath. As the above examples show, 
the need for protecting Hindu women from the lust of Muslim men was often articu-
lated together with concerns over the religious conversion of Hindu men. Yet there 
was a conspicuous absence of concern about the conversion of Hindu women. Wom-
en were largely seen as unmarked by religion, acquiring the faith of whoever ‘owned’ 
their bodies. The Hindu woman’s body was a commodity that had to be prevented 
from being stolen by Muslim men; for she would automatically become part of Mus-
lim society, it was assumed, if any Muslim man managed to marry, impregnate, or 
have sexual relations with her.99 
 
     The argument went a step further, and this was peculiar to the post-partition con-
text. Many Hindu commentators seemed to believe that the responsibility of protect-
ing Hindu women did not lie with Hindu men alone; it was very much a special re-
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sponsibility of the post-partition Indian state. In that sense, independent India was an 
essentially Hindu state. If the Indian state also protected Muslims, it was a mark of its 
generosity, not its duty. A common refrain in most of this Hindu communal propa-
ganda involved anger over how the Indian nation-state was unable to protect Hindu 
women despite protecting Muslims who remained in India.100 In fact, police reports 
from Calcutta reveal that the government took its responsibility of protecting Hindu 
women very seriously. 
 
     A series of reports from Calcutta demonstrate the enthusiasm with which Calcutta 
Police took up this ‘responsibility’. Such reports are often presented as success sto-
ries, proof of the commitment of the city police to its assigned duty. A closer look, 
however, often reveals much complexity, especially the lack of any sensitivity to the 
wishes of the women involved in such cases.101 In December 1948, Calcutta Police 
raided a Muslim bustee on information provided by a Mahasabha activist. They ‘re-
covered’ a sixteen-year-old Hindu girl from the house of one Abdur Razzaque.102 Her 
brother identified her as Santi, who had gone missing in early 1945. Razzaque main-
tained that he was married to Santi. The latter, who was the mother of a two-year-old 
girl, tried to hide her Hindu identity and wanted the police to leave them alone. But 
she was ‘minutely crossed by the police’; when she failed to answer questions ‘satis-
factorily’, the police report claimed, ‘the truth came out’.103 Razzaque was arrested 
and Santi, along with her daughter, was sent to a rescue home. The complexity of the 
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facts mattered little, as did the will of the woman involved. The very fact that Santi 
was living with a Muslim man made the latter into a criminal and her into a victim of 
abduction. Another case reveals how lower rungs of the police were given a free hand 
in intervening whenever they spotted a Hindu woman with a Muslim man. This time, 
two Constables arrested a Muslim man on the mere suspicion of kidnapping when 
they saw him in a rickshaw with a woman who ‘looked like’ a Hindu. Despite all in-
dications that this was a case of elopement, the police report insisted that the man ‘en-
ticed the girl away from her father’s place’.104 To give credibility to the Constables’ 
actions, it also added that he had ‘criminally assaulted her on the way’. 
 
     For ‘recoveries’ of Hindu women from the alleged clutches of Muslim men, there 
was no lack of enthusiasm among large sections of Hindu men in assisting the police. 
In one case, a group of Hindus took the initiative in ‘rescuing’ a Hindu woman and 
handing her over to the police when they noticed her come out of a Muslim bustee. 
Police investigations revealed that her first husband, who was a Hindu, had died in a 
communal clash some time back. She had nowhere to go; she needed to find shelter 
and feed herself and her son. Some time later, she got to know a Muslim man and 
eventually moved in with him to a Muslim bustee. However, this man also died a few 
months later. Now, having to fend for herself and her son, she had only come out of 
the bustee to get some water from a roadside tap, when Hindu neighbours spotted her 
and handed her over to the police. On charges which remain unknown, police arrested 
five Muslims in this connection.  
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     Newspapers with Hindu readerships often played an important role in ratifying po-
lice versions of such ‘recovery’ stories. Putting all complexities aside, the Bengali 
daily Basumati reported the above incident as the uncomplicated story of the ‘rescue’ 
of a Hindu woman.105 There were even occasions when some newspapers published 
stories that were factually wrong. On 12 August 1948, a report in the Hindusthan 
Standard, for example, claimed that police had rescued a young Hindu girl from the 
house of a Punjabi Muslim.106 However, the police report on this case confirmed that 
the man was, in fact, a Punjabi Hindu and was married to the girl. However, because 
they lived in a bustee with a large proportion of Muslims, Hindus of the locality were 
convinced that the man was a Punjabi Muslim.107 
 
     Public demands that Muslims be taught a lesson became more insistent following 
reports of an outbreak of communal violence in Santipur, a town in Nadia district not 
far from Calcutta. It started with an incident on 19 June 1948, when a group of Mus-
lim men chased three Hindu schoolgirls; they managed to catch one of them and mo-
lest her. This enraged Hindus of the area. When, the following day, Hindus of 
Santipur discovered the head of a freshly-slaughtered cow stuck on a clump of bam-
boos in the centre of town, a full-scale riot broke out.108 
 
     But instead of calling for peace, the Calcutta papers encouraged Hindus to crush 
Muslims once and for all. An editorial in Hindusthan exemplified this mood.109 It re-
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counted how during the days of the Raj, Muslims had freely gone around raping Hin-
du women in Bengal. The ‘Muslim-loving British administration’ and ‘Muslim-
appeasing Congress-minded Hindus’ did little to prevent such incidents. It claimed 
that Muslim goondas were openly assisted by their co-religionists, irrespective of 
class backgrounds. Large Muslim crowds were even known to have honoured Muslim 
rapists with garlands in public ceremonies to celebrate the dishonouring of Hindu 
women. For a while after independence, the editorial observed, there was a lull in 
Muslim criminal activities. Yet, by the first anniversary of Indian independence, Mus-
lims had renounced all pretence at self-control and renewed their habit of raping 
women of Hindu households. It pointed to the incidents leading to the riots at Santipur 
as proof of Muslim depredations and proclaimed that the Hindu reaction there was 
entirely justified. It went to the extent of hinting at the undesirability of government 
efforts to protect Muslims of Santipur. Finally, the editorial reflected on why the Mus-
lim criminals were feeling empowered again and what should be done to remedy this. 
It declared the reason to be the timidity of Hindu men and the Congress government’s 
‘weaknesses’ for Muslims. The only way of controlling Muslim mischief, it insisted, 
was to apprehend them before they could even touch the women. This was not a task 
that the police could perform, as they were only allowed to act when a crime actually 
took place. It was the fearless Hindu youth, the writer insisted, who should take up the 
mantle of crushing Muslim criminals before they could do anything. Thus suspicion 
was sufficient for Hindu young men to apprehend Muslims. The last line of the edito-
rial, however, mentioned that the destiny of Hindus lay in the ability of young men to 
sacrifice their lives to protect women without practicing violence or attacking the en-
emy. This, however, sits uncomfortably with the entire tenor of the editorial and was, 
in all probability, inserted to escape press censorship. Taken as a whole, this editorial 
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remains a testimony to the degree of leverage given to newspapers with a Hindu audi-
ence to incite Hindu violence against Muslims. 
 
     Thus a significant section of Hindus, the police and some allied newspapers 
emerged as self-proclaimed guardians of Hindu society, committed to protecting them 
from the city’s Muslims. The tropes of Muslim favouritism, the conversion of Hindu 
men to Islam and the continued oppression of Hindu women framed the arguments in 
favour of the socio-political subjugation of Calcutta’s Muslims. The next section will 
discuss the precise mechanisms by which the Muslims of Calcutta were marginalized 
and how they responded to the changed circumstances after partition. 
 
 
The National State and the Making of Calcutta’s Muslim Minority 
 
     The partition of British India into India and Pakistan dramatically altered the posi-
tion of urban Muslims who remained within India.110 The predicament of Calcutta’s 
Muslims was a part of the same story, but the transformation was sharper than in 
many other parts of the country. For almost a decade before partition, Muslim politi-
cal formations, especially the Muslim League, had dominated Bengal through the 
headquarters of the provincial government in Calcutta. This had made the city’s Mus-
lims a powerful minority. With partition, Calcutta became the capital of the Hindu-
majority province of West Bengal. The position and influence of Calcutta’s Muslims 
declined rapidly thereafter. They became a marginalized group, and the object of re-
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sentment that so many Hindus of the city had nurtured for years. The fact that Calcut-
ta’s Muslims had to reconcile themselves to a position of marginality became clear 
from the disposition of the Muslim political leadership almost immediately after the 
decision to partition Bengal was confirmed. 
 
    Partition unnerved even the ‘Nationalist Muslims’ of Calcutta. They petitioned the 
Bengal Congress not to forget them ‘in the heat and hurry of the time and circum-
stances’.111 They wanted assurances from the Congress leaders that whatever the fate 
of Bengal might turn out to be, they would not be ‘thrown to the wolf’.112 To con-
vince the Congress of their loyalty, the petitioners went on a diatribe against Muslims 
who demanded Pakistan, alleging that the Direct Action Committees of the League 
were responsible for keeping ‘the fire burning’.113 They were beyond control of even 
the Provincial Leagues. They insisted, therefore, that the Congress take up the initia-
tive in ensuring that these Committees were banned. 
 
     For their part, Muslim League leaders were inclined towards compromise. As men-
tioned above, ever since Gandhi’s campaign for peace on 15 August, Suhrawardy had 
urged Muslims to forget everything that the leaders of the Muslim League, including 
himself, had previously told them. He advised them to uphold all the symbols of the 
Indian nation-state, from flags to slogans, before even these were demanded from 
them. By November 1947, again it was Suhrawardy who raised doubts about whether 
the Muslim League should exist at all in the changed situation. An all-India confer-
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ence of Muslim leaders called at Suhrawardy’s behest in Calcutta led to many acri-
monious debates.114 The tense atmosphere prevailing even after the cessation of vio-
lence in September 1947 is apparent from the precaution Suhrawardy took to ensure 
the safety of the delegates. Having no faith in the West Bengal government or its po-
lice, he had gathered a private militia of five hundred strong from members of the 
Muslim National Guard.115 
 
     In his address to the delegates, Suhrawardy painted a bleak picture of the future of 
Muslims in India. He feared that a commercial boycott could begin any moment in 
Calcutta against Muslim enterprises, which would mean financial ruin for Muslims of 
the city. He also felt that whatever may be the attitude of the Congress towards Mus-
lims, allegations of ‘Muslim appeasement’ would force the Congress to leave the 
Muslims in the cold sooner or later. The meeting reached no conclusion, but the Star 
of India reported on 14 November 1947 that the delegates had expressed their virtual-
ly unanimous opinion that the League had, for all practical purposes, already ‘ceased 
to exist’.116 They had allegedly taken the view that League leaders should now join 
hands with the ‘nationalist Muslim leadership’.117 Finally, on 18 March 1948, Abul 
Hashem, a key figure in the Bengal League, informed the West Bengal Legislative 
Assembly that the Parliamentary Parties of the Muslim League in West Bengal, Oris-
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sa and Assam had been dissolved; for, in the ‘changed circumstances’, ‘communal 
organizations should be liquidated in the best interests of the Indian Dominion’.118 
 
     The dissolution of the League, which had been the assertive face of Muslim poli-
tics in India since at least the 1930s, created a sense of abandonment among the ordi-
nary Muslims of Calcutta. But what heightened their sense of betrayal even more 
were the appeals by the League leaders that they give up the religious rights that they 
had won through so many years of struggle. Muhammad Usman, Secretary of the 
Calcutta District Muslim League, at a meeting in October 1947 insisted that the Mus-
lims of Calcutta should refrain from sacrificing cows in mosques situated in Hindu 
localities (even in cases where such a custom existed), and from carrying beef through 
Hindu areas. Muslims were even to tolerate processions playing loud music to pass 
through mosques during prayer-time.119 This was just the prelude to the tragic loss of 
religious freedoms and spaces that Joya Chatterji describes in vivid detail.120 
 
     The Muslims of Calcutta who had supported the League movement for Pakistan 
reacted in multiple and complex ways to the quick surrender of the Muslim League 
leadership to the new dispensation. Many better-off Muslims, together with the bulk 
of the political elite, decided to leave for East Bengal. Several Muslim businessmen 
and merchants shifted their families and their movable wealth to safer destinations, 
but they themselves waited in Calcutta to see whether matters would settle down be-
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fore making their final call. But there were the vast numbers of lower-middle class 
and poor Muslims for whom leaving their hearth and home was no easy matter. This 
was a decision they could not take in haste. For them it was their last option. 
 
     Those poorer Muslims of Calcutta who were reluctant to leave the city responded 
to the quick escape of the rich and powerful among their co-religionists to East Ben-
gal with bitter resentment. A Bengali leaflet circulating in the name of the city’s Mus-
lim bustee-dwellers asserted that it was the Muslim poor who had sacrificed their 
lives for Pakistan since Direct Action Day. Now that Pakistan had been achieved, 
their leaders were abandoning them to enjoy the fruits of their struggles. They ac-
cused the leaders of not making any effort to get Calcutta included in Pakistan. The 
leaflet demanded that if the Muslim elite decided to emigrate, they must leave behind 
their belongings with the people in the bustees; or else their erstwhile followers would 
not hesitate to ‘answer cruelty with cruelty’.121 The Central Intelligence Officer of 
Calcutta reported that ‘Muslim hooligan elements’ had discarded all loyalty to their 
former leaders.122 The report claimed that even Muslim politicians admitted that there 
was a widespread sense among ordinary Muslims of being cheated by their political 
leaders; the leaders had, therefore, lost control over ‘illiterate Muslims’.123 Believing 
that Pakistan had become a reality because of their effort, they felt they had enough 
strength left in them to retain Calcutta for themselves. This sense of betrayal contin-
ued as ordinary Muslims found themselves increasingly marginalized in their own 
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city. Neither did this sentiment remain confined merely to ‘illiterate Muslims’ or 
‘hooligan elements’. 
 
     There are some indications of the emergence of a new, albeit low-profile, Muslim 
social leadership from among the ranks of small businessmen and petty traders who 
remained in Calcutta. As localized riots broke out in pockets of north Calcutta in the 
middle of 1948, a group of Muslim entrepreneurs came forward to negotiate with the 
officials to restore peace. A secret intelligence report from May 1948 mentions that a 
group of Muslim neighbourhood leaders, all petty traders and businessmen, had come 
together to discuss how ‘ordinary’ Muslims of Calcutta could protect themselves.124 
They insisted that unlike the rich and influential Muslims of Park Circus and 
Amratolla, the survival of Muslim traders, small entrepreneurs and poor labourers de-
pended upon their everyday dealings with Hindus. They could, therefore, ill afford to 
follow the prosperous Muslims of posh Muslim neighbourhoods, many of whom had 
already shifted most of their property and family to Pakistan. This enraged one of the 
leaders, the report observed, who asserted that if he had a few loyal young men, he 
would ensure that the rich Muslims were robbed of their wealth before they could 
leave Calcutta. Others at the meeting pacified him, and decided that apart from the 
peace committee they had decided to form together with Hindus, they would also 
raise a small batch of ‘young intelligent volunteers’ to collect intelligence from Hindu 
areas and warn Muslims of impending trouble. How successful these plans were, or 
the extent of the influence of this new Muslim leadership, is difficult to ascertain. But 
the point remains that the older Muslim leadership of Calcutta, who had previously 
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organized themselves mainly under the banner of the Muslim League, increasingly 
found themselves discredited. This provided the space for the emergence of a new 
stratum of localized neighbourhood-based community leadership who came to repre-
sent the Muslims of the city under these vastly altered circumstances.125 
 
     Calcutta also had an intricate network of Muslim criminal gangs that the Muslim 
League had exploited and patronized in the days before Partition. Used to their posi-
tion of dominance, this Muslim underclass took time to adjust to the changed condi-
tions. Within the city, there still were pockets where Muslims had a strong presence; 
many of these gangs felt that they could retain their power in such neighbourhoods 
and carry on as earlier with the same degree of impunity. Soon it became evident, 
however, that their influence had come under challenge from Hindus and the state 
machinery that the latter now came to dominate. 
 
     Khidderpore, the site of the Calcutta port, had a high concentration of working-
class Muslims, dominated by lascars and dock labourers. It was also notorious for its 
goonda gangs, patronized by the Muslim League before partition. The prospect of 
Calcutta being made a part of Hindu-majority West Bengal caused considerable con-
sternation among these gangs, who had strong roots among the Muslim labouring 
poor of the area. By the beginning of August 1947, leaflets circulated among these 
labourers urged them to ‘plunge into action’ to retain Calcutta in Pakistan by force.126 
Even after the inclusion of Calcutta in West Bengal, at least some Muslims of 
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Khidderpore still saw the arrangement as only a temporary one. On the first anniver-
sary of India’s independence, secret intelligence alerted the police to organized prop-
aganda in Khidderpore that Calcutta would soon become a part of Pakistan. Accord-
ing to these propagandists, India and Pakistan would soon go to war on the issue of 
Kashmir. With the Indian army busy defending the country’s western borders, Paki-
stani troops would invade from the eastern front and capture the whole of West Ben-
gal.127 While the police failed to establish the veracity of this information, they none-
theless expressed concern over the fact that almost ninety-five percent of Muslim 
households in Khidderpore had not hoisted the Indian national flag on Independence 
Day.128 
 
     Confidence among Khidderpore’s Muslims about their ability to maintain contin-
ued dominance in the area did not last very long. With the eclipse of the Muslim 
League in West Bengal, the shield that had protected them had collapsed, especially 
for those who had their hands stained by the stamp of criminality. This not only ex-
posed them to the long arm of the law, but also to attacks from rival Hindu goonda 
gangs who now enjoyed protection under the new regime. Take for example, the story 
of Nasiruddin, who ran a ration and coal shop at Khidderpore; he was a powerful local 
figure with some connections in the world of crime. Hindus of the area had a long-
standing grudge against Nasiruddin for his ‘hatred’ of Hindus, manifested in his 
‘rough’ behaviour towards Hindu customers.129 One day, in June 1948, the cashier of 
his shop made ‘some objectionable remarks against a Hindu girl’ in the presence of 
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his Hindu customers.130 Very soon, bands of Hindu goondas attacked his shop and 
assaulted Nasiruddin and his employees. Nasiruddin filed a police complaint, but to 
no avail. It was he, and not those who had attacked his shop, whom the Deputy Com-
missioner summoned to his office and warned of consequences if he did not amend 
his conduct. 
 
     It also transpired that since partition, Nasiruddin had become the target of some 
Hindu gangs who wanted to establish their authority in Khidderpore. They had even 
got him arrested on a previous occasion by exposing his dealings in the black market. 
A report from the Central Intelligence Officer observed that ‘Hindu hooligan ele-
ments’ were, in fact, ‘itching for creating communal unrest’ in Khidderpore and were 
on the lookout for opportunities to victimize Muslims in the area.131 What was more, 
these Hindu gangs continued to receive support and patronage from the local Con-
gress Committee, members of which had become ‘a danger to local Mohammed-
ans’.132 Nasiruddin, like other Muslims with criminal records against them, had be-
come an easy target despite their prowess as goondas. They learnt the hard way that 
their dominance, even in localities such as Khidderpore, was slipping away. 
 
     This sense of disempowerment was not confined to those with criminal records. 
For the smallest ‘anti-Hindu’ assertions, Muslims of Khidderpore, even those with no 
criminal past, also came under the police scanner. A police report of a ‘communal 
commotion’ in the area is indicative of this trend. This was caused when a Muslim 
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tenant of a house in Khidderpore expressed his annoyance at the early morning 
Mahalaya Radio programme and abused ‘the Hindu religion’ in the ‘most vituperative 
language’.133 Local police intervened and the Deputy Commissioner warned him for 
his behaviour. These kinds of police interference in the smallest of everyday local 
disputes, which barely concealed the state’s majoritarian bias, must have reinforced 
the sense of marginalization of the city’s Muslims. 
 
     Muslim subordination in post-partition Calcutta has to be understood in the context 
of the reorganization of the state machinery in the aftermath of partition. As men-
tioned above, government employees could opt to serve either India or Pakistan fol-
lowing the division of the subcontinent. Most Muslims chose Pakistan, just as Hindus 
chose India almost to a man. Senior officials often saw this as a career move and re-
fused to call themselves refugees when they emigrated as government servants.134 But 
there is evidence to suggest that for many low-ranking state functionaries, intimida-
tion and fear of future discrimination often dictated their choices.135 Indeed, intelli-
gence reports point to an organized conspiracy to murder Muslim policemen in cold 
blood after the partition of Bengal was announced on 3 June 1947. None of the cul-
prits were ever brought to book.136 With Muslim personnel reduced to a small minori-
ty within the force, the Calcutta Police emerged out of partition with a distinctly Hin-
du colour. 
                                                 
133 ‘Miscellaneous: Communal Agitation’, 24 September 1949, K.P.M. No. 3498/08, S.B. File 
No. 506/49, P.M. (1949), SBR, CP. This is the early morning radio programme aired every 
year, even to this day, marking the beginning of the Durga Puja celebrations in Calcutta. The 
programme consists of songs devoted to the Goddess, interspersed with scriptural recitations.   
134 Md. Mahbubar Rahman and Willem van Schendel, ‘“I Am Not a Refugee”: Rethinking 
Partition Migration’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 2003, pp. 551-84.  
135 Chatterji, Spoils of Partition, p. 168. 
136 Ibid. See details in File No. 614, Year 1947, IB, GB, WBSA; File No. 1123, Year 1947, 
IB, GB, WBSA. 
292 
     This was also reflected in its attitude towards problems of ‘social order’. The law 
of the land technically applied equally to all citizens; yet discrimination in the treat-
ment of Hindu and Muslim outlaws, evident in contemporary police records, exposed 
the biases in the administration. Moral persuasion was the preferred strategy to ‘con-
vince’ Hindu criminal gangs to disarm themselves. In case of Muslim goondas, how-
ever, the law-and-order machinery did not feel the need to administer any such pallia-
tives. These men had to confront the might of the state head-on. 
 
     While Gandhi was busy inviting Hindu goondas to surrender arms out of their own 
volition, the task of disarming Muslim goondas fell to the Anti-Robbery squad, assist-
ed by intelligence agencies. Paranoia around Muslim ‘conspiratorial organizations’137 
made the police fall back upon a tried and tested strategy: turning members of crimi-
nal gangs into state approvers, through a mixture of threats, intimidation and promises 
of protection. 138 Anonymously filed testimony, for example, gives details of how 
Muslim goonda gangs managed to procure firearms and ammunition for use during 
communal riots. In his own words, the approver claimed to be a ‘goonda’ of consider-
able infamy.139 Not without a touch of pride, he declared that ‘thieves’ and ‘robbers’ 
were terrified of him. They paid him regular subscriptions and generous cuts from 
their booty. A ‘staunch follower of Mr. Shahid Suhrawardy’, his job was to ‘create 
disturbances in meetings organized to criticise his actions’. 140 His activities were 
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well-known and all the top bosses of the Bengal League, including Suhrawardy, 
Nazimuddin, and even the League financier Mr. Ispahani, he claimed, ‘utilized’ him 
‘for collecting funds by threats and creating troubles in places where they wanted’.141 
He also claimed to act as a middleman in the supply chain of arms to the Muslim Re-
lief Committee, a League volunteer organization that had sprung up in the days after 
the Great Calcutta Killing ostensibly to provide relief to Muslim riot victims. Provid-
ing details of how the Committee sourced its arms from ‘a Negro of an American 
ship’, he confessed that he had received fifty rupees as brokerage per firearm for these 
transactions.142 But after partition, he assured the police, he was leading the ‘quiet 
life’ of an ordinary shopkeeper. 
 
     The strategy of forcing former accomplices to testify against their comrades seems 
to have been used widely to infiltrate criminal networks run by Muslim gangs. Alt-
hough its success is difficult to measure, its impact is revealed by the ripples it caused 
in the world of crime. At times it led to localized tensions. The Calcutta Police no-
ticed, for example, a ‘great commotion’ in the Amherst Street area one July evening 
in 1948. Enquiries revealed that Hindus of the locality were protesting against a local 
Muslim ‘bully’ who had allegedly assaulted and stabbed a Hindu.143 On further inves-
tigation, the police learnt that the man who had been stabbed was, in fact, a Muslim, 
and that he was stabbed by a member of his own gang. Abdul Rouf, the perpetrator of 
the crime, had plotted to murder the victim as this former accomplice of his had 
turned into a state approver and had deposed against him. 
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     Becoming a state approver was one of the strategies that the Muslim poor, black-
ened by criminal records, adopted to survive the state onslaught. But the loss of pro-
tection was only one dimension of their subordination; the other was the loss of pat-
ronage that endangered their livelihood. Exploitation by the Muslim political elite for 
their own gain, in return for protection and patronage, had also served to ensure a 
livelihood for members of the Muslim poor forced into criminality. It had enabled 
them to extract protection money from the neighbourhoods they dominated. Muslim 
goondas, just like their Hindu counterparts, were able to collect subscriptions from 
their co-religionists as payment for the service of ‘protecting’ them from their com-
munal ‘Others’; some had even demanded money from Hindus as a charge for sparing 
their lives during a Muslim offensive. Now, however, their vulnerability to the reor-
ganized police made it impossible to earn livelihoods by extracting protection money. 
Those who had earlier paid regular subscriptions saw no reason to do so any more; it 
was evident that their erstwhile protectors were now themselves in need of protection. 
If the former subscribers continued to pay, they could, in fact, face police harassment. 
This was the perfect time for many erstwhile protection-seekers to make noise about 
the ‘depredations’ of their former protectors. Thus, ‘respectable’ Muslims (and also 
some Hindus) who had previously paid protection money to Muslim criminal gangs, 
now began organizing themselves to invite the state to ‘rescue’ them from Muslim 
goondas. Thus, on the eve of partition, when ‘Muslim goonda elements’ went about 
‘extorting money’ from ‘peaceful Muslim residents of Free School Street’ (the cate-
gories invoked in the police record are instructive), the latter openly held a ‘Mohalla 
meeting’ to discuss ways of stopping ‘such rowdyism and criminal pursuits’.144 This 
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is one way in which the onslaught of the new state, overwhelmingly Hindu in compo-
sition and pro-Hindu in orientation, broke down Muslim communal solidarities that 
had, in the days before Partition, cut through the various registers of social differentia-
tion within the community. This changed, in very significant ways, the vocabulary  
in which Calcutta’s Muslims represented themselves and related to the emerging  
nation-state. 
 
     This rhetoric of being ‘peaceful residents’ was deployed ever more frequently by 
‘ordinary’ Muslims of Calcutta to claim protection from, and demonstrate loyalty to, 
the new state-in-the-making. It became a dominant trope in their self-description. This 
was radically different from the assertive voice of this middling section of Calcutta’s 
Muslims during the League regime, when large sections of them had fearlessly fore-
grounded their Muslim identity in describing themselves or making demands on the 
government. During the last days of the Raj, when the political dominance of the 
Muslim League in Calcutta was slipping away, those Muslims who neither belonged 
to the politico-economic elite nor were stained by criminality increasingly described 
themselves in non-communal terms. An appeal to the Bengal Government by resi-
dents of a Muslim bustee on Keshab Chandra Sen Street is illustrative of the changed 
modes of self-representation.145 
 
     At least since the Great Calcutta Killing, communal fractures in Calcutta were 
deep enough to divide the urban space into Hindu and Muslim zones. Hindus found it 
dangerous to pass through Muslim-dominated areas and the same was true the other 
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way round. The letter to the Bengal Government spoke of how Keshab Chandra Sen 
Street was the only corridor connecting eastern and central Calcutta that Muslims 
could access. After the 3 June announcement, the petitioners complained, even this 
stretch had become prone to Hindu attacks. What is striking about this letter is the 
very language through which this resentment was articulated. The Muslim complain-
ants diligently described themselves as ‘defenceless citizens’ and the attackers as 
‘miscreants’.146 Referring to administrative bias, the ‘harmless citizens’ complained 
how, after communal incidents, police always searched and arrested people ‘not from 
the community that attacks, but from the victims of the attack’.147 The context makes 
it clear that the petitioners were complaining about anti-Muslim discrimination in po-
lice investigation. But they scrupulously avoided describing the victims as Muslims 
and oppressors as Hindus. It reveals a new ‘common sense’ among Muslims in post-
partition Calcutta that if they wanted to make claims on the newly emerging nation-
state, the language of citizenship was far more effective than that of religious identity. 
This is in stark contrast to the way in which Hindus were freely asserting their Hindu 
identity to claim special protection and privileges from the state, almost assuming that 
the new state after partition was a de facto Hindu state. It was the Muslim minority of 
Calcutta who made constant appeals to the formal claims of the Indian state to be the 
champion of secular nationalism and civic citizenship. 
 
     Newspapers which had pro-Muslim League orientations in the days before parti-
tion deployed similar strategies in their reportage. Under the changed circumstances, 
reports in such papers exhibited a cautious approach and a reluctance to posit ‘Hindu 
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vs Muslim’ binaries while discussing communal antagonisms. Most of these adopted 
the tone of seeking protection from the state as good citizens, while scrupulously 
avoiding any direct accusation against Hindus or the government. An editorial in 
Azad, which complained about circulation of anti-Muslim rumours in different neigh-
bourhoods of Calcutta, is a case in point. Avoiding any direct confrontation, or identi-
fying the alleged rumour-mongers as ‘Hindus’, it suggested that this was the work of 
‘naughty-minded interested parties’ – an expression that enabled the editorial to avoid 
pointing fingers directly at Hindu propagandists.148 Again, instead of accusing the 
government of failing to prevent the circulation of such rumours, the report merely 
drew its attention to them and expressed hope that the police would take immediate 
action. 
 
     Even on those occasions when some of these newspapers printed a strongly-
worded article, it always contained an endorsement of state action rather than a cri-
tique of government. In July 1948, Amrita Bazar Patrika had claimed that Calcutta 
Police had unearthed ‘an organized conspiracy’ and an ‘espionage ring’ of Calcutta’s 
Muslims in support of ‘Hyderabad’s gangsters’.149 Instead of challenging the Patrika 
head on, Morning News couched its attack in terms of praise for the West Bengal 
Government for its promptness in denying the veracity of this report. It suggested that 
the government should take ‘deterrent action’ against the Patrika. But instead of put-
ting its demand across directly, it reminded the government that the Prime Minister 
himself had declared that ‘communal peace’ was India’s ‘essential requirement’. The 
implication was that Morning News, on its own, was not urging the punishment of its 
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rival; it was the Prime Minister’s statement that made it incumbent upon the govern-
ment to take action. 
 
     Sometimes, while reporting actual outbreaks of communal violence, a non-
antagonistic tenor became difficult to sustain. Yet the narrative strategies of such 
news reports continued to showed considerable restraint. During the festival of Holi in 
March 1949, a communal riot broke out in Kankinara in the 24-Parganas district on 
the outskirts of Calcutta. A long report in one such ‘Muslim’ newspaper expressed 
outrage, but never described it as a Hindu-Muslim conflict.150 Instead, it invoked the 
rhetoric of majority-minority, secularism and democracy to condemn the violence – 
categories that newspapers with a ‘Hindu’ audience rarely used at that time. Instead of 
stating facts on its own authority, the report adhered strictly to official data and state-
ments of the Premier and other government bodies. Lamenting administrative lapses, 
it pointed out that official information confirmed that the District Magistrate did not 
visit the site of violence to reassure minorities; even the police had allegedly sided 
with the aggressors. While it urged the government to bring the guilty to book, the 
report strove not to present this as a ‘Muslim’ demand. It insisted that this was a ‘sa-
cred duty’ of government that every ‘peace-loving’ member of the public who valued 
‘communal harmony’ wished the authorities to fulfil. The report further pointed out 
that ‘minorities’ in Kankinara had not celebrated their religious festivals out of fear 
for the past year. In fact, not one religious festival passed without an outbreak of 
communal violence in West Bengal. This only proved, the report concluded, that a 
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section of the public had not ‘absorbed’ the values of ‘secularism’ and ‘people’s gov-
ernment’ – ideals for which Mahatma Gandhi, ‘the father of the nation’, had sacri-
ficed his life. It urged the government to launch a campaign among this section of the 
public to explain to them the need for ‘religious tolerance’ in a ‘democratic state’. 
This was essential, the writer pointed out, to preserve the international reputation of 
India. 
 
     This report is a classic example of how Muslim minorities attempted to fit in to the 
changed situation. It was the Muslim press that, after partition, turned out to be the 
most vociferous upholders of the values that Congress nationalism, and now the Indi-
an nation-state, formally upheld – secularism, religious tolerance, democracy, peo-
ple’s government and so on. One of the strategies of survival of the Muslim minori-
ties, therefore, was to make moral claims for accommodation within the nation based 
on its own declared values – values that they felt were being violated by the majority 
community. 
 
     It is possible to appreciate the tenor of this criticism only when it is compared with 
the systematic assaults on religious and cultural freedom that the Hindu majority (with 
its new-found influence within the structures of governance) unleashed on the Muslim 
minority. As the previous newspaper report pointed out, not one religious festival had 
passed without the outbreak of communal violence in some area or another in West 
Bengal. Holi, in particular, led to localized violence in Calcutta almost every year 
since 1947. Sometimes, it would begin with petty fights, even among children. In one 
case, it began when a Hindu boy threw coloured water on a Muslim passer-by. This 
soon spread all over the locality, leading to a full-fledged clash between groups of 
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Hindus and Muslims.151 In another case, a scuffle around the throwing of coloured 
water resulted in a full-fledged gang war in Manicktola.152 The exact details of the 
incident remain unclear, but the real cause of conflict seemed to revolve around the 
question of which gang had the right to terrorize Muslims of the area. Bagla, a ‘noto-
rious criminal’, had allegedly thrown coloured water on a Muslim in Manicktola; this 
had led to a fight with local Muslims, when one of Bagla’s associates stabbed one of 
his opponents. Batu, the leader of a rival gang called ‘Bharat Jatia Bahini' (‘Indian 
National Army’), took exception to Bagla’s actions, probably because he thought that 
the latter was encroaching upon his sphere of influence. A free fight ensued, which 
involved the use of firearms. When compared to this ‘routine violence’153 against Cal-
cutta’s Muslims, the tone of Muslim newspapers seems very tame indeed. 
 
     Even when no communal violence actually took place, police reported tension in 
Muslim localities in anticipation of a communal clash during religious festivities. This 
often started with rumours about how Hindus were preparing for an attack. This was 
not a new trend; it had been much in evidence even before partition. For example, 
even in March 1947, police reported a widespread rumour of an impending Hindu at-
tack on Muslims on Holi.154 What was new, however, was the anticipation of retalia-
tory violence on religious festivals, when rumours travelled from East Bengal of how 
                                                 
151 Special Branch Report entitled ‘Re: Clash between a group of Hindus and Muslims over 
throwing of colour near Kilia Tangra 3rd Lane on 14.3.49’, 15 March 1949, K.P.M. No. 
3498/08, S.B. File No. 506/49, P.M. (1949), SBR, CP.  
152 ‘Statement of a Casual Agent’, 25 March 1948, K.P.M. No. 1489/05, S.B. File No. 506 II, 
P.M. (1948), SBR, CP; also see Confidential Diary Entry by S.I. H.M. Bhattacharya of S.B., 
Calcutta, dated 3 April 1948, ibid.  
153 Pandey, Routine Violence. 
154 ‘Special Branch Officer’s Report: Communal Situation in Calcutta’, 5 March 1947, K.P.M. 
No. 01488/05, S.B. File No. 506/48, P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. 
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Hindu festivals were obstructed by Muslims there.155 In November 1947, for example, 
intelligence officers reported panic among the Muslims of Beliaghata and 
Narkeldanga because of a rumour that Hindus would obstruct Muharrum processions 
and attack Muslims in Calcutta to avenge the violence that had erupted in Dacca 
around the Janmashtami processions.156 News of incidents on the other side of the 
border often reached the ears of Calcutta’s Muslim minorities before they arrived 
through official channels. These often caused tremors in Muslim neighbourhoods as 
fear of retaliatory violence gripped entire localities. In September 1948, as the first 
streams of information about a riot in Dacca were pouring into official circles in Cal-
cutta, the Special Branch found, quite ominously, that the details of the riot were al-
ready well-known among Muslims around Sealdah railway station – the entry point of 
Hindu refugees from East Bengal into Calcutta.157 
 
     If an information deficit about incidents on the other side of the border hindered 
police efforts at keeping communal violence at bay, anti-Muslim bias, going down 
right to the bottom of the police hierarchy, facilitated pervasive everyday anti-Muslim 
violence that reinforced the cultural subordination of Calcutta’s Muslims. One exam-
ple will illustrate the point. A letter to the editor of Paschim Banga Patrika by one 
Santi Chatterjee complained of how an immersion procession following Saraswati 
                                                 
155 I have argued elsewhere that rumour did not necessarily mean ‘false’ information. In bu-
reaucratic parlance, rumour often meant information circulating through informal channels 
that made them almost impossible to verify. Thus, rumours of violence in East Bengal did not 
necessarily imply that the information was untrue. See Ishan Mukherjee, ‘The Elusive Chase: 
“War Rumour” in Calcutta during the Second World War’ in Tanika Sarkar and Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay (eds.), Calcutta: The Stormy Decades, New Delhi: Social Science Press, 
2014, pp. 65-92.  
156 ‘Communal Affairs’, 14 November 1947, K.P.M. No. 1489/05, S.B. File No. 506 II, P.M. 
(1948), SBR, CP.  
157 Confidential Diary entry by S.I. A.C. Bhattacharya of S.B., Calcutta, dated 20 September 
1948, K.P.M. No. 3497/08, S.B. File No. 506/48, P.M. (1948), SBR, CP. 
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Puja in February 1949 desperately tried to provoke Muslims at Maulali Darga.158 
Prayers at the Darga were being held when this band of rowdy lathi-wielding Hindu 
young men passed by, burning crackers and playing loud music. A car full of police-
men, Chatterjee complained, stood by and watched the tamasha. The report attracted 
the attention of high officials and the Special Branch sent it to the local police station 
for comment. The response was a complete denial of the report. The concerned Assis-
tant Commissioner claimed that he was himself at the spot; when he saw the proces-
sion coming near the Darga, he requested them to stop making noise; this, he claimed, 
had an immediate effect and the procession passed by in silence.159 He said that there 
were, indeed, other processions that played music, but all of these were far away from 
the shrine. The Special Branch did not feel the need to investigate the matter further 
and informed the Governor’s office that all allegations in the letter printed by 
Paschim Banga Patrika were false.160 This was despite the fact that the Assistant 
Commissioner admitted that the processionists were carrying lathis. The fact that this 
was unnecessary, especially during Saraswati Puja celebrations, and that it could be a 
sign of majoritarian muscle-flexing, did not bother the police establishment at all. As 
long as it was Hindus, and not Muslims, who were showing off their power, the local 
administration remained silent. 
 
     It would not be pushing the point too far to argue that the local state apparatus 
promoted Hindu socio-cultural dominance. Local state agencies had historically toler-
                                                 
158  Darga is a Muslim shrine, mostly belonging to Sufi denominations. Paschim Banga 
Patrika, 5 February 1949, newspaper cutting, K.P.M. No. 3498/08, S.B. File No. 506/49, 
P.M. (1949), SBR, CP.  
159 Report of Assistant Commissioner on the incident near Maulali Darga, dated 13 February 
1949, ibid.  
160 Deputy Commissioner, Special Branch to the Secretary to the Governor of West Bengal, 
Home Department, 27 February 1949. 
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ated large domains of informal social dominance so long as it did not threaten the ve-
neer of ‘public order’.161 Local state functionaries in Calcutta, now overwhelmingly 
Hindu in their social profile, considered Hindu majoritarian dominance quite accepta-
ble, if this cowed the Muslim minority to the point that a superficial ‘peace’ prevailed. 
 
     The trouble was that this veneer of ‘peace’ repeatedly broke down. Hindu domi-
nance did not stop only at symbolic assertions of power. Assaults, stabbings and mur-
ders of Muslims had become so regular, even so unspectacular, that they hardly drew 
public attention. In November 1947, for example, the Special Branch reported how, 
on two different occasions, a Muslim hand-cart puller and a Muslim hawker were 
mercilessly stabbed.162 The police could only guess which gangs could have been in-
volved and failed to bring anyone to book. On another occasion, four young Hindu 
men stopped a Muslim toy bird seller while he was on his way home. One of them 
engaged him over the price of his goods, when another stabbed him in the back.163 
Again, another police report described how two young men brutally stabbed a ‘tea 
distributor’ without any provocation whatsoever.164 It is clear that Hindu criminals 
almost always targeted the most vulnerable sections of the Muslim poor and they exe-
cuted the stabbings and murders with so much unnecessary cruelty that it made these 
acts degradingly unheroic. 
                                                 
161 This argument has been forcefully put forward in Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, ‘Customs of 
Governance: Colonialism and Democracy in Twentieth Century India’, Modern Asian Stud-
ies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2007, pp. 441-470. Also see Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Imperial Power 
and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, c.1850-1950, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
162  ‘Communal Affairs’, undated but sometime in early November 1947, K.P.M. No. 
01488/05, S.B. File No. 506/48, P.M. (1947), SBR, CP. 
163 ‘Confidential Report of incidents on 22.7.48’, 23 July 1948, K.P.M. No. 3497/08, S.B. File 
No. 506/48, P.M. (1948), SBR, CP.  
164 ‘Report of Incident on 28.7.48’, 29 July 1948, ibid. Also, ‘Stabbing Incident’, 30 July 
1948, ibid. 
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Conclusion 
      
     In January 1950, the Union Parliament adopted the Constitution of free India, 
which declared that the new nation was a democratic republic. It guaranteed equal 
rights to all citizens, and inaugurated a regime based on joint electorates and universal 
adult franchise. Only a month later, however, Calcutta plunged into communal may-
hem once more. The precise details of the incidents that triggered this violence remain 
shrouded in allegations and counter-allegations by both Indian and Pakistani govern-
ments. It is usually attributed to ‘police actions’ in East Bengal, one against com-
munist activists in Kalshira village of Khulna district,165 and the other against Santhal 
share-croppers in Rajshahi district.166 Whatever initial causes there may have been, 
given the persistent hate campaign and structural violence unleashed against Calcut-
ta’s Muslim minority, the flare-up did not come as a surprise to anyone.167 The vio-
lence resulted in a mass exodus across the eastern borders of the Radcliffe Line. It al-
so gave a fillip to the processes of ghettoization and subordination of Muslims that 
had been going on ever since partition. Thus, before the leaders of independent India 
promised democracy based upon universal adult franchise and legal equality, a slow 
insidious process of marginalization had already reduced Calcutta’s Muslims to a vul-
nerable minority, whose very status as Indian citizens was rendered questionable. This 
chapter attempted to delineate some aspects of this process which ensured the domi-
                                                 
165 See Badruddin Umar, Purba Banglar Bhasha Andolan O Tatkalin Rajniti, vol. 2, second 
edition, Dhaka: Jatiya Grantha Prakashan, 1996, p. 228; Anjan Kumar Ghosh, ‘Partial Truths: 
Rumour and Communal Violence in South Asia, 1946-92’, PhD Thesis, University of Michi-
gan, 1998, p. 89; Bandyopadhyay, Decolonization in South Asia, pp. 49-50. 
166 See Sukumar Biswas and Hiroshi Sato, ‘Religion and Politics in Bangladesh and West 
Bengal’, Joint Research Programme Series No. 99, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Econom-
ics, 1993, pp. 34-41; Ghosh, ‘Partial Truths’, pp. 89-90; Bandyopadhyay, Decolonization in 
South Asia, p. 50. 
167 See Sree Ashutosh Lahiri: Jibanbyapi Atmatyager Kahini, Calcutta, December 1951, p. 
16, Ashutosh Lahiri Papers, Pamphlets, Serial No. 69, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. 
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nance of India’s (predominantly Hindu) leadership over a docile Muslim minority 
who would not come in their way, and enabled them to observe constitutional niceties 
without jeopardizing their dominance. 
 
     Yet electoral democracy in India did eventually create the space for Muslims to 
negotiate their way into positions of power and influence, often taking advantage of 
the relentless factional squabbles within the Congress. As Joya Chatterji has shown, a 
new kind of ‘Muslim politics’ emerged in Calcutta from the mid-1950s, which,  
despite often being deeply conservative, did not reduce Muslims to a mere ‘vote-
bank’.168 
 
     The story that this chapter has tried to tell is of the systematic subjugation of Mus-
lim minorities in Calcutta, which structured the nature of Muslim life and politics in 
the decades to come. For that reason, the narrative does remain one of majoritarian 
oppression. This, however, does not preclude the possibilities of personal bonds and 
sympathies between individuals of different communities in everyday life, neither 
does it deny the existence of some efforts at more organized forms of resistance to-
wards minority oppression. However, this chapter has elucidated how structural vio-
lence was inaugurated under the auspices of the new regime at the point of its very 
birth, and how the rapid emergence of an administrative machinery of the nation-state 
reduced Muslims to a vulnerable minority. Undoubtedly, this project met with only 
limited success, as India’s post-colonial history testifies. 
                                                 
168 Chatterji, Spoils of Partition, pp. 194-208. 
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Conclusion 
 
     This thesis has attempted to understand the nature of transition from ‘the colonial 
to the post-colonial’ in South Asia through a study of mass politics in Calcutta. It fo-
cuses on five short years, from the end of the Second World War, to 1950, when the 
Parliament of independent India adopted a constitution which declared the new na-
tion-state to be a democratic republic. This constitution affirmed India’s commitment 
to guarantee equal rights to all its citizens irrespective of their status, personal beliefs 
and community affiliations. This thesis has tried to demonstrate how the transitional 
state, itself a product of the process of the transition, intervened to restructure social 
(and political) relations prior to the adoption of these lofty constitutional ideals. 
 
     Decolonization has been described, broadly speaking, in two ways. One charts a 
linear trajectory of progress towards a brighter future – from post-war upheavals un-
der colonial rule towards a regime of equal citizenship under the nation-state. The se-
cond turns the lens back to front: telling a story of progressive deterioration, from the 
impact of war and famine to riots, displacements, and refugee formations. In this se-
cond grand narrative, the inauguration of the nation-state marks an intensification of 
social control and an elaboration of the coercive institutions of government. Both the 
characterizations are caricatures, of course: serious historical scholarship has compli-
cated both narratives in a variety of ways. Yet these grand themes have left their mark 
as referents in all such scholarly exercises. This thesis does not claim to be an excep-
tion, although it has sought to intervene and challenge some of the assumptions that 
have hitherto undergirded the historiography. 
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     To begin with, the thesis expresses discomfort with the way some historians have 
identified two distinct ‘types’ of mass action in this period – ‘cross-communal, anti-
colonial’ and ‘communal’ - holding that these are mutually opposed forms of political 
expression, each with distinctive characteristics. In the first, camaraderie between dif-
ferent communal groups – particularly ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’ – is much in evidence, 
and historians assume that it follows that different communities joined hands in a 
fight to free themselves from the oppressions of colonial rule. In the second type of 
mass politics, Hindus and Muslims are understood to have fought each other. In the 
analysis of this second type of mass action, criticism of the state usually remains con-
fined to the charge of inaction, or of active communal bias on the part of its function-
aries. 
 
     This thesis has challenged this dual categorization. It shows that it is impossible to 
rescue a pure moment of ‘cross-communal, anti-colonial’ solidarity in the last years of 
the Raj – whether during large-scale street demonstrations or in quotidian life. The 
first two chapters deal with spectacular mass agitations in protest against trials of In-
dian National Army (INA) officers. Historians have previously presented these as 
moments of ‘cross-communal, anti-colonial’ solidarity, when Hindus and Muslims 
came together to question the right of the colonial state to hold trials against a ‘na-
tional’ army. The thesis, through a close study of hitherto unexplored archives, has 
shown that such claims are unsustainable. Communal fractures and intra-party in-
trigues played a part in the way the protests unfolded. Again, in the subsequent chap-
ters, the thesis has tried to identify a long-term, slow process of break-down in inter-
community relations. It shows that communal antagonism and hostility remained a 
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facet of everyday life even during the period when historians have assumed united 
anti-colonial action to be the dominant mood music in mass politics. 
 
     In rejecting these binary categories of popular action, the thesis has opened up a 
critique of the received chronologies of popular politics in this era. Scholars have di-
vided post-war mass politics into two time-periods. The initial months after the Se-
cond World War, they assume, were marked by Hindu-Muslim solidarity in street ac-
tion. Both communities are said to have embraced the same causes, and staged spec-
tacular street action against the colonial state. However, in their analysis, the tide 
seems to have suddenly taken a dramatic turn: the sub-continent plunged into a riot-
ous blood-bath as Hindus and Muslims (and Sikhs) began killing each other in com-
munal frenzy. 
 
     This thesis rejects this periodization which does not bear historical scrutiny. It ar-
gues for a slow and steady rise in the virulence of communal tension and violence 
over a longer time-frame. 
 
     Another goal of the thesis was to understand the nature of crisis in the state that 
this transition precipitated. Historians have given it many labels – freedom, independ-
ence, decolonization, and transfer of power being some of those more frequently used. 
This thesis has distanced itself from using the rather tired argument about whether 
‘freedom’ is a better framework than ‘decolonization’. Instead, it focuses tightly on 
understanding the precise processes of change that state institutions underwent, and 
how the state came to be imagined in political action, both spectacular and quotidian. 
Instead of presupposing the nature of this transformation by an a priori choice of one 
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of these labels (which is invariably limiting), this thesis used the technique of thick 
description of the historical material to arrive at some of its conclusions. In so doing, 
this thesis has argued that the transitional state at this historical conjuncture is best 
understood as a profound crisis in the ‘sublime imaginary’ of the state. 
 
     The thesis deploys a conceptual frame-work that draws upon Timothy Mitchell’s 
proposition that modern institutions of state power, in the process of creating disci-
plined governmentalized populations, simultaneously produce a ‘state effect’. This 
makes the dispersed, polymorphous state institutions appear to be a coherent, larger-
than-life, all-powerful, entity in popular perception. However, given that the discipli-
nary project of modern governmentalized institutions and structures of power always 
remains incomplete and susceptible to challenges, the ‘state effect’ it produces must 
also be perpetually vulnerable. In order to understand how, despite such vulnerability, 
the impression of a singular all-powerful state is sustained in the public domain, the 
thesis refers to Thomas Blom Hansen’s concept of the ‘imagined state’. Hansen has 
shown that the state is imagined through a ‘constitutive split’ between its ‘sublime’ 
and ‘profane aspects’. When state actors indulge in corruption or connive in majori-
tarian violence, these acts are relegated in public perception to its ‘profane’ aspects. In 
such a situation, Hansen argues, the ‘sublime’ dimensions of the state, in the form of 
inquiry commissions or judicial institutions, imagined as repositories of a higher rea-
son and impartial justice, are called upon to stabilize the state’s imaginary as the ulti-
mate repository of power. This thesis suggests that the moment of transition from the 
colonial to the post-colonial order can broadly be understood as a crisis in both ‘pro-
fane’ and ‘sublime’ imaginaries of the state. At the same time, it recognizes that any 
reduction of the transitional state’s manifestations into a ‘sublime’/‘profane’ binary 
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necessarily involves an oversimplification that is impossible to sustain on closer his-
torical scrutiny. In this, the thesis stands in agreement with new historical scholarship 
on the everyday state, which emphasizes the complexity, messiness and incoherence 
of the process of transition to post-colonial nationhood. 
 
     The first chapter, which deals with the first Red Fort trial of three INA officers, 
shows how the government’s efforts at staging court martial proceedings under full 
public scrutiny met with catastrophic failure. Rather than hailing the government for 
its commitment to fair judicial procedures, protesters themselves staged spectacles 
through street action. This was repeated in the case of protests against Rashid Ali’s 
‘unfair’ sentence. In the case of communal violence, propagandists publicly pro-
claimed their lack of confidence in government-appointed commissions of inquiry to 
deliver justice to the riot victims. Again, rebellion within Calcutta police, the alleged 
misdeeds of some policemen, and government’s failure to punish the guilty personnel, 
the fourth chapter has shown, fatally damaged the ‘state effect’ in public eyes. The 
last chapter has shown how political leaders at the helm of the new nation-state at-
tempted to reclaim public confidence in state institutions, even by falling back upon 
Mahatma Gandhi’s moral influence. 
 
     In terms of methodology, this thesis has attempted to address some of the issues 
raised by social anthropologists, whose works have been a key influence in the recent 
historiography of the everyday state. A persistent concern for anthropologists of the 
state has been to grapple with the problem of how one may study the conceptions of 
the ‘state’ as a trans-local entity through ethnographies rooted in a locality. This thesis 
has tried to address this issue through a micro-historical approach. One fundamental 
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question that has animated this thesis is how to understand the transitional state, im-
plicated in grand processes of imperial disengagement and constitution-making, by 
focusing on the street politics of a single city. 
 
     Some recent studies of decolonization have argued in favour of a long-term view 
of the processes of disengagement of European empires from their erstwhile colonies. 
Though such studies have yielded important insights, the thesis reiterates the value of 
a micro-historical approach, and the importance of fine-grained local studies of quo-
tidian life and everyday state action located at the moment of formal imperial disen-
gagement. Such a focus can reveal patterns in the process of decolonization that es-
cape more sweeping longue duree studies of the end of empire across time and space. 
 
     The thesis raises several issues that it could not address. One of the most pressing 
of these is the applicability of this model of state crises to other spatial and temporal 
locations. How does the nature of crisis of state power during decolonization in South 
Asia compare with imperial disengagements in other parts of the world? What contri-
bution can such localized studies of regime-change in one part of the world make to 
our understanding of similar processes elsewhere? The second set of questions pertain 
to its applicability across time. Can we locate similar crises of state power during re-
gime change in other historical periods? Is this nature of crises peculiar to European 
imperial disengagements, or can it be generalized to other kinds of moments of end  
of empire at other points of time? This brings us to the vexed issue of the  
relationship between the nature of the particular state crisis delineated in the thesis 
and ‘modernity’? 
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     Thomas Blom Hansen says that the ‘constitutive split’ in the imaginary of the state 
between its ‘sublime’ and ‘profane’ aspects can be traced to ideas in Roman law. Yet 
he is careful to point out that this conception of the state struck root in India via colo-
nialism. Such a conception of state, therefore, was very much a product of ‘colonial 
modernity’. This is affirmed by Timothy’s Mitchell’s formulation of the ‘state effect’; 
it is the effect of modern forms of disciplinary power that conjures up this idea of a 
homogeneous, all-powerful entity identifiable as ‘the state’. It is unlikely, therefore, 
that the particular type of state crises with which this thesis is concerned can be gen-
eralized to create a model for regime changes in pre-modern times. In what ways, 
then, does state crises during similar situations in the pre-modern world differ from 
the patterns this research throws up?  
 
     Perhaps, the most pressing question of all is whether a similar crisis of state power 
is possible in a neo-liberal world order, when governments of nation states do not aim 
to project the state as an all-powerful entity, or as the ultimate repository of sover-
eignty, justice or reason. What happens in contexts when state actors actively try to 
present the state as a mere rational facilitator of global capital flows? What implica-
tion does it have for the nature of state crises when states no longer even pretend to 
act as protectors of its people from injustice and oppression, when they suggest that 
the panacea for all human problems lie in the free movement of and a deeper penetra-
tion of global capital? These are questions that I hope this thesis will encourage future 
historians to ponder. 
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